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THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN SMALL 
U.S. FIRMS 
F. BLAISE RONCAGLI 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays related to the financing and investment 
decisions of small U.S. firms.  Each of the essays presents interesting and original 
empirical research questions, with hypotheses well-grounded in finance and economic 
theories.  The empirical methodology, data and models that are used to test the 
hypotheses are presented for each essay.  The three empirical questions addressed are (1) 
Why don’t small firms take every trade credit discount offered to them? (2) What 
determines the cash holdings of small firms? and (3) Why do small firms make 
investments unrelated to their core business? This dissertation answers these questions by 
analyzing the data available in the National Survey of Small Business Firms (NSSBF) 
conducting in 1998 and 2003. 
Essay 1 investigates the usage of trade credit discounts by small firms and 
examines the determinants of the buyer’s decision to accept or reject discounts that have 
been offered by the seller as part of their trade credit terms.  It draws upon two theories to 
illuminate the firm’s motivation for taking or rejecting trade credit discounts, i.e., the 
Pecking Order Theory of capital structure originated by Myers and Majluf (1984), and 
the theory of manager-shareholder agency conflict first described by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976).  Both theories offer empirically testable and competing hypothesis that 
relate the firm’s decision to accept or reject discounts to the firm’s capital structure, its 
ability to meet financial obligations in a timely manner, and agency costs.  This essay 
contributes to the literature on trade credit discount usage in a number of ways.  First, this 
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is the first study that examines the failure to take trade credit discounts as a possible 
agency cost to the firm to examine the effect of credit card usage by small firms on taking 
trade credit discounts.  This is also the first study to consider the transaction costs of 
taking trade credit as a determinant in the decision to do so.   
Essay 2 examines variations in firms’ cash holdings and will relate them to 
agency costs and management monitoring, substitutes for cash, short and long-term 
financial obligations, management/firm competency in cash management, and other 
control variables.  It builds upon previous work by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) on agency 
costs in small firms, as well as work by Opler, et al. (1999) on the determinants of cash 
holdings. This essay also draws upon the literature on bank monitoring, relationship 
lending and shareholder-creditor agency problems in small firms for determinants of 
agency costs in this sample of small firms. Further, it builds on the work of Faulkender 
(2002) to examine the hypotheses that accumulation of cash is a form of non-value-
maximizing behavior for the small firm owner and may represent an agency cost to the 
firm in the presence of other shareholders. In addition, the consideration of the impact of 
family ownership and the inherited/purchased status of the firm on cash holdings is 
unique to this essay. The results of separate estimations using the data from 1998 and 
2003 surveys have enabled interpretation of some of the observed results in the context of 
the very different macroeconomic environments.  Such comparisons between the results 
of the two estimations provided an additional dimension to the analysis that had not 
previously been undertaken. 
Essay 3 examines why some small firms choose to invest in assets that are not 
necessarily related to or supportive of their core business, such as loans to shareholders, 
mortgages, investments in other firms, and artwork.  Two finance theories that are 
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examined to explain the motivations of small firm owners and managers in the area of 
firm investments are the Agency Theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the Free 
Cash Flow Theory of Jensen (1986).  The “other investments” made by the small firm is 
modeled as a function of agency costs and management monitoring, firm’s free cash 
flows, and diversification potential. The NSSBF surveys used for this study provided a 
unique opportunity to relate the degree of the primary owner’s commitment of wealth to 
the firm, to the firm’s other investments.  This made it possible to investigate a personal 
diversification motive as the reason for the small firm’s investment in non-core 
investments. Further, results from separate estimations using the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF 
surveys lent themselves to interpretation of some of the results from the standpoint of the 
prevailing macroeconomic environments.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Small firms of less than 500 employees constitute the majority of firms in the 
U.S., and are collectively the largest employer in the U.S.  These firms tend to be owned 
by individuals, small groups of investors or families, with other minority equity holders 
represented by angel investors, extended family, friends, and venture capitalists.  Small 
firms are very closely held, with one or a small group of owners owning a controlling 
interest in the firm.  Unlike large, publicly-owned corporations, small firms possess 
certain unique ownership and governance structures.  They also largely differ from 
publicly-owned firms in matters relating to corporate governance, agency problems, and 
information asymmetry which in turn have implications for the financing sources, 
relation to capital providers, heavy reliance on bank financing and the associated lending 
relationships, and so forth.  This dissertation addresses some of these peculiarities 
through the hypotheses and data analyses in three different essays.  For empirical 
examination, the dissertation uses the National Survey of Small Business Finance 
(NSSBF) data from two different surveys, 1998 and 2003. The chapters that follow 
provide a disposition of the theoretical constructs that provide a framework for the 
development of hypotheses, empirical methodology, and inferences from the findings. 
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The NSSBF data and the different variables to be used in the dissertation are also 
included. Finally, the contributions from the dissertation are briefly narrated. 
1.1 Ownership and Structure of Small Firms 
The model of a firm held by a single primary owner who owns 50%  or more of 
the firm, who in most cases is also the manager of the firm, is frequently encountered 
among the population of small firms.   According to the 2003 National Survey of Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF), 18% of the population of 6.3 million small U.S. firms has a 
primary owner who holds exactly 50% ownership in the firm, while 58% have a primary 
owner who holds 100% ownership in the firm.  Ninety percent of small U.S. firms are 
exclusively owned by a single family, and 94% of all small firms are managed by one of 
the owners rather than a hired professional.  The age of small U.S. firms ranges from 1 to 
103 years, with a mean of 14.3 years.  Seventy-nine percent of small U.S. firms were 
founded by their current owners, while 3.7% were inherited and 17.3% were purchased. 
Regarding industry affiliation, 11.5% are in construction, 3.8% are in 
transportation, 5.9% are in wholesale, 18.4% are in retail, 7.1% are in manufacturing, 
45.8% are in services, 0.3% are in mining and 7.2% are in financial services.  Most small 
U.S. firms (79.4%) are located in an urban MSA; only 20.4% are located in a rural area. 
Regarding number of owners, 58% of small U.S. firms have one owner, 31% have 
two owners, 5.5% have three owners, 2.7% have four owners, and the remaining 2.8% of 
the population of small firms have ownership spread between 5 and 3800 owners.  It is 
very common for owners to also work for the firm.  Twenty-seven percent of small firms 
are entirely staffed by owners, while 17% employ owners as 50% of their workforce, 
11% employ owners as 33% of their workforce, and 7% employ owners as 25% of their 
workforce.  Only 1.2% of small firms employ no owners at all in their workforce. 
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Regarding firm organization type, 42.5% are sole Proprietorships, 5.5% are 
partnerships, 31.0% are S-corporations, 14.4% are C-corporations and the remaining 
6.6% of small U.S. firms are structured as limited liability partnerships (LLP) or limited 
liability corporations (LLC).  Only 0.04% of small U.S. firms are publicly traded.  Thirty-
four percent of small firms having a single owner are structured as sole proprietorships, 
while 15% of single owner firms are S-Corporations, and 5.7% of single owner firms are 
C-Corporations.  Even among single owner firms, the benefits of incorporation in 
separating the assets of the entrepreneur from the liabilities of the firm are apparently 
appreciated.  
 Only 3.3% of small firms had declared bankruptcy within the seven years 
preceding the survey date, or had a judgment against them within the three years 
preceding the survey date.  However, 15.7% had been more than sixty days delinquent on 
an obligation one or more times within the three years preceding the survey date. 
Regarding owner characteristics, in 22.3% of small U.S. firms women hold more 
than 50% of the ownership stake, while 9.3% are minority-owned.  The owners’ age 
ranges from 19 to 93 years, with a mean of 51.5 years. The owners’ experience managing 
any business ranges from 0 to 65 years, with a mean of 19.3 years. The highest level of 
education attained by the owner is High School graduate for 19.3%, some college but no 
degree for 16.3%, Associate Degree for 9.2%, Trade School graduate for 6.9%, a college 
degree for 26.3% and a post-graduate degree for 20.4% of owners.   
Only 4.4 % of small firm owners had declared bankruptcy within the seven years 
preceding the survey date, or had a judgment against them within the three years 
preceding the survey date.  However, 12% of those owners had been more than sixty days 
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delinquent on a personal obligation one or more times within the three years preceding 
the survey date. 
1.2 Financing Sources for Small Firms 
Most small U.S. firms are not publicly traded and issue no public debt or equity, 
but rely on financial institutions such as banks and finance companies, trade credit, and 
even friends and family members or other shareholders, for debt financing.  These firms 
also tend to be informationally opaque relative to large public corporations.  A lack of 
participation in public financial markets means that little information is publicly available 
regarding the firm’s history, current condition or future prospects.   
According to the 2003 NSSBF survey, 84.2% of small U.S. firms report using a 
commercial bank as their primary source of financial services, 8.2% report using a 
savings bank, 1.3% report using a savings and loan, 3.7% report using a credit union, 1% 
report using a finance company, 0.8% report using a brokerage or mutual fund company, 
and only 0.2% report that family or another individual is their primary source of financial 
services.  Regarding loans as a source of finance, 13.3% report holding a mortgage, 
25.5% report having a motor vehicle loan, 10.3% report having a loan for equipment, 
30.3% report accepting loans from firm owners, 10.1% report having miscellaneous other 
loans, and 8.7% report using leasing as a source of financing.   
During the three years preceding 2003, 34.2% of small U.S. firms reported 
applying for one or more loans or renewal of a line of credit.  Of those firms that did 
apply, 14.9% reported being turned down on at least one of these applications.  Of those 
who were turned down, 46.2% of rejections were for a new line of credit, 0.7% were for a 
capital lease, 14.8% were for a mortgage for business purposes, 4.9% were for a business 
vehicle loan, 12.7% were for an equipment loan, 13.2% were for an “other” type of loan 
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and 7.4% were for a line of credit renewal.  Approximately 17.9% of small firms stated 
that they did not even bother to apply for a loan during that period because they feared 
they would be turned down, even though they needed credit.  The most common reason 
cited by 21.4% was “poor balance sheet or financial situation”, followed by “credit 
history” cited by 14.2%, “firm not in business long enough (including young 
management)” by 13.4%, “personal credit history” by 9.0%, “large amount of 
outstanding loans, overextended” by 8.2%, “firm too small for institution, too few assets” 
by 6.5%, “insufficient collateral or no guarantee available” by 4.5%,  “experience with 
previous loan applications” by 3.4%, “firm would fail institution’s guidelines” by 2.8% , 
“other” by 2.7%, “firm in decline or risky industry” by 2.6%, “firm too highly leveraged, 
too little equity” by 2.1%, “not ascertainable” by 1.2% and “slow, weak economy” by 
1.1%.   
The fact that 30.3% of small firms that accept loans from firm owners is notable, 
as accepting such loans does not obligate the firm to outside entities or their scrutiny, and 
does not put control of the firm at risk as a loan from a financial institution would.  Of 
those firms that report having loans from shareholders, 71% report having one loan, 
17.4% report having two loans, 5% report having three loans, 2.6% report having four 
loans and 1.2% report having five loans.  The remaining 2.8% of small firms report 
having from 6 to 24 loans from shareholders.  The outstanding principal owed on all of 
the firm’s shareholder loans to the total reported liabilities of the firm, on average, stands 
at 122%   
No sole proprietorships reported having shareholder loans.  All other forms of 
firm organization did report having shareholder loans, though, in the following order: C-
6 
 
Corporations 17.5%, S-Corporations 8.4%, Limited-liability Partnerships and 
Corporations 2.3%, Partnerships 2.1%. 
The average length of the relationship between a small U.S. firm and its primary 
financial institution is 124 months.  The average distance to that primary financial 
institution is 34.4 miles.  The average length of the relationship between the firm and the 
financial institution with which it has had its longest relationship (not necessarily the 
primary one) is 146 months and the average distance to that institution was 7.1 miles.  On 
average, small firms maintained relationships with 2.4 separate financial institutions.  
Small firms tend to benefit from developing long-term relationships with lenders, which 
allows the lender time to gather information about the prospects and character of the firm 
and its owners, thus alleviating the information asymmetry problem between firm and 
lender (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004).   
Small firms also use credit cards as a source of financing, with 46.7% reporting 
that they use the owner’s personal credit card to pay business expenses, and 48.1% 
reporting that they use the firm’s credit card to pay business expenses.  As high as 72.8% 
of firms using the owner’s personal card pay the balance in full each month, and 70.7% 
of firms using the firm’s card pay the balance in full each month.  The average interest 
rate reported for the owner’s credit card is 8.0%, and 6.7% for the firm’s credit card. The 
survey does not indicate whether or not either the owner’s credit card or the firm’s credit 
card has a grace period during which interest is not accrued on new charges.  However, 
the large percentage of firms reporting that they pay the card balance in full each month 
would suggest that they do have a grace period, as carrying a zero balance month-to-
month is a prerequisite in many cases for the grace period to take effect.  The advantage 
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of having a credit card with a grace period is that it could potentially be used as a source 
of very inexpensive or free short-term credit for a firm that paid the card off every month. 
Trade credit is an important source of short-term finance for small firms, with 
60% of firms reporting that they made purchases on credit within the past 12 months.  on 
average, the purchases made on credit was 64.4% of their total purchases.  Discounts for 
early payment were offered on average by about 17.8% of the firm’s trade credit 
suppliers.  Firms took on average 53.5% of the discounts offered, choosing 46.5% of the 
time to use expensive trade credit instead of taking the discount.  Trade credit represents 
on average about 27% of the total liabilities of the typical small U.S. firm, so it is a 
significant source of finance for these firms.  
Equity financing is not a frequently used source of financing for the majority of 
small U.S. firms.  Only 2.8% of sole proprietorships and partnerships reported receiving 
an equity investment from new or existing owners/partners within the past 12 months.  
Fifty-one percent of those firms report using that equity for working capital, 14.6% report 
using it for land and buildings, 11.8% for equipment or machinery, 4.7% for debt relief, 
4.5% for “other”, 4.0% for leasehold improvements, 3.8% report using it for “multiple 
uses”, 2.3% for furniture and fixtures, and 1.9% for motor vehicles. 
Coincidentally, only 2.8% of S-Corporations and C-Corporations reported 
receiving an equity investment from new or existing shareholders within the past 12 
months.  As indicated before, only 0.04% of small U.S. firms are publicly traded, so most 
of that equity investment came from private investors.  For those firms that did receive an 
equity investment, 92.9% received it from individual investors, 0.6% from venture 
capitalists, 0.3% from public sale, and 6.6% from “other”.  Of the firms that received an 
equity investment from individual investors, 81% received it from the original founders, 
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7.4% from angel investors, 1.7% from employees, and 13.9% from “other individuals”.  
In short, most equity investment was “internal equity”, coming from the original founders 
or other individuals who are friends or family of the existing owners.  “External equity” 
from those not close to the firm was a very small portion of the equity investment 
received by small U.S. firms.  Regarding the uses to which small S-Corporations and C-
Corporations applied their equity investment, 71% percent report using the equity for 
working capital, 9.4% for “other”, 6.9% for debt relief, 3.7% for inventory accumulation, 
2.5% for equipment and machinery, 2.5% for “multiple uses”, 1.5% for land and 
buildings, and 1% for motor vehicles.   
For those firms that did receive equity however, the equity was an important 
source of funding for the firm.  For sole proprietorships that issued equity within the past 
12 months, the ratio of the new equity issued to the firm’s total assets, on average, is 
0.56, while for S-Corporations and C-Corporations, the ratio of the new equity issued to 
the firm’s total assets, on average, is 0.46.  The picture that emerges is that few small 
U.S. firms resort to the issuance of equity as a source of finance, but for those that do, it 
is a large and apparently important infusion of finance.  Ou and Hanes (2006) used data 
from the 1993 and 1998 NSSBF surveys to determine the characteristics of small U.S. 
firms that issue internal equity.  They found that younger firms and those in financial 
distress tended to issue internal equity.  In short, firms that would have difficulty 
obtaining finance from more traditional sources relied upon equity infusions from 
existing owners and those close to them. 
1.3 Value Maximization, Agency Costs and Small Firms 
 The theory of agency costs has largely been formulated from the context of large, 
publicly owned firms. Therefore, it is important to describe the nature and implications of 
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agency costs in large firms and then relate them from the perspective of small firms.  This 
study will first summarize the classical finance theory of agency and agency costs, then 
describe potential issues to consider when applying this theory to small firms. 
 Economic theory asserts that the managers of a firm are agents of the owners, 
who accept funds for investment from the owners and who invest those funds in 
production opportunities that maximize the value of the owners’ investment in the firm.  
In the presence of perfect capital markets in which individuals can borrow and lend at the 
same market-determined rate, the personal preferences of the owners for current versus 
future consumption are separated from the firm’s optimal investment decision.  This is 
the principal of Fisher Separation, which describes how investors (owners) can turn their 
funds over to managers of the firm in the knowledge that those funds will be invested in 
the optimal set of production possibilities.  All owners of the firm are unanimous in their 
investment decision, though they may differ in their time preferences for consumption, 
and will borrow or lend at the market rate to satisfy those preferences (Copeland, Weston, 
and Shastry, 2005). 
There are a number of imperfections in the real world that cause deviations from 
pure Fisher Separation, not the least of which is the fact that the rate at which investors 
can borrow is generally higher than the rate at which they can lend.  An important 
imperfection that is of particular interest in Finance is the fact that the managers of a firm 
cannot always be depended upon to pursue the goals of shareholder value maximization 
to which they are entrusted. 
Managers have a large and undiversified commitment of their human capital to 
the firm.  In the absence of an ownership share in the firm that would serve to align their 
interested with those of other owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), such managers may 
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take measures which will protect their personal investment of human capital, such as the 
selection of lower-risk (lower return) projects over higher-risk (higher return) ones, to the 
detriment of their mandate to maximize shareholder value.  Managers also have their own 
personal time preferences for consumption and utility functions, which may motivate 
them to extract non-pecuniary benefits from the firm today in lieu of value-maximizing 
investments for the firm’s future.  Shirking, expenditures on expensive office trappings, 
artwork, unnecessary use of corporate vehicles and aircraft, meals or social events 
expensed to the firm, and other perquisites that benefit the manager at the expense of the 
owners all represent an agency cost to the firm.   
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) applied agency theory to the relationships between 
managers and shareholders, and between shareholders and debt holders.  Shareholder-
manager agency costs arise when the objectives of management and shareholders are not 
perfectly aligned toward the goal of maximizing shareholder value.  It is characterized by 
misuse of company assets for personal or professional gain by managers, to the detriment 
of shareholder value.  Shareholder-manager agency costs decline as the ownership share 
of the manager increases, since the manager bears an increasing cost of her non-value 
maximizing use of the firm’s assets.  According to Jensen and Meckling, in the limiting 
case of a manager who owns 100% of the firm, the owner/manager no longer represents 
the interests of anyone but herself, and no shareholder-manager agency cost would exist. 
Shareholder-debtholder agency costs arise when firms undertake projects that 
increase the risk of the firm beyond what debtholders have anticipated (and have priced 
into their lending agreements) in order to gain higher returns for shareholders.  This 
action effectively transfers wealth from debtholders to shareholders, since the 
shareholders realize the benefit if the projects succeed, while debtholders bear the risk of 
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default if they fail.  One of the solutions proposed by Jensen and Meckling for mitigating 
both the agency costs of equity and debt was monitoring of the firm’s management, in the 
former case by shareholders, and in the latter case by debtholders.  Monitoring does not 
come without a cost however, which shareholders factor into what they will pay for the 
firm’s equity, and which debtholders factor into the price of the firm’s debt.  This type of 
agency cost can arise even when shareholder-manager agency issues do not exist. 
Though the general framework of agency costs are applicable to small firms, there 
are certain differences that are important particularly from the hypotheses and empirical 
analyses developed in this dissertation.  Small firms range from sole proprietorships, 
small partnerships and closely held corporations, to small public corporations whose 
shares are publicly traded on an exchange.  In proprietorships, small partnerships and 
closely held corporations, ownership and control are not separated, and the agency costs 
that arise as ownership and control of the firm’s assets are separated are not yet a problem 
for the firm (Jensen 1998).  Ownership of the firm is restricted to a few individuals, who 
take all of the risk and reap all of the reward.  These individuals may also choose to 
extract non value-maximizing pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the firm.  This 
was recognized by Jensen and Meckling as resulting in a reduction of the value of the 
firm, but they also recognized that it was not inconsistent with efficiency.   
As firms grow they tend to assume an organizational structure that supports the 
increasing needs of the firm for risk sharing, raising capital, and specialization of 
management, such as the open corporation form of firm organization (Jensen 1998).  As 
the gap between the ownership and control of the firm’s assets widens, firms also enter 
into an increasing number of agency relationships between the firm’s managers and 
suppliers, new shareholders, employees and lenders.  Each of these relationships offers 
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the opportunity for increased agency costs for the firm.  Jensen and Meckling 
hypothesized that ownership costs would increase as the ownership share of the firm’s 
manager decreased.  Among small firms where the transition from majority ownership to 
minority ownership can more readily be observed than for large firms, one would expect 
this hypothesized result to be particularly evident.   
For the small firm that is 100% owned by a single investor or closely related 
group of investors with common investment objectives (husband-wife, parent-child, 
small family group), the firm’s assets are under the control of that owner and can be used 
for whatever (legal) purpose that the owner chooses.  The owner may choose to 
maximize her investment in the firm by choosing only projects whose return is greater 
than or equal to the firm’s market-determined cost of capital, she may choose to forego 
some of these projects in exchange for current wages and dividends that effectively trade-
off future consumption for current consumption, or she may even invest in non-pecuniary 
perquisites which increase her personal welfare but do not necessarily contribute to firm 
value.  In any case, she is making decisions about the use of firm assets that are 
consistent with her personal time preference for current versus future consumption, rather 
than with firm value maximization.  Since there are no other owners of the firm, 
shareholder-manager agency is not an issue, although shareholder-debtholder agency may 
be if the owner makes decisions to invest in risky projects that result in a shift of wealth 
from debtholders to shareholders. 
When the owner’s share of the firm is less than 100%, the value reducing 
behaviors of the owner/manager will create an agency cost to the firm.  As Jensen and 
Mecking point out, as the ownership share of the primary owner/manager drop below 
100%, some of the costs of the value-reducing behaviors of the manager are pushed onto 
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the other shareholders, which can provide an incentive for the manager to increase such 
behaviors, which reduces the value of the firm to an even greater extent.   
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) investigated owner-manager agency costs in small 
firms using the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) database 
created from survey data compiled by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.  In their study, 
they developed a model which relates two measures of agency cost to a set of ownership 
variables and a set of external monitoring variables.  Those measures of agency cost were 
(1) Operating Expenses / Annual Sales, and (2) Annual Sales / Total Assets.  Their 
ownership variables included measures of manager ownership, family ownership and 
number of non-manager shareholders. Their monitoring variables included length of 
longest banking relationship, number of banking relationships and the debt-to-asset ratio.  
They focused on a sub-sample of S- and C-Corporations, excluding sole proprietorships 
and partnerships from their sample in order to test their agency cost hypotheses against a 
sample of firms for which agency could possibly be a problem. 
Ang, Cole and Lin found that agency costs are higher when an outsider manages 
the firm than when an owner manages it, and that agency costs vary inversely with the 
principal owner’s ownership share, both of which are consistent with the original theory 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on owner-manager agency costs.   They found that 
agency costs increase with the number of non-manager owners, consistent with decreased 
aggregate monitoring by shareholders as their numbers increase, due to the free-rider 
problem. 
They also determined that external monitoring variables that are commonly 
associated in the banking literature with monitoring of borrowers by lenders were found 
to be significant determinants of owner-manager agency costs in small firms.  These 
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variables are the length of the firm’s longest banking relationship (negative), the number 
of banking relationships (negative) and the debt-to-assets ratio (positive) which tend to 
attract the attention of lenders concerned about the ability of the firm to meet its debt 
obligations.    
Brau (2002) investigated whether banks price owner-manager agency costs into 
the loans they make to small businesses.  Using the 1998 NSSBF database, Brau 
regressed interest rates and collateral requirements against the same ownership structure 
and monitoring variables used by Ang, Cole and Lin, and found that firm ownership 
structure had no effect upon either the interest rate charged or the requirement for 
collateral, for small business loans.  However, he found that the monitoring variables 
significantly affected both interest rates and collateral requirements, consistent with prior 
research in the banking literature on the determinants of loan characteristics.  Brau 
concluded that based on the lack of effect of ownership structure on the terms of bank 
loans, banks do not price owner-manager agency costs into their loans. 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) examined the agency costs of debt in firms 
with some level of founding family ownership, using a selection of large firms from the 
S&P500 during the period 1993 through 1998.  They found that these firms pay up to 32 
basis points less in interest on their debt than firms with no founding family ownership 
present.  The effect was strongest for firms with less than 12% founding family 
ownership.  The authors suggest that founding families have interests that are more in 
alignment with debtholders than other shareholders, such as firm survival and reputation, 
rather than wealth maximization.  Furthermore, founding family owners are likely to be 
undiversified and have much of their investments tied up in the firm, making them more 
risk averse, similar to debtholders.  They also suggest that the longevity of family 
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ownership means that debtholders will continue to deal with the same corporate 
governing structure over an extended period of time, and will develop a relationship with 
that governing structure that will contribute to the reduction of agency costs.  The authors 
also found, however, that having a family member as CEO resulted in a higher cost of 
debt due most likely to debtholder concerns about competence and entrenchment.   
Anderson and Reeb (2003) examined the performance of a sample of firms from 
the S&P500 with some degree of family ownership, over the period 1992 through 1999.  
Using ROA as a measure of performance, they found that family firms are significantly 
better performers than non-family firms, particularly when the founder or an outsider 
serves as CEO, but not when another family member serves as CEO.  They find that 
performance rises as family ownership rises, but starts to decrease above approximately 
30 percent family ownership, which they attribute to entrenchment effects.  Even above 
30 percent, however, family firms continue to outperform non-family firms.  The authors 
interpret these results to mean that for public firms in well-regulated markets, family 
ownership decreases agency problems.  They suggest that family owners are more 
concerned with firm survival than short-term profitability, and this leads them to invest in 
projects that maximize long-term value. 
  Vos et al. (2006) showed in a study of U.S. and U.K. small firms that the 
managers of small firms are not always motivated by the goal of firm value 
maximization.  They find that many small firms are content to enjoy moderate growth 
and fund that growth with internal sources of funding as often as possible, while the 
higher growth small firms are more likely to apply for external debt financing.  Parker 
(2004) cites numerous studies that support the contention that in many cases, the small 
firm is viewed by its owners as a means to independence, increased personal wealth, 
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increased job satisfaction and as an alternative to unemployment in their local 
geographical region.  Walker and Brown (2004) surveyed 290 Australian small business 
owners and found that these owners valued non-financial lifestyle criteria over financial 
criteria in measuring their success.  They found that non-pecuniary goals such as personal 
satisfaction and achievement, pride in the job and a flexible lifestyle were valued over 
wealth creation by the surveyed owners.   
1.4 Information Asymmetry and Financial Constraints in Small Firms 
 As indicated earlier, most small firms are closely held and are not required to 
comply with the public disclosure regulations placed upon publicly-traded firms.  The 
firm’s owners and those close to them may possess good information about the firm’s 
financial condition and prospects, but those outside that privileged circle may not.  This 
condition of information asymmetry between the firm insiders and potential outside 
investors has repercussions on the small firm’s ability to attract capital that have been 
extensively studied. 
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) developed an equilibrium model in which imperfect 
information between borrowers and lenders, and the lenders’ resulting concern about the 
quality of the borrowers and the riskiness of their projects, will naturally lead to an 
equilibrium in which the supply of credit is not necessarily equal to the demand at the 
interest rate that lenders are willing to charge.  Lenders believe that increasing the interest 
rate or collateral requirements charged on their loans will either attract less desirable 
borrowers who are less likely to repay (adverse selection) or will induce borrowers to 
undertake riskier projects with potentially higher returns to compensate for the higher 
cost of the loan (asset substitution).  For this reason, lenders fix the rate and collateral 
requirements at a level that accounts for information asymmetry.  This rate represents a 
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trade-off between the increasing return to the lender, and the increasing costs of adverse 
selection and asset substitution, as the interest rate is increased.   
 Leland and Pyle (1977) recognize that in a financial market in which information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders exists, and where borrowers wish to finance a 
mix of good and bad projects whose quality is known to the borrowers but invisible to the 
lenders, lenders may drive up the cost of funds such that some good projects do not 
receive financing.  They assert that for good projects to be funded, information must be 
transferred between borrower and lender.  One mechanism that they suggest would signal 
to lenders the quality of a firm’s projects is the amount of equity that the firm’s owners 
are willing to invest.  The more equity they invest, the more likely it is that the firm’s 
projects are sound.  The owners incur a welfare cost because they must invest more 
equity than they would if information could be directly transferred between borrower and 
lender, for the same set of projects.  Leland and Pyle derive the result that the firm’s debt 
will be an increasing function of the owners’ equity position whenever the owners’ equity 
position is greater than 18.6 percent of the cost of the firm’s project.   In short, increasing 
the owners’ equity position improves the firm’s ability to raise debt financing for a 
project, even when the project itself is invisible to lenders.  
 Small firms are generally started through an equity investment by the original 
owner(s), and are sustained by periodic infusions of equity or loans from the existing 
owners and others very close to the firm and its owners.  According to Leland and Pyle, 
these infusions of equity can send a signal to outside investors regarding the owners’ 
internal knowledge of the firm’s conditions and prospects.  One would expect that outside 
investors would want to see that the investment was sizable relative to the owner’s total 
wealth.  
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1.5 Pecking Order Theory and Small Firms 
The Pecking Order Theory was originally developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
to describe the effect on the firm’s capital structure of information asymmetry between a 
firm’s managers and investors regarding its future prospects, under the assumptions that 
(1) managers will act to maximize the value of the existing shareholders’ investment 
rather than the new shareholders’ investment, (2) that existing shareholders are passive 
investors who do not adjust their holdings of the firm’s stock in response to changing 
information1, and (3) that firms have access to capital markets that are perfect and 
efficient with respect to publicly available information.  Under these conditions, they 
show that any issuance of new equity by the firm will be interpreted by financial markets 
as a signal from management that the firm’s shares are overvalued.  This will cause the 
firm’s share price to drop, reducing the value of the firm for existing shareholders.  In 
order to avoid this situation, they show that managers who follow a policy of maximizing 
the value of the firm for existing shareholders will choose to finance new investments 
using internal equity first2, followed by risk-free debt, then risky debt, and then external 
equity last, until all available projects with a positive net present value have been funded 
or until funding can no longer be obtained.  As pointed out by Tirole (2006), the Myers 
and Majluf ranking of financing sources is in increasing order of “information intensity”, 
from those that are least sensitive to information asymmetry between the firm and 
investor to those that are most sensitive to information asymmetry between the firm and 
                                                 
1 Myers and Majluf feel that these first two assumptions best support the available empirical evidence 
regarding the effect of equity and debt issuance on a firm’s share price in public markets 
2 Internal equity in this context refers to retained earnings, cash infusions from the entrepreneur(s), or 
additional shares sold to current owners or those very close to the firm. 
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investor.  It is the idea that information asymmetry leads to a ranking of financing sources 
that is the central concept of the Pecking Order Theory. 
 The fact that small firms are very information-opaque would suggest that the 
Pecking Order Theory might be especially relevant to explaining their capital structure.  
In examining how this theory might be applied to small firms, a number of important 
characteristics of small firms must be considered.  The assumption that small firms have 
access to perfect and efficient capital markets in general does not hold.  Small firms issue 
very little external equity, and generally do not issue debt through public markets, but 
tend to rely on financial institutions and the firm’s shareholders or other individuals for 
debt and equity financing when internally-generated funds are inadequate.  When 
applying the Pecking Order Theory to small firms, therefore, one must consider how 
information asymmetry between the small firm and each of its funds providers impacts 
the cost of that finance and thus its position in a small firm financing pecking order. 
The assumption that management acts to maximize the value of the existing 
shareholders investment in the firm is one that bears closer analysis for small firms.  This 
assumption was essential to the Myers and Majluf theory in order to align it with 
empirical observations of the effect of equity and debt issuance announcements on the 
price of a firm’s external equity and debt.  However, the owner/managers of small 
closely-held firms may have their own total welfare in mind rather than firm value 
maximization, as has been indicated earlier.  Maximizing their investment in the firm 
may not be as important as other personal goals toward which the firm is used a means to 
an end.  As a result, the owner/managers of the small firm may choose to implement 
negative NPV projects, or may choose to implement a set of non-optimal (non-
maximizing) positive NPV projects.  Based on their personal preference for risk, they 
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may choose projects that are higher risk (return) than lenders would prefer but are 
favorable to equity investors, or they may choose “safe” projects that promote slow 
growth and firm longevity and which are more in alignment with the interests of lenders.  
It is this information asymmetry with regards to both the intentions and the project 
opportunities of the small firm that must be overcome by outside investors.  The relative 
difficulty experienced by an investor in overcoming this information asymmetry will 
determine the position of that investor’s financing in the Pecking Order hierarchy. 
A survey of the small firm financing literature indicates that in the absence of 
public markets to provide information about the small firm, investors must rely on two 
mechanisms to overcome the information asymmetry problem: reputation and 
relationship.  Reputation refers to those aspects of the history of a small firm that matter 
to investors, such as firm performance, payment history as reflected in the firm’s credit 
rating, past debt repayment history and trade credit history, and the human capital 
embodied in the firm’s management, such as experience, education and age.  For small 
firms that are too young to have established their own reputation, the reputation of the 
firm’s owner(s) and their willingness to commit their personal wealth to the firm and to 
secure the firm’s debt with personal collateral and guarantees may be substituted for the 
firm’s reputation. 
Relationship refers to the knowledge about the firm and its owners obtained by 
executing multiple business transactions with them over time; knowledge that reduces the 
information asymmetry problem and may facilitate investment in the firm.  A rich body 
of literature exists showing how an ongoing relationship between a small firm and a 
financial institution may facilitate lending under more favorable terms than would exist 
without that relationship.  Since small firms rely heavily on debt financing from banks 
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and other financial institutions, reducing the information asymmetry between the firm 
and a lending institution by establishing and maintaining a long-term relationship can be 
essential to obtaining the debt financing required by the small firm.  Relationship can also 
refer to the relationship between the small firm and its suppliers, who extend trade credit 
to the firm to facilitate purchasing of goods or services from the supplier.  Not only is 
trade credit an important form of finance for the small firm, but a successful buyer-seller 
relationship can provide a signal to financial institutions regarding the reliability of the 
small firm in paying its debts, which in turn can facilitate lending by those institutions. 
What then is the Pecking Order of financing choices for small firms?  As 
predicted by Myers and Majluf, retained earnings (“slack”) will be first in the pecking 
order since information asymmetry is not an issue when the firm is using its own funds.  
Next in the pecking order will be other sources of finance provided by the existing 
owners, such as internal equity and loans from shareholders.  Information asymmetry is 
not an issue when the firm’s owners choose to invest additional funds in the firm in 
support of project opportunities of which they have full knowledge.  Issuance of internal 
equity is one way for small firms to receive additional funding, but it is not without 
problems.  Without capital markets to price the equity, firms must rely on financial 
statement data, prices of previous equity issuances or simply what participants agree to 
pay in order to determine a share price.   
Furthermore, unless participants believe that the firm’s prospects are so good that 
there will be future buyers for their shares at a price consistent with the future value of 
alternative investments of comparable risk, they may choose to diversify and take their 
money elsewhere rather than purchase more shares in the firm.  Owners who are already 
heavily invested in the firm and thus poorly diversified may be unwilling to invest yet 
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more of their personal wealth into the firm.  Dilution of ownership share will be an issue 
for any owner of an S-Corporation or C-Corporation that does not participate in an 
internal equity issue in an amount proportional to her existing ownership share. 
Regarding debt, the Pecking Order Theory indicates that firms will issue risk-free 
debt, followed by risky debt in order of increasing risk (cost), where “risk” refers to 
default risk.   How does a firm issue “risk-free” debt?   Tirole (2006) indicates that senior 
debt fully collateralized by the salvage value of the firm’s assets and hence immune to 
announcements of good or bad fortune by the firm, would be considered risk-free by the 
investor.  For large firms that are publicly traded and that issue debt in public markets, 
the default risk of debt is reflected in ratings applied to each debt issuance by firms that 
specialize in this service.   
For a small firm however, the risk of default is more difficult to assess due to the 
scarcity of publicly available information.  Banks and other financial institutions, which 
are the traditional lenders to small business, rely upon financial statements, firm and 
owner credit ratings, credit scoring models and information gleaned from an extended 
relationship with a firm to assess the risk of lending to a small firm.  To reduce the 
lender’s exposure to default, lenders often require that the firm or owner(s) pledge assets 
as collateral, or that the owner(s) provide personal guarantees that the debt will be repaid 
out of personal assets in case of firm default.  Small firm owners that borrow from 
traditional sources soon find that the risk of loss of their personal wealth is tied to the 
default risk of the firm’s debt.  Rational owners will limit their exposure to this risk by 
limiting their borrowing from traditional sources, based on their personal preferences for 
risk.  Also, since an asset can only be pledged as collateral for one loan, the value of the 
23 
 
small firm’s real assets (or those of its owners) may place a constraint on the total value 
and type of loans received. 
Small firms do have an alternative borrowing source to the traditional financial 
institutions.  As was shown earlier, loans from shareholders are a significant source of 
financing for small firms.  Such loans do not require that the firm’s owners pledge 
personal collateral or guarantees, since the loans are coming from the firm’s owners 
themselves.  Unlike an external financial institution, the firm’s owners are not likely to 
force the firm into bankruptcy if the firm defaults on debt payments, but will likely show 
forbearance until such time as the firm is in a position to repay the debt.  Also, such loans 
do not insert an external financial institution ahead of the owners in claims upon the 
firm’s assets in case of bankruptcy.  Loans from shareholders can provide the same tax 
advantages to the small firm as loans from traditional financial institutions.  These loans 
also do not change the relative ownership structure by changing the distribution of equity 
across the owners.  Since the loans are provided by the owners themselves, pricing issues 
due to information asymmetry are unlikely to be an issue. 
Given these advantages, why don’t small firms avoid loans from traditional 
sources altogether, and just borrow funds from their shareholders?  Shareholders, unless 
exceptionally wealthy, may not be able to provide enough debt financing to meet the 
needs of a growing firm.  Even if they are able, they may be unwilling to take such an 
undiversified stake in the firm, acting as both debt and equity investor in the firm.  
Finally, the idea of using loans from shareholders instead of loans from outside investors 
defeats one of the key benefits of leverage, namely that using debt from outside investors 
increases the returns to equity for the firm’s shareholders.  
24 
 
Another source of finance available to small firms is supplier financing, more 
commonly known as trade credit.  Trade credit is basically a form of lending from a 
supplier to a buyer in which the buyer may purchase goods or services from the seller and 
take delivery of them, then provide payment at a later time, according to terms 
established between buyer and seller.  Typical trade credit terms specify payment within 
30 days, and although that may vary by seller and industry, the point is that trade credit is 
a form of short-term financing.  Trade credit during the credit term is free to the buyer, 
unless the seller offers a discount for early payment, in which case it can become quite 
expensive as will be shown in the first essay of this paper.  Extending payment beyond 
the credit term may subject the buyer to late payment penalties, denial of future trade 
credit, and if consistently practiced, can result in a reduction of the firm’s credit rating. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that suppliers tend to show a considerable 
degree of forbearance in the collection of their accounts receivable from customers, 
tolerating late payments and even allowing some customers to take trade credit discounts 
beyond the end of the discount period.  Preservation of the ongoing buyer-seller 
relationship in anticipation of future business may be a powerful motive for this observed 
behavior.  The apparently lower costs of financial distress for trade credit over other 
forms of external financing may reduce the real cost of this form of credit to small firms 
relative to those other source, even in the presence of trade credit discounts.  
Huyghebaert, Van de Gucht and Van Hulle (2007) examine the use of bank loans in the 
debt mix of Belgian start-up firms, and obtain empirical results that suggest that firms 
evaluate not only the cost of debt, but the differences in liquidation policy on default, and 
so tend to use less bank loans relative to trade credit in their debt mix as a result. 
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Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) present results that support the hypothesis that 
buyers and sellers use trade credit terms to resolve the two-way information asymmetry 
that exists between them.  Buyers lack information about the quality of seller’s goods or 
services and desire time to assess the quality before making payment.  Sellers do not 
know the creditworthiness of buyers, and would like to limit their exposure in case the 
buyer does not pay.  Buyer or seller reputation can mitigate this information asymmetry 
to some extent.  However, small firms, particularly younger ones, may not have an 
established reputation.  For small firms, trade credit is an important means of resolving 
information asymmetry and as was shown earlier, is a major source of financing. 
So where then does trade credit fall in the small firm Pecking Order hierarchy?  
Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Nilsen (2002) show that firms that are credit constrained 
tend to turn to trade credit financing, which is available when other forms of external 
financing are not.  Biais and Gollier (1997) derive an equilibrium model in which firms 
use trade credit to convey a signal to lenders that they are reliable, which in turn 
facilitates access to external financing.  Their model suggests that the reason that firms 
use trade credit, which can be more expensive than bank financing, is to provide a signal 
that resolves the information asymmetry between the firm and potential lenders, and 
facilitates access to less expensive forms of credit offered by financial institutions.  In 
their model, Biais and Gollier establish a causal link between trade credit and bank 
financing.  All of this suggests that trade credit precedes bank financing in the small firm 
Pecking Order hierarchy, even though trade credit may in fact be nominally more 
expensive than bank financing.  
With all of these caveats about small firms in mind, what then would be the 
Pecking Order of financing for small firms?  Using increasing information intensity as 
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the sorting criteria, the order would be retained earnings, internal equity issues and 
shareholder loans, followed by supplier financing (i.e. trade credit), then financing from 
traditional lenders (i.e. leases, bank loans and lines of credit), and last of all, external 
equity.   
1.6 The Three Essays 
This dissertation comprises three essays that will address three major empirical 
questions related to the financing and capital structure of small U.S. firms.   The 
empirical questions are: 
1. Why don’t small firms take every trade credit discount offered to them? 
2. What determines the cash holdings of small firms? 
3. Why do small firms make investments unrelated to their core business? 
These three empirical questions are stated and discussed in the following three separate 
chapters of the dissertation.  For each question, the appropriate theoretical and empirical 
background, testable hypotheses, data, methodology, results and analysis are described. 
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CHAPTER II 
ESSAY 1: WHY DON’T SMALL FIRMS TAKE EVERY TRADE CREDIT 
DISCOUNT OFFERED TO THEM? 
It is worthwhile to open this question by reviewing the basics of trade credit and 
how it is offered by suppliers to buyers.  Trade credit is the provision of short-term 
financing by a seller to a buyer in order to facilitate trade between the two parties.  The 
seller delivers goods or services to the buyer, and grants deferred payment privileges to 
the buyer for those goods or services under terms specified by the seller.  Typical trade 
credit terms can be structured as one-part or two-part terms.  One-part terms simply 
specify a date by which full payment of the invoice amount is due.  For example, “Net 
30” terms would indicate that the full amount of the invoice is due no later than 30 days 
from the date of the invoice, or from some other date established as part of the terms.   
 Two-part terms are used when trade discounts are offered.  These terms specify a 
discount amount, a period during which the discount may be taken, and a final date by 
which payment in full must be received if the discount is not taken.  For example, “2/10 
Net 30” terms specify that if the buyer pays within 10 days, they can take a 2% discount 
from the invoice amount, otherwise payment in full is expected within 30 days.  The first 
10 days of credit are essentially “free”, but the additional 20 days can only be bought at 
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the cost of refusing the 2% discount.  It is a standard exercise in introductory Finance 
textbooks to show that borrowing the full invoice amount for an additional 20 days can 
cost the buyer 37% on an average annual basis.3  This makes trade credit a very 
expensive form of credit if discounts are not taken.  In fact, an APR of 37% for typical 
“2/10 Net 30” terms makes trade credit more expensive than bank loans, credit cards and 
most other legal forms of financing.   
 It is important to note that this problem does not arise in one-part trade credit 
terms.  In such terms, the entire credit period essentially represents “free” credit.  The 
buyer gets to borrow their own money, equal to the full amount of the invoice, for the full 
credit period.  It is only when discounts are offered that an opportunity cost arises 
associated with refusing the discount.  This creates a powerful incentive for sellers to 
offer trade discounts in order to encourage firms to pay within the credit period, and thus 
reduce their own collection costs (Ferris, 1981). 
2.1 Theory and Testable Hypotheses  
Why then would a rational firm that was offered terms such as “2/10 Net 30” 
choose to decline the offer of a 2% discount and 10 days of free credit, and choose 
instead to pay a 37% annualized rate of interest for an additional 20 days of credit?  
There are three possible explanations: (1) they cannot take the discount due to inadequate 
financing,  (2) they will not take the discount due to an intention to use accounts payable 
to fund other management initiatives, or (3) they do not understand the cost of forgoing 
discounts and using expensive trade credit.   A firm that maintains a consistent policy of 
refusing trade discounts and paying invoices at the end of the full trade credit period can 
accumulate 30 days or more of working capital.  If these funds are not invested in 
                                                 
3 See Brigham & Besley, Chapter 15 
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inventory, they can be held in cash or marketable securities to be used at the discretion of 
management.  Furthermore, if these funds are not eventually invested in projects whose 
internal rate of return exceeds their 37% annual cost, the firm’s management is not 
engaging in value maximizing behavior.   
This suggests that failure to take trade discounts may in some cases represent an 
agency cost to the firm.  If this is the case, then empirically one would expect to find that 
variables that traditionally proxy for agency costs, such as ownership share of the firm’s 
manager or variables that proxy for monitoring of management by shareholders and 
debtholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976), would be significant determinants of trade 
credit discount usage.  This leads to the first testable hypothesis: 
H1: Trade Credit discount usage is negatively related to agency conflict in 
the firm. 
 Firms that cannot take the discount are those firms with inadequate internally 
generated cash flows or cash reserves to make early payments, and whose access to less 
expensive forms of debt financing is limited.  Such firms may find it impossible to obtain 
bank loans, lines of credit, or credit cards, or may have access to such sources of credit 
but are carrying such a high burden of debt that payments on that debt constrain their 
ability to make early payments to suppliers.  These firms find it necessary to allow their 
accounts payable to grow, and pay the oldest payables first as accounts receivable are 
collected.  They essentially exist by “hand to mouth”. 
 Empirically for small firms, one would expect to find that variables that proxy for 
firm liquidity and the availability of other less expensive sources of finance would be 
significant positive determinants of trade credit discount usage.  The term “less 
expensive” here is defined as the Pecking Order theory would indicate, described in 
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section 1.5 of this dissertation.  Variables that proxy for firm distress and financial 
constraints in raising capital would also be significant negative determinants of trade 
credit discount usage, as firms that could not find other forms of financing would 
certainly be forced to fall back on taking full advantage of trade credit and eschewing 
discounts.  This leads to the second testable hypothesis: 
H2: Trade Credit discount usage is positively related to firm liquidity and 
to availability of less expensive forms of finance. 
 There is another possibility that must be explored related to management and firm 
competence, where “competence” is defined for the purposes of this study as a 
combination of business experience and education.  It is generally assumed that large 
firms will have among their management staff individuals that are educated and 
experienced in the field of corporate finance, and who will be able to determine the costs 
and trade-offs associated with taking or deferring trade credit discounts.  These 
individuals are often supported by complex accounting software systems that can help 
manage the firm’s cash, payables and receivables according to policies established by 
management, carefully timing payments and purchases to meet corporate liquidity 
targets. 
 Small firms on the other hand may be owned or managed by a young high school 
graduate or someone with specialized education and experience in the firm’s field of 
business, but having little or no formal finance education.  The high cost of consistently 
deferring trade credit discounts may not be familiar to them, and their bookkeepers, 
accountants or other financial advisors may not effectively convey that cost to them.  
Such owners or managers may ignore trade credit discounts out of ignorance, deciding 
31 
 
that the discounts are a small payment to make for the extra weeks of credit, failing to 
take into account the cumulative cost of following this policy over time.   
Does management “competence” have a measurable effect on firm performance?  
Bates (1990) uses a sample of 4,429 U.S. firms owned by non-minority entrepreneurs to 
model firm survival as a function of human and financial capital inputs.  He finds that 
entrepreneur education is a positive determinant of firm longevity, with owners having 
four or more years of college showing the strongest positive effect on firm longevity.   
Bosma et al. (2004) used data from a 1994 survey of 2000 Dutch entrepreneurs to 
determine if there exists a relationship between the Human and Social characteristics of 
the entrepreneur and three measures of the performance of the entrepreneur’s firm: 
survival probability, profitability and employment created.  They find that the 
entrepreneur’s business experience and industry experience are positive determinants of 
firm survival.  They find that business experience and industry experience along with the 
entrepreneur’s education level are positive determinants of the profitability of the firm.  
They find that industry experience and the entrepreneur’s previous experience as an 
employee are positive determinants of employment creation.  In summary, they find that 
entrepreneur experience and education are positive determinants of some important 
dimensions of firm performance. 
 Coleman (2007) used data from the 1998 National Survey of Small Business 
Finance (also used in this study) to show that the education and experience level of the 
owner has a positive effect on the profitability of small women-owned firms in the 
service and retail industries.  She also found that prior business experience was a positive 
determinant of profitability in male-owned firms. 
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 Given that management “competence”, defined as the entrepreneur’s education 
and/or previous business experience, has been shown to be a positive determinant of firm 
profitability, how does that relate to the use of trade credit discounts?  Basic accounting 
principles would indicate that firms that consistently take trade credit discounts offered 
will pay less for supplies and raw materials, thus reducing their operating expenses and 
cost of goods sold.  This will have a direct positive effect on their operating profits.  
Small firms having managers who are aware (through education or experience) of the 
benefits of a policy of taking trade credit discounts offered and who make the decision to 
take them may improve the profitability of the firm.  Thus the empirically observed 
relationship between management competence and firm profitability could be driven at 
least in part by a relationship between management competence and the trade credit 
discount usage decision.  This leads to the third testable hypothesis: 
H3: Trade Credit discount usage is positively related to management 
competence as measured by education and experience. 
 Partially offsetting the cost of not taking trade credit discounts that are offered is 
the cost to the small firm of setting up and administering the process of paying vendors 
that offer discounts on a different schedule than those who do not.  Unlike large firms 
that have highly automated accounting systems and accounts payable specialists to 
manage payments, small firms are likely to have more simplified, sometimes manual 
accounting systems and may use the firm’s owner, owner’s family or a hired bookkeeper 
to manage accounts payable.  Under these circumstances, firms that are not offered 
significant trade credit discounts that can offset the perceived cost of administering them 
may choose to forego discounts.  Similarly, small firms that use manual rather than 
automated accounting systems may also determine that the cost of managing trade credit 
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discounts exceeds the benefit of taking them.  These factors should be taken into account 
when examining the determinants of trade credit discount usage in small firms.   
 Ferris (1981) develops a theory of trade credit usage that is based on transaction 
costs.  In his model, both supplier and buyer use trade credit to smooth otherwise 
stochastic flows of payments between them, reducing their need for precautionary money 
holdings and the opportunity cost associated with holding those funds.  Thus, trade credit 
reduces the cost of the transaction for both buyer and seller relative to what would occur 
if no trade credit were used.  Buyers and sellers are motivated to enter into trade credit 
agreements for the joint reduction in transaction costs they can both enjoy from that 
relationship. 
In Ferris’ model, discounts for early payment provide a mechanism for the seller 
to reallocate some transaction costs back to the buyer.  Those reallocated costs are those 
associated with the effort required on the seller’s part to collect payments from the buyer, 
as well as other costs related to the extension of financing from seller to buyer for the 
longer time period.   Discounts should induce buyers to pay earlier, reducing the seller’s 
average level of Accounts Receivable and the costs associated with working capital 
financing.  The buyer should be motivated to use the discounts offered in order to resist 
this cost transfer.  Ferris suggests that the benefits to the buyer of refusing discounts and 
using the longer and costlier trade credit period would have to be substantial in order for 
the buyer to take this course.   
If the buyer’s internal transaction costs associated with processing early discount 
payments for some suppliers while paying others on a different schedule are sufficiently 
high, then the buyer may decide that refusing the discounts and using costly trade credit 
is a more attractive alternative.  For small firms with limited administrative resources and 
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simple or even manual accounting systems, this may be the case.  In Ferris’ model, if the 
buyer’s internal transaction costs associated with processing discounts exceed the 
transaction costs transferred from buyer to seller through the discount mechanism, then 
the buyer would obtain more value from eschewing the discounts entirely.  If the firm’s 
internal transaction costs can be reduced below the level of the transferred transaction 
costs, then taking discounts becomes an attractive option.  This leads to the fourth 
testable hypothesis: 
H4: Trade Credit discount usage is negatively related to the firm’s 
transaction costs of taking discounts. 
2.2 Review of Empirical Studies 
There are numerous empirical studies in the trade credit literature that examine 
the determinants of trade credit usage from either the buyer side, the supplier side, or 
both.  Most papers use some variant of accounts payable or accounts receivable for their 
independent variable in a linear regression model, and examine the determinants of that 
variable.  If discounts are used at all in these models, they are used as a regressor variable 
to reflect the cost of trade credit.  Few studies specifically model the trade credit discount 
decision, perhaps because few finance databases offer data that specifically reports the 
results of that decision by firm management. It generally must be inferred from other 
variables. 
Perhaps the most often referenced empirical paper in the trade credit literature is 
Peterson and Rajan (1997).  They empirically model the determinants of trade credit 
usage from both the supplier and the buyer side, using a sample of small firms from the 
1987 NSSBF database, and a sample of large firms from the COMPUSTAT database.  
They find that profitable firms use less trade credit, as do firms with large unused lines of 
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credit.  Also, firms that have longer relationships with their bank use less trade credit.  
Regarding discounts, their results indicate that the decision to take discounts and avoid 
expensive trade credit is driven by the availability of less expensive credit to the firm.  
They indicate that their results are consistent with the Pecking Order theory. 
Three papers that are notable for their focus on the trade credit discount decision 
are Danielson and Scott (2000), Bopaiah (1998), and Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti 
(2011). 
 Danielson and Scott (2000) investigate the use of trade credit discounts by firms 
facing credit rationing, using data taken from the 1995 National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) Credit, Banks and Small Business Survey.  This survey 
asks the question “How often do you take advantage of trade credit discounts offered?” 
and allows the respondent to reply with one of four answers: “Always”, “Usually”, 
“Rarely” or “Never”.  Converting this to a binary variable with values ALWAYS or 
NEVER, the authors find that firms that have been turned down on a recent loan request, 
have a shorter relationship with their banker, have a fixed term loan outstanding, or have 
had more bank account manager turnover are less likely to take all discounts offered than 
other firms.  Firms that consider retained earnings to be an important source of funds tend 
to take more trade discounts.  In short, firms that have access to internal funding take 
more discounts, but firms that have difficulty obtaining external credit or that must 
service existing debt take less discounts. 
 Bopaiah (1998) examined the availability of credit to family businesses using data 
from the 1987 NSSBF survey.  The NSSBF surveys ask the question “What percentage 
of trade credit discounts offered do you take?”, and prompts the user to reply with a 
numeric percentage between 0% and 100%.  Using OLS regression, he regressed the 
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percentage of discounts offered that were taken by the firm (same dependent variable as 
used in this study) against variables that represent management characteristics ( but not 
“competence” related variables), financial performance and risk, banking relationships 
and general firm characteristics.  He finds that family owned firms, more profitable firms, 
firms with more liquidity, firms with longer relationships with their bank, older firms and 
larger firms take more discounts than others.  Firms with higher debt ratios, firms that 
have relationships with a large number of banks, firms that are corporations and firms 
that were required to post collateral for their last loan take less discounts than other firms.  
These results are consistent with the results of Danielson and Scott. 
 Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2011) used the same NSSBF survey data and 
dependent variable as the Bopaiah study, but modeled the trade credit decision against a 
(mostly) different set of variables.  Using OLS regression, they find a significant and 
positive relationship between the size of discount offered by the main supplier and the 
percentage of discounts used.  They find a significant negative relationship between 
variables that proxy for firm distress, and percentage of discounts used.  They also find a 
negative relationship between profitability and percentage of discounts used.  Although 
they do not offer a direct explanation for this observation, it would be consistent with 
their other observation that more profitable firms are offered less trade credit and are less 
likely to use it.  A negative relationship between log assets and discounts used is not 
explained, but could be explained by their other observation that larger firms are offered 
bigger discounts but for a shorter period.  Finally, they observe a significant positive 
relationship between length of bank relationship (a proxy for better access to bank credit) 
and discounts used, consistent with both Bopaiah and Danielson and Scott.   
37 
 
 Existing empirical evidence is thus consistent with the idea that firms that have 
difficulty obtaining credit take less trade credit discounts, while firms that have access to 
credit or have internal funds available take more trade credit discounts. No empirical 
studies have been identified that address the relationship between agency costs and trade 
credit discounts,  manager and firm competence and trade credit discounts, or transaction 
costs and trade credit discounts. 
2.3 Model, Variables and Data  
The model chosen to test the hypotheses is shown below.  This model defines the 
percentage of trade credit discounts offered that are actually taken by a firm as a function 
of variables that proxy for agency costs and monitoring, variables that proxy for sources 
of financing that affect the firm’s capital structure, variables reflecting financial distress 
(lack of availability of capital), variables that proxy for management competence, 
variables that proxy for transaction costs associated with trade credit discounts, and firm 
characteristic control variables.  Including all of the variables explicitly, the model can be 
written as: 
PCTDISCOUNTSi = β0i + β1iFEMOWNi + β2iMINOWN i + β3iOWNEXP i + 
β4iOWNEDU i + β5iPCACCTNG i + β6iMAINSUPL i + β7iOWNSHR i + 
β8iOWNMGR i +  
β9iUSEDCARD i  + β10iLnUNUSEDLOC i + β11iLnQUICKRATIO i + 
β12iLnPROFTOINCOME i + β13iDBSCORE i + β14iPAIDLATE i + 
β15iFIRMDISTRESS i + β16iLnDEBTRATIO i + β17iLnINVRATIO i + εi 
 
 The specific variables chosen in each category are summarized in table 2.1, along 
with their hypothesized relationship (+ or -) to PCTDISCOUNTS.   There is also a 
column in the table that indicates which of the four hypotheses (H1 through H4) is being 
tested by the inclusion of that variable in the model.  In the model, PCTDISCOUNTSi is 
the percentage of the offered discounts that were taken during accounting period “i”.  The 
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accounting period represented by “i” is either fiscal year 1998 or fiscal year 2003, 
depending upon the NSSBF survey used.  Balance sheet and income statement quantities 
for the period “i” were for the full fiscal year. 
The data sources to be used to estimate the model and test the hypotheses are the 
1998 and 2003 National Surveys of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) databases.  Since 
these databases are used for all three surveys in this dissertation, their description has 
been relegated to Chapter V of this document.  The unique design aspects of these survey 
databases that influence the choice of model estimation methodology are described in that 
chapter. 
The mapping between these model variables and the raw variables in the 1998 
and 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) survey databases is 
described in Section 5.3 of this document.   In some cases, the model variables are 
directly mapped to variables in the survey database.  In other cases the model variables 
are calculated as a combination of survey variables, or are dummy variables derived from 
variables in the survey database.  Due to the similarities between the 1998 and 2003 
surveys, the variables in table 2.1 have the same meaning when estimating the model 
using the 1998 database as when using the 2003 database.  
 2.3.1 The relationship between discounts, profitability and liquidity.  Two 
previous studies that used some version of the NSSBF database (Bopaiah, and Burkart et 
al.) included firm profitability as a regressor when modeling trade credit discount usage.  
Bopaiah used both profitability and liquidity in his model of trade credit discount usage.  
Their reasoning was that more profitable firms and firms with more liquid assets (i.e. 
cash and equivalents) would be in a position to take more trade credit discounts.  Both 
profitability and liquidity have been included in the model to test hypothesis H2.   
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However, one concern that must be considered is the possibility that both profitability 
and liquidity are endogenous to the model.  That is, they are both determinants of, and 
determined by, trade credit discount usage.  This possibility was not addressed by any of 
the previous papers on this topic. 
First will be addressed the potential endogeneity of profitability in the model.  
Profitability may provide a firm with the cash flow required to support making purchases 
on discount.  Less profitable firms may not have adequate cash flow to take discounts as 
they are made available, and may have to defer payment through use of trade credit until 
sales can be made or receivables converted to cash.  This is the basis of the argument for 
including profitability as a regressor in the model to test hypothesis H2. 
On the other hand, use of trade credit discounts reduces the firm’s total expenses, 
increasing the firm’s operating profits on a dollar-for-dollar basis.  (In the 1998 and 2003 
NSSBF, the variable PROFIT is the difference between total income and expenses from 
the fiscal year income statement as reported by the survey respondent firms.)  This would 
suggest that profitability is determined at least in part by trade credit discount usage.  
However, upon further scrutiny, this relationship is actually very small.  As reported in 
Section 1.2 using the 2003 NSSBF survey data, only 17.8% of the firm’s suppliers on 
average offer discounts, and only 53.5% of those discounts on average are taken by the 
firm.  Considering that a typical discount for early payment is around 2%, the total 
reduction in firm expenses (increase in profits) due to trade credit discounts is on average 
much less than 1%.  Regressing LnPROFTOINCOME on PCTDISCOUNTS using the 
1998 NSSBF data shows a very weak positive relationship (β=0.0003, t=1.98, 
P>|t|=0.048, F=3.92, Prob>F=0.048, R-squared=0.0056).    
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Performing the same regression using the 2003 NSSBF data shows no significant 
relationship.  This result suggests that the endogeneity of profitability in the model is not 
an issue.  The variable LnPROFTOINCOME therefore will not be instrumented in the 
model estimation. 
Second, the endogeneity of liquidity in the model will be addressed.  Liquidity on 
the balance sheet indicates that the firm maintains adequate supplies of cash and near-
cash assets that will be available when the opportunity arises to take a trade credit 
discount. This is the basis of the argument for including liquidity as a regressor in the 
model to test hypothesis H2. 
Examination of the current asset accounts affected by the use of trade credit 
discounts shows that the taking of trade credit discounts itself has an immediate effect on 
the balance sheet within the same period.  The firm’s cash balance is reduced by less than 
it would have been if the discounts had not been taken for the firm’s purchases, 
effectively contributing the amount of the discounts to the firm’s cash balance for that 
period.  This has a positive effect on firm liquidity for the period relative to what it would 
have been without the discounts.  This would suggest that liquidity is determined at least 
in part by trade credit discount usage.  Regressing LnQUICKRATIO on 
PCTDISCOUNTS using the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF data confirms that that 
PCTDISCOUNTS is a significant positive determinant of LnQUICKATIO for both 
surveys.  This result suggests that LnQUICKRATIO may be endogenous within the 
model and may require instrumental variable (IV) regression estimation methods to 
properly estimate, though additional testing will be required to confirm or deny this 
assumption. That testing will be addressed in the methodology section of this essay.
 
 
Table 2.1 
Independent Variables and Their Hypothesized Relationship to PCTDISCOUNTS 
Independent 
Variable 
Description Hypothesized 
Relationship 
to Discount 
Usage 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Comments 
Agency:     
OWNSHR Percentage of business owned by principal owner (+) H1 Increasing firm ownership share reduces agency 
conflict (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
OWNMGR Dummy, 1 = firm is managed by an owner (+) H1 Having firm managed by owner reduces agency  
conflict (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
Liquidity and Credit 
Availability: 
    
FEMOWN Dummy, 1 = greater than 50% female ownership (-) H2 Proxy for credit discrimination = less likely to 
take TC discounts 
MINOWN Dummy, 1 = greater than 50% minority 
ownership (African-American, Asian, Pacific 
Islander, American Indian, Alaska Native) 
(-) H2 Proxy for credit discrimination = less likely to 
take TC discounts 
USEDCARD Dummy, 1 = firm has used owner’s or 
businesses’ credit card for purchases during 1998 
or most recent fiscal year 
(+) H2 Credit cards are nominally less expensive than TC 
with discounts 
LnUNUSEDLOC Natural log of the ratio of unused balance on all 
Lines of Credit, to Total Assets 
(+) H2 Line of credit is nominally less expensive than 
TC with discounts.  Firm should tap line of credit  
to take discounts. 
LnQUICKRATIO Natural log of the ratio of Cash  plus Accounts 
Receivable to Current Liabilities 
(+) H2 Firms with more liquid internal working capital 
will take more discounts 
LnPROFTOINCOME Natural log of the ratio of Profit to Total Income (+) H2 More profitable firms may have more retained 
earnings to support taking more discounts
DBSCORE 
 
Dun & Bradstreet Credit Score (higher score = 
greater risk) 
(-) H2 Firms with poor credit scores are credit 
constrained and cannot take discounts 
PAIDLATE Dummy, 1 = if firm paid any invoice beyond end 
of the credit period during 1998 (2003) or most 
recent fiscal year 
(-) H2 Firms with history of late payments may be in 
distress and cannot take discounts 
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Independent 
Variable 
Description Hypothesized 
Relationship 
to Discount 
Usage 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Comments 
FIRMDISTRESS Dummy, 1 = firm declared bankruptcy within 
past 7 years or defaulted on an obligation within 
past 3 years 
(-) H2 Distressed firms lack access to internal or external 
sources of funding and must make use of trade 
credit financing 
LnDEBTRATIO Natural log of the ratio of Total Liabilities to 
Total Assets.   
(-) H2 Firms with higher debt ratio will need to service 
debt rather than take discounts, to avoid default .   
Mgmt Competence:     
OWNEXP Number of years of experience of principal owner 
managing this or other business 
(+) H3 More experience = more likely to know when to 
take TC discounts 
OWNEDU Less than High School = 1 
High School graduate = 2 
Some college but no degree = 3 
Associate Degree/occupational = 4 
Trade School/vocational program = 5 
College degree = 6 
Post-graduate degree = 7 
(+) H3 More education = more likely to know when to 
take TC discounts 
Transaction Costs:     
LnINVRATIO Natural log of the ratio of Inventory to Total 
Assets 
(+) H4 Firms that maintain higher inventory levels use 
TC discounts to reduce cost of inventory. 
PCACCTNG Dummy, 1 = firm uses PC’s to automate 
accounting 
(+) H4 Automation of accounting lowers the cost of 
taking discounts = more likely to take TC 
discounts 
MAINSUPL Dummy, 1 = firm’s main supplier offers TC 
discounts 
(+) H4 Firm may find it cost effective to process TC 
discounts for its largest supplier (largest single 
source of discounts).  This will also help the firm 
maintain a good credit rating with that supplier. 
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 2.3.2 Sample size and summary statistics for numeric variables.  Sections 6.2 
and 6.3 of this document describe the transformation and clean-up applied to the 1998 
and 2003 NSSBF sample data prior to analysis.  In that section it was indicated that 120 
observations (out of a total of 3,561) in the 1998 NSSBF are excluded and 627 
observations (out of a total of 21,200) in the 2003 NSSBF are excluded, due to failure to 
meet the “going concern” criterion. 
An additional 2,313 observations are excluded from the 1998 NSSBF data due to 
missing items for independent variables the trade credit regression model, or because 
OFFEREDTCD=0 (so that PCTDISCOUNTS is missing), or due to negative or outlier 
values for QUICKRATIO and DEBTRATIO (Values of QUICKRATIO greater than 300 
and DEBTRATIO greater than 100 were set to missing).  This leaves 1,128 complete 
observations for analysis from the 1998 NSSBF data base.  Observations are excluded by 
setting FIN_WGT to zero, but the observations are not actually dropped from the sample, 
as described in Section 6.3.   
An additional 13,285 observations are excluded from the 2003 NSSBF data due to 
missing items for independent variables in the trade credit regression model or because 
OFFEREDTCD=0 (so that PCTDISCOUNTS is missing), or due to negative or outlier 
values of QUICKRATIO and DEBTRATIO (Values of QUICKRATIO greater than 300 
and DEBTRATIO greater than 100 were set to missing).  This leaves 7,288 complete 
observations for analysis.  Observations are excluded by setting FIN_WGT to zero, but 
the observations are not actually dropped from the sample, as described in Section 6.3.  
Finally, selection of implicate #3 only as described in section 6.4, results in 1,458 
complete observations for analysis from the 2003 NSSBF data base. 
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Note that some of the variables in the model have been transformed to their 
natural log form and Winsorized.  This has been done to reduce the rather large skewness 
and kurtosis typical of the untransformed numeric variables in the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF 
samples.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 describe the rationale behind this and the transformation 
methodology used.   Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below provide sample statistics for the numeric 
variables in the model, including the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis.  
The untransformed and transformed variables are included in the table for comparison, 
and to show how the logarithmic transformation and Winsorization of the variables have 
reduced skewness and kurtosis. 
 
      variable |         N      mean        sd       max       min  skewness  kurtosis 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      1128  54.27482  44.57126       100         0  -.173667  1.203019 
      OWNEXP |      1128  21.67819  11.40308        72         0  .6536732   3.37928 
      OWNSHR |      1128  70.05674  29.32434       100         1 -.3314255  1.804973 
   UNUSEDLOC |      1128  .1757949  .7128282  16.00024         0  14.36281  268.2457 
  QUICKRATIO |      1128  4.638941  16.04608  280.9496         0  10.02789  129.3894 
PROFTOINCOME |      1128  .0403563  1.144274         1 -27.78788 -15.94104  337.7205 
   DEBTRATIO |      1128  .9567783  1.519665  18.26782  .0054743  5.955071  50.91508 
  ZDEBTRATIO |       876  .4966086  .2740079  .9988063  .0054743 -.0058015    1.9009 
    INVRATIO |      1128  .2117687  .2432367  .9908435         0   1.16968  3.487414 
   CASHRATIO |      1101  2.093121  8.322678   147.673         0  11.56505  174.3091 
     ARRATIO |      1128  2.600202  11.08057     187.5         0  10.96303  142.6207 
 LnUNUSEDLOC |      1128  .1152049  .2370365  2.833228         0  4.968755  39.65333 
LnQUICKRATIO |      1128  1.075312  .8621913  5.641728         0  1.671781   6.83672 
LnPROFTOIN~E |      1128   4.18045   .234802      4.81  1.415898 -3.849758  39.68118 
 LnDEBTRATIO |      1128  .5502286  .4153116  2.958436  .0054594   2.09369  9.440935 
LnZDEBTRATIO |       876  .3858866  .1880077  .6925501  .0054594 -.2610079  1.986723 
  LnINVRATIO |      1128  .6862517  .1149137  1.022083   .581172  .9920607  2.959688 
 LnCASHRATIO |      1101  .5791051  .7653576   5.00175         0  2.160821  8.434396 
   LnARRATIO |      1128  .7198298  .7458335  5.239098         0  2.107468   9.98655 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      1128  .1124606  .2137275  1.593252         0   3.64321  20.08923 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      1128  1.072346  .8487296  4.647591         0  1.543102    5.9512 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      1128  4.184176  .2054848  4.803224   2.86409 -1.825475  19.17937 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      1128  .5501612  .4149258   2.89844  .0054594  2.084052  9.355567 
wLnZDEBTRA~O |       876  .3858275  .1879126  .6851684  .0054594 -.2629043  1.985174 
 wLnINVRATIO |      1128  .6862486  .1149046  1.018577   .581172  .9916893  2.958063 
wLnCASHRATIO |      1101  .5769966  .7545569  4.069027         0  2.039404  7.397054 
  wLnARRATIO |      1128  .7145487   .719143  3.970292         0  1.786104  7.524263 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Figure 2.1.  Sample statistics for numeric model variables from 1998 NSSBF
 45 
 
 
 2.3.3 DEBTRATIO and insolvent firms.  Examination of the maximum value of 
the variable DEBTRATIO in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 shows maxima that are considerably in 
excess of one.  DEBTRATIO is the ratio of total liabilities over total assets for a firm.  
For a typical firm in sound financial health, total assets should exceed total liabilities, the 
difference being the shareholders’ equity in the firm.  For these firms, DEBTRATIO 
should not exceed one.  However for some firms, total liabilities may exceed total assets, 
leading to negative equity.  These firms are called balance sheet insolvent firms.  Such 
firms will exhibit a DEBTRATIO of greater than one.  These firms may continue to 
operate as long as they are not cash flow insolvent and can continue to meet their debt 
payment obligations, and as long as their DEBTRATIO value does not violate any 
covenants on the firm’s debt that might trigger foreclosure. 
    variable |         N      mean        sd       max       min  skewness  kurtosis 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      1458  56.21948   44.5413       100         0 -.2244587  1.209707 
      OWNEXP |      1458  24.16049   11.1087        65         0  .4136017  3.015918 
      OWNSHR |      1458  68.24279  27.76535       100         8 -.0610716  1.556785 
   UNUSEDLOC |      1458  .1768291   .536785  8.962179         0  10.22697  140.6152 
  QUICKRATIO |      1458  5.174741  16.30614  275.2632         0  9.887714  129.4686 
PROFTOINCOME |      1458  .0165088  3.461267         1 -131.6735 -37.81453  1439.162 
   DEBTRATIO |      1458  .8703825   2.02049  44.20573  .0018836   12.5927  213.0355 
  ZDEBTRATIO |      1185  .4664344  .2797261         1  .0018836  .0769458  1.809332 
    INVRATIO |      1458  .1955367  .2381094  .9767092         0  1.260109  3.629428 
   CASHRATIO |      1424  2.717712  11.30043  275.2632         0  13.62333  269.4488 
     ARRATIO |      1455  2.412904  8.242731       160         0  12.46196  205.8385 
 LnUNUSEDLOC |      1458  .1248278   .226732  2.298796         0  4.233277  29.13614 
LnQUICKRATIO |      1458  1.169796    .88524  5.621354         0  1.533104  6.053156 
LnPROFTOIN~E |      1458  5.517657  .1737437      6.15    1.2546 -9.874296  253.5563 
 LnDEBTRATIO |      1458  .4983387  .3961456  3.811224  .0018818  2.685634   16.0401 
LnZDEBTRATIO |      1185  .3642226  .1943432  .6931472  .0018818 -.1558523  1.829139 
  LnINVRATIO |      1458  .2339434  .1703728  .7247782  .0839403  1.021851  2.911423 
 LnCASHRATIO |      1424  .6682202  .8243844  5.621354         0  2.060212  7.988917 
   LnARRATIO |      1455  .7567489  .7455421  5.081404         0  1.701816  7.265967 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      1458  .1233656  .2147582  1.673976         0  3.543666  19.64631 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      1458  1.166444  .8708885  4.537961         0  1.405632  5.227356 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      1458   5.52023  .1321928  6.105282  4.661638   .761532  10.08383 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      1458  .4952821  .3767001  2.508437  .0018818  2.095397  10.22442 
wLnZDEBTRA~O |      1185  .3641982  .1943024  .6861819  .0018818 -.1566227   1.82826 
 wLnINVRATIO |      1458  .2339053  .1702659  .7029824  .0839403  1.019161  2.899872 
wLnCASHRATIO |      1424  .6672613  .8193063   4.61512         0  2.002754  7.486651 
  wLnARRATIO |      1455  .7539381  .7318557   3.89182         0  1.530306   5.98181 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2.2. Sample statistics for numeric model variables from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 only) 
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In Figures 2.3 and 2.4 below, DEBTRATIO has been divided into quartiles, with 
the means and linearized standard errors indicted for each of the four quartiles.   Note that 
the fourth quartile contains the firms with DEBTRATIO>1, for both samples, 1998 and 
2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are 767 such balance sheet insolvent firms in the 1998 NSSBF survey, and 
782 balance sheet insolvent firms in implicate #3 of the 2003 NSSBF survey.  After 
excluding observations with missing item data, 252 firms in the 1998 sample (out of a 
total of 1,128) are insolvent, and 273 firms in implicate #3 of the 2003 sample (out of 
1458)  are insolvent.  It is these firms that cause the value of DEBTRATIO in figures 2.1 
and 2.2 to be greater than one.  Due to the NSSBF survey criteria that firms accepted for 
the survey sample be in operation at the time of the survey, these firms have not been 
dropped from the sample as they continued to be going concerns.  However, an 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |             Linearized 
        Over |       Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------ 
DEBTRATIO    | 
           1 |   .0001507   .0000386      .0000751    .0002264 
           2 |   .1500921   .0040426      .1421659    .1580184 
           3 |   .5952191   .0063615      .5827462    .6076919 
           4 |   4.107276   .3054738      3.508342     4.70621 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |             Linearized 
        Over |       Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------ 
DEBTRATIO    | 
           1 |   9.27e-06   4.17e-06      1.10e-06    .0000174 
           2 |   .1212125   .0034488       .114451     .127974 
           3 |    .535353   .0068142      .5219935    .5487126 
           4 |   3.172341   .2553991      2.671618    3.673065 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 2.3. 1998 NSSBF: Quartiles of DEBTRATIO
Figure 2. 4. 2003 NSSBF: Quartiles of DEBTRATIO
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alternative variable called “ZDEBTRATIO” has been created that is trimmed so that 
values above one are set to missing.  Results using this variable are also presented. 
 2.3.4 Summary Statistics for Dummy and Categorical Variables.  Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 provide un-weighted one-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical variables 
in the model for the final 1,129 observations of the 1998 NSSBF sample, and tables 2.4 
and 2.5 provide un-weighted one-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical variables 
in the model for the final 1,464 observations of the 2003 NSSBF sample.   
Note that variable OFFEREDTCD = 1 for 100% of the observations used in the 
1998 and 2003 samples.  This variable identifies the subpopulation of firms that are 
actually offered trade credit discounts, all of which provided a response value for 
PCTDISCOUNTS in the two surveys.  There are actually 1,473 firms in the 1998 sample, 
and 9,139 in the 2003 sample, that have OFFEREDTCD = 1.  Unfortunately, missing 
item data for some of these observations reduces the usable observations to 1,129 and 
1,464, respectively, as described earlier.   
 Examination of the distribution of responses for PCTDISCOUNTS in tables 2.3 
and 2.5 shows a cluster of responses around zero percent discounts used, and around one-
hundred percent discounts used, for both samples.  This suggests that most small firms 
maintained a policy of either taking all discounts offered, or none of them, during the 
previous fiscal year.   
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Table 2.2 
Sample statistics for dummy/categorical variables from 1998 NSSBF (n=1128) 
Dummy/Categorical Vars Response Number 
of 
Responses 
Percent of 
Sample 
FEMOWN: Female owns 
more than 50% of the firm 
No 
Yes 
973 
155 
86.3 
13.7 
MINOWN: Minority owns 
more than 50% of the firm 
No 
Yes 
1050 
78 
93.1 
6.9 
 
OWNMGR: Firm's 
Manager is an owner  
No 
Yes 
177 
951 
15.7 
84.3 
OWNEDU: Principal 
owner's level of education
  
Less than High School 
High School graduate 
Some college but no degree  
Assoc Degree/occupational program 
Trade School/vocational program  
College degree 
Post-graduate degree 
15 
183 
181 
59 
29 
463 
198 
1.3 
16.2 
16.0 
5.2 
2.6 
41.0 
17.6 
PCACCTNG: Firm uses 
PC's for accounting  
No 
Yes 
98 
1030 
8.7 
91.3 
MAINSUPL: Firm's main 
supplier offers trade credit 
discounts  
No 
Yes 
574 
554 
50.9 
49.1 
USEDCARD: Firm has 
used owner's or firm's credit 
card within most recent 
fiscal year  
No 
Yes 
189 
939 
16.8 
83.2 
DBSCORE: Dun and 
Bradstreet credit score  
 
Low Risk 
Moderate Risk 
Average Risk 
Significant Risk 
High Risk 
141 
340 
308 
224 
115 
12.5 
30.1 
27.3 
19.9 
10.2 
PAIDLATE: Firm has paid 
at least one invoice past due 
date within most recent 
fiscal year 
No 
Yes 
519 
609 
46.0 
54.0 
FIRMDISTRESS: Firm has 
been bankrupt/delinquent 
on business obligations 
No 
Yes 
 
880 
248 
78.0 
22.0 
 
OFFEREDTCD: Firm is 
offered trade credit 
discounts by at least one 
supplier 
No 
Yes 
0 
1128 
0.0 
100.0 
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Table 2.3  
Sample distribution of PCTDISCOUNTS from 1998 NSSBF (n=1128) 
PCTDISCOUNTS: Percentage of discounts offered that are taken 
% Taken   % of Sample % Taken   % of Sample 
0 (n=266)       23.6 
1 (n=41)        3.6 
2 (n=32)        2.8 
3 (n=6)         0.5 
4 (n=2)         0.2 
5 (n=26)        2.3 
7 (n=1)         0.1 
8 (n=1)         0.1 
10 (n=43)       3.8 
11 (n=1)        0.1 
13 (n=1)        0.1 
15 (n=5)        0.4 
20 (n=10)       0.9 
21 (n=1)        0.1 
22 (n=1)        0.1 
25 (n=12)       1.1 
26 (n=1)        0.1 
29 (n=2)        0.2 
30 (n=9)        0.8 
32 (n=1)        0.1 
33 (n=3)        0.3 
35 (n=1)        0.1 
40 (n=6)        0.5 
46 (n=2)        0.2 
49 (n=2)        0.2 
50 (n=71)       6.3 
53 (n=1)        0.1 
54 (n=2)        0.2 
58 (n=1)        0.1 
60 (n=3)        0.3 
62 (n=1)        0.1 
63 (n=1)        0.1 
65 (n=3)        0.3 
66 (n=2)        0.2 
67 (n=2)        0.2 
70 (n=5)        0.4 
72 (n=2)        0.2 
74 (n=2)        0.2 
75 (n=27)       2.4 
78 (n=1)        0.1 
80 (n=28)       2.5 
82 (n=1)        0.1 
85 (n=4)        0.4 
90 (n=37)       3.3 
92 (n=3)        0.3 
93 (n=2)        0.2 
95 (n=16)       1.4 
96 (n=2)        0.2 
98 (n=6)        0.5 
99 (n=10)       0.9 
100 (n=419)     37.1 
Total (n=1,128) 100.0 
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Table 2.4 
Sample statistics for dummy/categorical variables from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 
only, n=1458) 
Dummy/Categorical Vars Response Number 
of 
Responses 
Percent of 
Sample 
FEMOWN: Female owns 
more than 50% of the firm 
No 
Yes 
1284 
174 
88.1 
11.9 
MINOWN: Minority owns 
more than 50% of the firm 
No 
Yes 
1392 
66 
95.5 
4.5 
OWNMGR: Firm's 
Manager is an owner  
No 
Yes 
226 
1232 
15.5 
84.5 
OWNEDU: Principal 
owner's level of education
  
Less than High School 
High School graduate 
Some college but no degree  
Assoc Degree/occupational program 
Trade School/vocational program  
College degree 
Post-graduate degree 
12 
256 
257 
136 
137 
450 
210 
0.8 
17.6 
17.6 
9.3 
9.4 
30.9 
14.4 
PCACCTNG: Firm uses 
PC's for accounting  
No 
Yes 
85 
1373 
5.8 
94.2 
MAINSUPL: Firm's main 
supplier offers trade credit 
discounts  
No 
Yes 
806 
652 
55.3 
44.7 
USEDCARD: Firm has 
used owner's or firm's 
credit card within most 
recent fiscal year  
No 
Yes 
199 
1259 
13.6 
86.4 
DBSCORE: Dun and 
Bradstreet credit score  
 
Low Risk 
Moderate Risk 
Average Risk 
Significant Risk 
High Risk 
Very High Risk 
282 
290 
428 
190 
122 
146 
19.3 
19.9 
29.4 
13.0 
8.4 
10.0 
PAIDLATE: Firm has paid 
at least one invoice past 
due date within most 
recent fiscal year 
No 
Yes 
764 
694 
52.4 
47.6 
FIRMDISTRESS: Firm 
has been 
bankrupt/delinquent on 
business obligations 
No 
Yes 
 
1402 
56 
96.2 
3.8 
OFFEREDTCD: Firm is 
offered trade credit 
discounts by at least one 
supplier 
No 
Yes 
0 
1458 
0.0 
100.0 
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Table 2.5 
Sample distribution of PCTDISCOUNTS from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 only, 
n=1458) 
PCTDISCOUNTS: Percentage of discounts offered that are 
taken 
% Taken   % of Sample % Taken   % of Sample 
0 (n=292)       20.0 
1 (n=36)        2.5 
2 (n=48)        3.3 
3 (n=7)         0.5 
4 (n=2)         0.1 
5 (n=43)        2.9 
6 (n=2)         0.1 
8 (n=2)         0.1 
10 (n=82)       5.6 
12 (n=2)        0.1 
13 (n=1)        0.1 
14 (n=1)        0.1 
15 (n=3)        0.2 
17 (n=2)        0.1 
20 (n=37)       2.5 
25 (n=14)       1.0 
26 (n=1)        0.1 
30 (n=10)       0.7 
35 (n=1)        0.1 
37 (n=1)        0.1 
40 (n=9)        0.6 
44 (n=1)        0.1 
47 (n=1)        0.1 
50 (n=99)       6.8 
60 (n=4)        0.3 
66 (n=1)        0.1 
70 (n=11)       0.8 
75 (n=27)       1.9 
80 (n=22)       1.5 
81 (n=1)        0.1 
85 (n=3)        0.2 
90 (n=55)       3.8 
95 (n=20)       1.4 
96 (n=1)        0.1 
97 (n=1)        0.1 
98 (n=2)        0.1 
99 (n=11)       0.8 
100 (n=602)     41.3 
Total (n=1,458) 100.0 
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 2.3.5 Sample correlations.  Figures 2.5 and 2.6 present the Pearson correlations 
between the variables in the empirical model for the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples, 
respectively.  As can be seen, there are no correlations between variables with absolute 
values greater than 0.5.   
 
 
 
             | PCTDIS~S   FEMOWN   MINOWN   OWNEXP   OWNEDU PCACCTNG MAINSUPL 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
PCTDISCOUNTS |   1.0000  
      FEMOWN |   0.0243   1.0000  
      MINOWN |  -0.1035*  0.0333   1.0000  
      OWNEXP |   0.1538* -0.1503* -0.0794*  1.0000  
      OWNEDU |   0.0023  -0.0547   0.1012* -0.0784*  1.0000  
    PCACCTNG |   0.0264  -0.0689* -0.0524   0.0382  -0.0082   1.0000  
    MAINSUPL |   0.1095*  0.0457   0.0468  -0.0521  -0.0735* -0.0370   1.0000  
      OWNSHR |  -0.0472   0.0215   0.0640* -0.1679* -0.1662* -0.0657*  0.0406  
      OWNMGR |  -0.0466   0.0235   0.0599* -0.0971* -0.0732* -0.0638*  0.0387  
    USEDCARD |  -0.0507  -0.0002   0.0194  -0.0108   0.0375   0.0133  -0.0578  
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   0.0426  -0.0507  -0.0195   0.0222   0.0190   0.0185  -0.0578  
wLnQUICKRA~O |   0.1492*  0.0157   0.0084   0.0030   0.0851*  0.0231   0.0305  
wLnPROFTOI~E |   0.0675*  0.0362   0.0158  -0.0060  -0.0491  -0.0326  -0.0244  
     DBSCORE |  -0.2677*  0.0374   0.1146* -0.2122*  0.0448   0.0251  -0.0610* 
    PAIDLATE |  -0.2385*  0.0275   0.0623* -0.0684*  0.0080  -0.0069  -0.0110  
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -0.1007*  0.0429   0.0337  -0.1271* -0.0807* -0.0350  -0.0733* 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -0.0126   0.0568  -0.0284   0.0773*  0.0027   0.0008   0.0310  
FIRMDISTRESS |  -0.2713* -0.0067   0.0916* -0.0924*  0.0110   0.0270   0.0522  
 
             |   OWNSHR   OWNMGR USEDCARD wLnUNU~C wLnQUI~O wLnPRO~E  DBSCORE 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR |   1.0000  
      OWNMGR |   0.0019   1.0000  
    USEDCARD |   0.0384   0.0675*  1.0000  
wLnUNUSEDLOC |  -0.0417  -0.0223   0.0730*  1.0000  
wLnQUICKRA~O |   0.0046   0.0067  -0.0201   0.0547   1.0000  
wLnPROFTOI~E |   0.0936* -0.0197   0.0192  -0.0323  -0.0095   1.0000  
     DBSCORE |   0.0904*  0.0220   0.0078  -0.0460  -0.1260* -0.0273   1.0000  
    PAIDLATE |   0.0054   0.0125   0.0145  -0.1407* -0.2062* -0.0056   0.3108* 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.0770*  0.0222  -0.0356   0.0439  -0.4078*  0.0366   0.1816* 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -0.0167  -0.0094   0.0604*  0.0072  -0.1711*  0.0012   0.0378  
FIRMDISTRESS |   0.0600* -0.0476   0.0204  -0.0691* -0.1906* -0.0353   0.3490* 
 
             | PAIDLATE wLnDEB~O wLnINV~O FIRMDI~S 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
    PAIDLATE |   1.0000  
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.1419*  1.0000  
 wLnINVRATIO |  -0.0464  -0.0166   1.0000  
FIRMDISTRESS |   0.4042*  0.1802* -0.0151   1.0000       
Figure 2.5. 1998 NSSBF: Pearson Correlations of Model Variables 
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Figure 2. 6. 2003 NSSBF: Pearson Correlations of Model Variables (using implicate #3 only) 
 
 2.3.6 Variance inflation factors.  The variance inflation factors for the 1998 
model estimation are provided in table 2.6 below.  The variance inflation factors for the 
2003 model estimation are provided in table 2.7 below.  They were generated following 
unweighted OLS estimation of the Trade Credit model for the two survey samples.  No 
evidence of multicollinearity is indicated by the low values in these tables. 
 
  
 
             | PCTDIS~S   FEMOWN   MINOWN   OWNEXP   OWNEDU PCACCTNG MAINSUPL 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
PCTDISCOUNTS |   1.0000  
      FEMOWN |  -0.0509   1.0000  
      MINOWN |  -0.0326   0.0623*  1.0000  
      OWNEXP |   0.1020* -0.1191* -0.0332   1.0000  
      OWNEDU |   0.0392  -0.0387   0.0624* -0.0270   1.0000  
    PCACCTNG |   0.0232  -0.0258  -0.0021   0.0073   0.0542*  1.0000  
    MAINSUPL |   0.0925* -0.0247  -0.0300   0.0151  -0.1217*  0.0236   1.0000  
      OWNSHR |  -0.0451   0.1012* -0.0046   0.0237  -0.0740* -0.1021*  0.0450  
      OWNMGR |   0.0025  -0.0469  -0.0435  -0.2210* -0.0078  -0.0661* -0.0036  
    USEDCARD |  -0.0618*  0.0416  -0.0095  -0.0713*  0.0474   0.0034  -0.0683* 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   0.0838* -0.0235  -0.0222  -0.0206   0.0374   0.0211   0.0041  
wLnQUICKRA~O |   0.1178*  0.0092   0.0246  -0.0114  -0.0163  -0.0484  -0.0172  
wLnPROFTOI~E |   0.0245  -0.0242  -0.0005  -0.0181  -0.0169  -0.0952*  0.0021  
     DBSCORE |  -0.3182*  0.0247   0.0177  -0.1407*  0.0213   0.0345  -0.0451  
    PAIDLATE |  -0.3090*  0.0558*  0.0171  -0.0969*  0.0372   0.0261  -0.0673* 
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -0.1540*  0.0291  -0.0028  -0.0770*  0.0183   0.0565* -0.0226  
 wLnINVRATIO |   0.0334  -0.0109  -0.0608*  0.0909* -0.0298   0.0033   0.0048  
FIRMDISTRESS |  -0.0741*  0.0365  -0.0264  -0.0093   0.0038   0.0497   0.0141  
 
             |   OWNSHR   OWNMGR USEDCARD wLnUNU~C wLnQUI~O wLnPRO~E  DBSCORE 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR |   1.0000  
      OWNMGR |   0.0684*  1.0000  
    USEDCARD |   0.0272   0.1002*  1.0000  
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   0.0258   0.0108   0.0271   1.0000  
wLnQUICKRA~O |   0.0429   0.0272   0.0080  -0.0265   1.0000  
wLnPROFTOI~E |   0.0718*  0.0459  -0.0277  -0.0288   0.0379   1.0000  
     DBSCORE |   0.0435   0.0282  -0.0099  -0.1290* -0.1992*  0.0008   1.0000  
    PAIDLATE |  -0.0023  -0.0092   0.0309  -0.0774* -0.1890* -0.0629*  0.3138* 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.0112   0.0320   0.0190   0.1968* -0.4106* -0.1324*  0.1989* 
 wLnINVRATIO |   0.0241  -0.0094   0.0530* -0.0012  -0.2330* -0.0028   0.0371  
FIRMDISTRESS |   0.0019  -0.0032   0.0067   0.0139  -0.0642*  0.0133   0.1174* 
 
             | PAIDLATE wLnDEB~O wLnINV~O FIRMDI~S 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
    PAIDLATE |   1.0000  
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.1960*  1.0000  
 wLnINVRATIO |   0.0601*  0.0678*  1.0000  
FIRMDISTRESS |   0.0596*  0.0799* -0.0261   1.0000 
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Table 2.6 
Variance Inflation Factors – 1998 NSSBF 
Variable VIF  1/VIF   
FIRMDISTRESS 1.33     0.753458 
wLnQUICKRA~O 1.31     0.766107 
PAIDLATE 1.30     0.770636 
wLnDEBTRATIO 1.28     0.779160 
DBSCORE 1.27     0.785433 
OWNEXP 1.15     0.872944 
OWNSHR 1.10     0.911221 
OWNEDU 1.10     0.913136 
wLnINVRATIO 1.07     0.934430 
FEMOWN 1.05     0.955273 
MINOWN 1.05     0.955955 
MAINSUPL 1.04     0.957346 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 1.04 0.961233 
OWNMGR 1.04     0.962252 
USEDCARD 1.03     0.974850 
wLnPROFTOI~E 1.02     0.978739 
PCACCTNG 1.02     0.978806 
    Mean VIF 1.13  
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Table 2.7  
Variance Inflation Factors – 2003 NSSBF 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
wLnDEBTRATIO 1.34     0.747756 
wLnQUICKRA~O 1.31     0.761148 
DBSCORE 1.21     0.829069 
    PAIDLATE 1.16     0.859437 
OWNEXP 1.12     0.893830 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 1.09     0.920127 
OWNMGR 1.08     0.922817 
wLnINVRATIO 1.08     0.926631 
OWNSHR 1.05     0.954170 
FEMOWN 1.05     0.956011 
wLnPROFTOI~E 1.04     0.963451 
OWNEDU 1.03     0.967185 
PCACCTNG 1.03     0.969284 
MAINSUPL 1.03     0.970762 
USEDCARD 1.03     0.972136 
FIRMDISTRESS 1.03 0.975010 
MINOWN 1.02     0.983610 
Mean VIF 1.10  
 
 
  
 56 
 
2.4 Estimation Methodology 
The model specified in the previous section is estimated using survey-weighted 
least squares regression or the equivalent method, WLS with robust standard errors.  The 
sign and statistical significance of the independent variable coefficients are used to test 
the hypotheses.  The rationale behind the use of a survey-weighted regression estimation 
methodology, which is common to all three essays in this dissertation, is described in 
Section 6.1.  In addition to the nature of the survey and its impact on regression 
estimates, there are two additional econometric challenges that this model and data 
present.  Those challenges are selection bias, and endogeneity of regressors.  They are 
addressed in the following sections of this essay. 
 2.4.1 Potential selection bias. The fact that the response variable 
PCTDISCOUNTS is only recorded in the samples for those observations for which 
OFFEREDTCD = 1 and is missing for all other observations presents a challenge to the 
estimation methodology.  This is similar to what is encountered in labor studies in 
Economics, where wages of an individual is used as the dependent variable in a 
regression which models the level of wages against a variety of individual and family 
factors to explore the determinants of wages.  Typically, wages is not observed in a 
sample unless the individual is also employed, which causes the wages variable to be 
truncated in the sample.  If the employment status of an individual in the sample was 
completely random, then model estimation could proceed using only the subpopulation of 
the sample for which wages was observed with no fear of bias.  Unfortunately, the 
determinants of employment may themselves be complex and so the employed 
individuals do not represent a random subsample.  In cases such as this, OLS regression 
will produce biased estimates.  
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As described by Breen (1996), “incidental truncation” in which the presence or 
absence of a response variable in the sample depends upon the value of another variable 
in the sample.  When all of the regressor variables for the model are present for every 
observation in the sample (with the exception of some missing item data), but the 
response variable itself is only observed for the selected subset of the sample 
observations, and missing for all other observations,  Breen describes this as a sample 
selection problem rather than a truncation or censorship problem.  The usual full-sample 
regression estimation methodologies cannot be applied in this situation, as they will 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates of the regression parameters.  Nor can 
estimates using only the subpopulation of firms for which OFFEREDTCD=1 be used, as 
the sample representing that subpopulation as in the sample is not randomly selected and 
the estimates thus obtained will be biased and inconsistent (Breen, 1996).  Fortunately, 
Heckman (1976, 1979) derived a two-step estimation procedure to correct for the bias 
introduced by this type of selection process which is described below. Imagine the 
existence of an unobserved (latent) variable OFFEREDTCD* of which the observed 
dummy variable OFFEREDTCD is the realization in the sample.  OFFEREDTCD* can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
OFFEREDTCD*i = wi'αi + µi  ,  where     
 (1) 
OFFEREDTCDi = 0 if OFFEREDTCD* i  ≤ 0, and 
OFFEREDTCDi = 1 if OFFEREDTCD* i  > 0 
 
The wi are variables that determine the decision to offer or not offer trade credit 
discounts, and may or may not be same as the variables xi in equation (2) below.  The 
subscript “i” varies from 1 to N, the size of the sample, even though there are only  n < N 
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observations that have observed values for PCTDISCOUNTS.  The errors µ are assumed 
to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance σµ2.  Given these 
assumptions, the probability that OFFEREDTCD=1 can be expressed as shown in 
equation (1a) below, and can be estimated using Probit regression with a suitable set of 
regressors wi 
Pr(OFFEREDTCDi = 1) = Ф(wi'αi)     (1a) 
 
where Ф(wi'αi) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal 
distribution evaluated at wi'αi.  Equation (1a) is estimated using ALL of the observations 
in the sample that pass the going concern test and are not missing any item data for the 
independent variables wi. 
Now consider the existence of another latent variable PCTDISCOUNTS* of 
which the observed PCTDISCOUNTS is the realization in the sample.  
PCTDISCOUNTS* can be expressed as: 
 PCTDISCOUNTS*i = xi'βi + εi  ,  where     (2) 
PCTDISCOUNTSi = PCTDISCOUNTS*i  if  OFFEREDTCDi = 1, but 
PCTDISCOUNTSi  is not observed if OFFEREDTCDi = 0 
 
The errors  ε  are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance σε2.  In this model, the errors ε  and µ are assumed to have correlation ρ and 
have a joint bivariate normal distribution.  Equation (1) models the process by which 
observations in the sample are selected to have observed values of PCTDISCOUNTS, 
and equation (2) is just the structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS, as originally 
presented in Section 2.3. 
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Estimating the expected value of equation (2) gives: 
E(PCTDISCOUNTSi | OFFEREDTCD=1, xi) = xi'βi + E(εi  | OFFEREDTCD=1)     (3) 
But remember from (1) that when OFFEREDTCD=1, wi'αi + µi > 0, or µi > wi'αi. 
Substituting this last inequality into (3) gives: 
E(PCTDISCOUNTSi | OFFEREDTCD=1, xi) = xi'βi + E(εi  |  µi > wi'αi) 
Under the assumption that ε and µ are bivariate normal, Breen derives the result: 
E(εi  |  µi > wi'αi) = ρσεσµ[φ(wi'αi)/Ф(wi'αi)] 
E(PCTDISCOUNTSi | OFFEREDTCD=1, xi) = xi'βi + ρσεσµ[φ(wi'αi)/Ф(wi'αi)]   (4) 
E(PCTDISCOUNTSi | OFFEREDTCD=1, xi) = xi'βi + λ[φ(wi'αi)/Ф(wi'αi)]           (5) 
In equation (5), φ(wi'αi) is the probability density function (pdf) for the standard normal 
distribution, and Ф(wi'αi) is the cdf for the standard normal distribution.  The ratio of the 
two as written above is the “inverse Mills Ratio”.  Equation (5) is only estimated for 
those n < N observations that have OFFEREDTCD=1, unlike equation (1a) that is 
estimated using the full sample subject to the going concern and missing item data 
criteria.   
Note that the first term in equation (5) is just the structural model for 
PCTDISCOUNTS from Section 2.3; the second term represents the correction for the 
selection bias.  If the selection process in equation (1) and the structural process in 
equation (2) are totally independent of each other, then ρ = 0 and thus λ = 0 and so there 
is no bias correction.  This will be observed in the model estimation as a failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of zero equality for the t-test on the estimated regression coefficient  
λ෠. 
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 In order to estimate (5), equation (1a) must first be estimated across the entire N 
observations of the sample an estimate of the inverse Mills Ratio for each observation can 
be derived using the estimated values of wi'αi.  Then equation (5) can be estimated, 
limiting “i” to range across the  n < N observations in the sample for which 
OFFEREDTCD=1, using either survey-weighted least squares or WLS with robust 
standard errors, as explained in section 6.1 of this document.  Note that if the estimated 
coefficient  λ෠  in equation (5) is not significantly different than zero, then there is no 
selection bias and it can be concluded that the selection process is independent of the 
structural equation process.  The standard errors produced by the estimation of (5) must 
be adjusted for the fact that an estimated value of the inverse Mills Ratio is being used 
from the first step regression.  (This is similar to the correction that must be made to the 
standard errors produced by the second step of 2SLS estimation.)  Fortunately, STATA 
does this correction automatically when using the “heckman” estimation command. 
 In order to determine a list of regressor variables wi to estimate equation (1a), it is 
important to remember that the decision to offer trade credit is a seller decision, while the 
decision to take trade credit discounts is a buyer decision.  This makes the selection 
process is the model unique when compared to typical examples of selection in the 
economics literature, which mostly involve “self-selection” wherein the selection 
decision is made by the same entity to whom the structural model applies.  The fact that 
the selection decision and the decision to take discounts are made by separate entities 
might suggest that they are entirely independent of each other, and hence no selection 
bias correction need be applied.  
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 Keeping in mind that the selection decision is a seller decision, and that the seller 
only has access to externally visible information about the firm and its business 
environment to use in its decision to offer trade credit discounts or not, the regressors wi 
are chosen on the following basis.   
Industry dummy variables are chosen because as shown by Ng, Smith and Smith 
(1999), the terms of trade credit, including offering of discounts, is very industry 
dependent.   
DBSCORE is chosen as an externally visible indicator of the firm’s ability to 
make payments in a timely manner, including the firm’s ability to make early payments 
to take advantage of any discounts offered.  A seller wishing to reduce the Days Sales 
Outstanding on its accounts receivable may choose to selectively offer discounts to those 
firms that can actually pay early.  Alternatively, consistent with the signaling theory of 
Smith (1981), a seller looking for an early signal of distress may offer discounts to firms 
that are weaker and at risk of default.   
LnTOTEMP and LnFIRMAGE are chosen as general measures of firm size and 
firm age, respectively.  These can be viewed as externally visible proxies for stability, 
survivorship and reputation.  Such factors may influence the relationship between buyer 
and seller and the terms on which credit is offered.  They can also be viewed as control 
variables in the Probit regression.  Note that with the addition of these variables, the 
selection equation contains two exogenous variables that are excluded from the outcome 
equation.  As explained by Cameron and Trivedi (2009), doing this reduces the 
possibility of multicollinearity between the Mills Ratio term and the rest of the variables 
in the outcome equation. 
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 Including the variables discussed above, the Probit Index from equation (1a) 
above can be written as: 
wi'αi = α0i + α1iDBSCORE + α2iMANUFACTURING + α3iTRANSPORTATION 
+ α4iWHOLESALE + α5iRETAIL + α6iSERVICES + α7iLnTOTEMP + 
α8iLnFIRMAGE  
 
Figures 2.7 (for the 1998 NSSBF) and 2.8 (for the 2003 NSSBF) below show the results 
of the estimation of the Probit model with OFFEREDTCD as the response variable and 
using the Probit Index specified above for the regressors.  The full samples (minus 
observations with missing item data) are used for the estimation, although the 2003 
survey data uses implicate #3 only.  Survey weights and robust standard errors are used in 
the Probit regressions displayed in these tables.  Maximum likelihood Probit estimation is 
employed.   
For both the 1998 and 2003 surveys, the models are significant as indicated by the 
Wald Chi-square test.  All regressors in the 2003 Probit estimation except WHOLESALE 
are significant at the 0.05 percent level, indicating that they are good candidates for the 
Probit estimation step of the Heckman estimation of the full model.  For the 1998 Probit 
estimation, WHOLESALE and RETAIL are clearly not significant, and LnFIRMAGE is 
barely not significant at the 0.05 percent level but is comfortably significant at the 0.1 
percent level.  As the full model is very significant, this full set of variables will be 
employed for the Probit step of the Heckman estimation of the full model. 
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Figure 2.7. 1998 NSSBF: Probit Regression to examine determinants of OFFEREDTCD 
 
 
Figure 2.8. 2003 NSSBF: Regression to examine determinants of OFFEREDTCD (using implicate #3 only) 
 
The original structural model from Section 2.3 is estimated using survey-weighted 
regression or WLS with robust standard errors, and compared to an estimation of 
equations (1a) and (5) using a Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach.  According to Breen 
(1996, pg. 40), ML is to be preferred to the two-step estimation of the model as ML 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       4087 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =     474.88 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2233.7238                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1360 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  OFFEREDTCD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     DBSCORE |  -.0785546   .0203509    -3.86   0.000    -.1184417   -.0386676 
MANUFACTUR~G |   .2591512   .1156958     2.24   0.025     .0323916    .4859107 
TRANSPORTA~N |   -.492876   .1699273    -2.90   0.004    -.8259273   -.1598247 
   WHOLESALE |   .1588798     .11916     1.33   0.182    -.0746696    .3924292 
      RETAIL |  -.1924711   .0951185    -2.02   0.043    -.3788999   -.0060423 
    SERVICES |  -.6594888   .0837571    -7.87   0.000    -.8236498   -.4953279 
   wLnTOTEMP |   .4079067   .0274746    14.85   0.000     .3540575    .4617558 
  wLnFIRMAGE |   .1326471   .0336467     3.94   0.000     .0667008    .1985935 
       _cons |  -.9109546     .14547    -6.26   0.000    -1.196071   -.6258386 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       3441 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =     336.78 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2040.7658                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1037 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  OFFEREDTCD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     DBSCORE |  -.0934196   .0278781    -3.35   0.001    -.1480596   -.0387795 
MANUFACTUR~G |   .2459827   .1101613     2.23   0.026     .0300705     .461895 
TRANSPORTA~N |  -.6482335   .1638067    -3.96   0.000    -.9692889   -.3271782 
   WHOLESALE |   .1916089   .1212776     1.58   0.114    -.0460909    .4293087 
      RETAIL |  -.1137383   .0866553    -1.31   0.189    -.2835795     .056103 
    SERVICES |   -.533168   .0767725    -6.94   0.000    -.6836393   -.3826966 
   wLnTOTEMP |    .298207   .0233509    12.77   0.000     .2524402    .3439738 
  wLnFIRMAGE |   .0711041   .0374404     1.90   0.058    -.0022777    .1444858 
       _cons |  -.3967484   .1487523    -2.67   0.008    -.6882975   -.1051992 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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produces estimates that are asymptotically normal and unbiased, and are more efficient 
than using the two-step estimation procedure.   By comparison, OLS estimation of (5) 
with no Heckman correction term will produce estimates that are biased and inconsistent, 
while using a two-step estimation of (1a) and (5) will produce estimates that are 
consistent. 
 Sample selection models are very sensitive to heteroskedasticity and non-
normality of the error terms.  Sample selected estimators are neither efficient nor 
consistent under heteroskedasticity, and are not consistent under non-normality (Breen 
1996, pgs. 58-59). 
The two-step model above was derived on the assumption that ε and µ are 
bivariate normal and homoscedastic.  As a robustness check, the results of the estimation 
using the Heckman ML method with other estimation methods for the same model will 
be compared to determine if there are significant differences that could be attributed to 
the violations of the assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality. 
2.4.2 Endogeneity.  One of the assumptions of OLS regression is that the error 
term is unrelated to the independent variables (regressors) of the model,  That is, E(ε | x) 
= 0, where ε is the matrix of the residuals of the regression and x is the matrix of 
regressors.  Regressors that satisfy this condition are exogenous to the model; those that 
do not are endogenous.  The presence of endogenous regressors in the model leads to the 
OLS estimators being inconsistent.   
When examining the structural model presented in section 2.3 and the theoretical 
justification for the regressors chosen for the model, the variable LnQUICKRATIO has 
been identified as potentially having an endogenous relationship with PCTDISCOUNTS, 
the dependent variable.   
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The endogeneity of this regressor in the model can be tested using the Durban-
Wu-Hausman test described by Davidson and McKinnon (2004) and Wooldridge (2003).  
For a regressor that is found to be endogenous in the model, the method of instrumental 
variables (IV) will be used to replace the endogenous variable with a set of instrumental 
variables that meet three criteria:  (a) they are highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable, (b) they are not correlated with the error term of the structural model (are 
exogenous), and (c) they can be legitimately excluded from the original structural model.  
Criteria (a) is testable and will be used along with theoretical considerations to select the 
instruments from the available candidates in the sample.  Criteria (b) is not testable 
directly, though if the model is over-identified, then the test of over-identifying 
restrictions can be used to test the null hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous.  To 
satisfy (c) instruments are chosen that are determinants of LnQUICKRATIO but not of 
PCTDISCOUNTS, which is testable. 
In selecting instruments, care is taken that the set of instruments chosen to replace 
the endogenous variable exceeds the number of endogenous variables by at least one.  
This will ensure that the system of equations (structural and reduced form) is over-
identified.  Two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) or Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) may then be used to estimate the model, and the test of over-
identifying restrictions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) will be performed to determine if 
the set of instruments is exogenous. 
 2.4.2.1 Instruments for LnQUICKRATIO.  The selection of instruments for an 
endogenous variable that are both valid and not weak can be very challenging and subject 
the model estimation to criticism if not done carefully and with adequate justification 
(Murray, 2006). When weak instruments are chosen, the 2SLS estimates tend to be biased 
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and their standard errors are too small, resulting in misleading hypothesis tests.  Using 
weak instruments to correct for endogeneity can introduce IV estimation errors that are as 
bad or worse than the OLS estimates they are intended to correct. 
LnQUICKRATIO is a composite balance sheet variable created by summing cash 
and accounts receivable, dividing by current liabilities, performing any data 
transformation required as described by Section 6.2, then taking the natural log of the 
result.  The focus of LnQUICKRATIO is on the current asset portion of the balance 
sheet, so to find instruments that meet the correlation criteria, the other asset accounts on 
the balance sheet that may be negatively correlated with LnQUICKRATIO are potential 
candidates for instruments.  Candidate instrument variables using balance sheet data are 
then created for those asset accounts using data available in the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF 
surveys.    
LnDEPRTOASSETS and LnOTRRATIO have been selected as candidate 
instrument variables.  LnDEPRTOASSETS is the natural log of the ratio of the firm’s 
depreciable assets to total assets, which is expected to be negatively correlated with 
liquidity since investments in such longer-term assets may be done at the expense of 
liquidity.  LnOTRRATIO is the natural log of the ratio of “other current assets” to total 
assets, which  may either be positively or negatively correlated with liquidity, depending 
on whether it is another substitute for liquidity (negative), or another manifestation of 
management’s policy to invest in current assets over longer term assets (positive). 
To test criteria (a), that the instruments are strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variable, one must examine the Pearson correlation of these variables with 
LnQUICKRATIO as shown in figure 2.9 below for the 1998 NSSBF and in figure 2.10 
for the 2003 NSSBF. 
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Figure 2.9. 1998 NSSBF: Pearson correlation of LnQUICKRATIO instruments 
 
 
Figure 2.10. 2003 NSSBF: Pearson correlation of LnQUICKRATIO instruments 
 
 
The weak correlation between LnQUICKRATIO the three chosen instruments 
suggests that these might be weak instruments.   In order to ensure that the model is over-
identified, both instruments are kept.  Later tests will indicate if these are weak 
instruments.  It appears that criteria (a) is not satisfied.  Unfortunately, finding 
instruments that meet the criteria for good instruments among the variables available in 
the NSSBF database is a challenge that limits the selection of instruments.   
Figures 2.11 and 2.12  below show the survey-weighted least squares regression 
of LnQUICKRATIO against the chosen instruments, using robust standard errors.  All of 
the instruments are statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level in these regressions. 
 
 
             | wLnQUI~O wLnDEP~S wLnOTR~O 
-------------+--------------------------- 
wLnQUICKRA~O |   1.0000  
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -0.1162*  1.0000  
 wLnOTRRATIO |   0.2516* -0.0605*  1.0000  
 
             | wLnQUI~O wLnDEP~S wLnOTR~O 
-------------+--------------------------- 
wLnQUICKRA~O |   1.0000  
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -0.1172*  1.0000  
 wLnOTRRATIO |   0.2760* -0.0278   1.0000  
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Figure 2.11. 1998 NSSBF: Regression of LnQUICKRATIO against instruments 
 
 
Figure 2. 12. 2003 NSSBF: Regression of LnQUICKRATIO against instruments 
 
 
To test criteria (c), that the instruments can be excluded from the structural model, 
the instruments are included in the structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS and estimated 
using robust WLS.  The results for the 1998 NSSBF data are shown in figure 2.13 and for 
the 2003 NSSBF data in figure 2.14.  In both cases, the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the instrumental variables in the estimated model are equal to zero at the 
0.05 level cannot be rejected.  Therefore, both instruments can legitimately be excluded 
from the structural model, and criteria (c) is satisfied. 
  
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1458 
                                                       F(  2,  1455) =   12.79 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0628 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .91588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -.6919908    .220126    -3.14   0.002    -1.123789   -.2601926 
 wLnOTRRATIO |   1.022422   .2631249     3.89   0.000     .5062777    1.538567 
       _cons |  -.6724175    .568996    -1.18   0.237    -1.788558    .4437226 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1128 
                                                       F(  2,  1125) =   31.28 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0865 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .87149 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -.4582259   .1706524    -2.69   0.007    -.7930587    -.123393 
 wLnOTRRATIO |    .516497    .070581     7.32   0.000     .3780118    .6549823 
       _cons |   1.094835   .0588196    18.61   0.000     .9794265    1.210243 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Figure 2.13. 1998 NSSBF: structural model including three instruments 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1128 
                                                       F( 19,  1108) =   12.47 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1889 
                                                       Root MSE      =  40.133 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FEMOWN |   6.660184    4.09231     1.63   0.104    -1.369368    14.68974 
      MINOWN |  -18.34047   5.768563    -3.18   0.002    -29.65901   -7.021928 
      OWNEXP |   .6725405   .1397455     4.81   0.000     .3983448    .9467362 
      OWNEDU |   .8064288   .8485176     0.95   0.342    -.8584538    2.471311 
    PCACCTNG |   12.04226     5.1846     2.32   0.020     1.869517      22.215 
    MAINSUPL |   14.16011   3.200646     4.42   0.000     7.880099    20.44012 
      OWNSHR |  -.0094421   .0575969    -0.16   0.870    -.1224534    .1035692 
      OWNMGR |  -3.313883   4.967217    -0.67   0.505     -13.0601     6.43233 
    USEDCARD |   -2.68682   4.020778    -0.67   0.504    -10.57602    5.202378 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   5.314489   6.202395     0.86   0.392    -6.855277    17.48425 
wLnQUICKRA~O |   5.728865   1.932791     2.96   0.003     1.936521    9.521208 
wLnPROFTOI~E |   18.69985    7.04563     2.65   0.008     4.875566    32.52413 
     DBSCORE |  -2.957854   1.511785    -1.96   0.051    -5.924138    .0084303 
    PAIDLATE |  -8.586384   3.555207    -2.42   0.016    -15.56208   -1.610686 
FIRMDISTRESS |   -19.0933   4.320067    -4.42   0.000    -27.56973   -10.61686 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   1.800393   3.791783     0.47   0.635    -5.639492    9.240279 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -2.277368   14.82494    -0.15   0.878     -31.3655    26.81076 
 wLnOTRRATIO |  -1.447238   3.079151    -0.47   0.638    -7.488862    4.594387 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |   10.50818    9.05983     1.16   0.246     -7.26818    28.28454 
       _cons |  -43.75774   34.09466    -1.28   0.200    -110.6551    23.13965 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Figure 2.14. 2003 NSSBF: structural model including three instruments 
2.4.2.2 The Durban-Wu-Hausman Test.  Endogeneity of LnQUICKRATIO in 
the model can be tested using the Durban-Wu-Hausman test as described in Wooldridge 
(2003, pg 507).  This test requires that one first performs a survey-weighted least squares 
regression of the reduced form equation for LnQUICKRATIO shown below: 
LnQUICKRATIOi = β0i + β1iFEMOWNi + β2iMINOWN i + β3iOWNEXP i + 
β4iOWNEDU i + β5iPCACCTNG i + β6iMAINSUPL i + β7iOWNSHR i + 
β8iOWNMGR i + β9iUSEDCARD i +  β10iLnUNUSEDLOC i + 
β11iLnPROFTOINCOMEi  + β12iDBSCORE i +  
β13iPAIDLATE i + β14iLnDEBTRATIOi + β15iFIRMDISTRESS   + 
β16iLnOTRRATIO + β17iLnINVRATIO + β18iLnDEPRTOASSETS + µi 
 
The residuals from this regression are then included as a regressor in the original 
structural model presented in Section 2.3.  If the coefficient of the residual term in the 
model is significantly different than zero when estimated using survey-weighted least 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1458 
                                                       F( 19,  1438) =    9.64 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1850 
                                                       Root MSE      =  40.275 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FEMOWN |   2.758206   5.337174     0.52   0.605    -7.711274    13.22769 
      MINOWN |  -4.914674   7.892671    -0.62   0.534    -20.39706    10.56771 
      OWNEXP |   .0567438    .143492     0.40   0.693    -.2247323    .3382199 
      OWNEDU |   1.348544    .932674     1.45   0.148    -.4810038    3.178091 
    PCACCTNG |   .7451728   5.990711     0.12   0.901     -11.0063    12.49664 
    MAINSUPL |   8.883382   3.302506     2.69   0.007     2.405136    15.36163 
      OWNSHR |   .0237126   .0633593     0.37   0.708     -.100574    .1479992 
      OWNMGR |  -2.651197   5.015733    -0.53   0.597    -12.49013     7.18774 
    USEDCARD |  -6.620677   4.482035    -1.48   0.140     -15.4127    2.171351 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   17.12684    5.89196     2.91   0.004     5.569082     28.6846 
wLnQUICKRA~O |   3.817436   2.005802     1.90   0.057    -.1171751    7.752046 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -5.531428   10.65452    -0.52   0.604    -26.43149    15.36864 
     DBSCORE |  -4.236725   1.134631    -3.73   0.000    -6.462433   -2.011016 
    PAIDLATE |  -20.25221   3.577767    -5.66   0.000    -27.27041     -13.234 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -9.954424    10.2512    -0.97   0.332    -30.06333    10.15448 
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -4.379723   4.563768    -0.96   0.337    -13.33208    4.572634 
 wLnOTRRATIO |   2.335708   7.463734     0.31   0.754    -12.30526    16.97668 
 wLnINVRATIO |   18.57083   10.90955     1.70   0.089    -2.829513    39.97117 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -12.35012   11.17154    -1.11   0.269    -34.26439    9.564148 
       _cons |   91.68288   63.27141     1.45   0.148    -32.43126     215.797 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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squares regression using robust standard errors, then it can be concluded that 
LnQUICKRATIO is endogenous in the model; otherwise one can conclude it is not. 
The results of the Durban-Wu-Hausman test for LnQUICKRATIO  using the 
1998 NSSBF data are shown in figures 2.15 and 2.16 below.  The first figure is the 
results of the regression of the reduced form equation for LnQUICKRATIO from which 
the residuals for step 2 are derived.  Included in the figure is a Wald test for the null that 
the coefficients of the instruments are jointly zero.  That null hypothesis can be rejected 
with an F-value greater than 10, which according to Staiger and Stock (1997) is the 
minimum F-value for this test below which instruments are considered to be weak. 
The second figure is the results of the regression of the original structural model 
including variable “quickresid” which contains the residuals from the step 1 regression.  
Also included in this figure is a Wald test for the null hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficient for the residuals is zero.  The test results indicate that the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero cannot be rejected.  From this it is concluded that 
LnQUICKRATIO is not endogenous in the model using the 1998 NSSBF data. 
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Figure 2.15. 1998 NSSBF: Regression of reduced form model for LnQUICKRATIO (step 1 of Durban-Wu-Hausman 
test) 
  
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1128 
                                                       F( 18,  1109) =   16.79 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3190 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .75784 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FEMOWN |   .0615223    .083426     0.74   0.461    -.1021683    .2252128 
      MINOWN |   .0800132   .1161038     0.69   0.491    -.1477948    .3078211 
      OWNEXP |  -.0003685    .002734    -0.13   0.893     -.005733     .004996 
      OWNEDU |   .0498485   .0150991     3.30   0.001     .0202224    .0794745 
    PCACCTNG |    .031885   .0961034     0.33   0.740    -.1566799      .22045 
    MAINSUPL |   .0233792    .061446     0.38   0.704    -.0971843    .1439428 
      OWNSHR |    .001876   .0010775     1.74   0.082    -.0002382    .0039902 
      OWNMGR |    .009916   .1020676     0.10   0.923    -.1903514    .2101834 
    USEDCARD |   .0025243   .0682403     0.04   0.970    -.1313703     .136419 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   .2605771   .1540849     1.69   0.091    -.0417538    .5629079 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -.1568942   .1543213    -1.02   0.310    -.4596889    .1459006 
     DBSCORE |  -.0048467   .0287402    -0.17   0.866    -.0612379    .0515445 
    PAIDLATE |  -.1869018   .0696965    -2.68   0.007    -.3236536     -.05015 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -.1963231   .0705567    -2.78   0.005    -.3347628   -.0578834 
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -.6499466   .0874798    -7.43   0.000     -.821591   -.4783021 
 wLnOTRRATIO |   .3252673   .0736968     4.41   0.000     .1806664    .4698682 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -1.721261   .2686347    -6.41   0.000    -2.248351   -1.194172 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -.8200753   .1665252    -4.92   0.000    -1.146815   -.4933352 
       _cons |    3.14835   .7041751     4.47   0.000     1.766684    4.530015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test for H0: LnOTRRATIO = 0 and LnDEPRTOASSETS = 0 
F( 2,  1109) = 22.95     Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Figure 2. 16. 1998 NSSBF: Regression of structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS 
 
The results of the Durban-Wu-Hausman test for LnQUICKRATIO  using the 
2003 NSSBF data are shown in figures 2.17 and 2.18 below.  The first figure is the 
results of the regression of the reduced form equation for LnQUICKRATIO from which 
the residuals for step 2 are derived.  Included in the table is a Wald test for the null that 
the coefficients of the instruments are jointly zero.  That null hypothesis can be rejected 
with an F-value greater than 10, which according to Staiger and Stock (1997) is the 
minimum F-value for this test below which instruments are considered to be weak. 
The second figure is the results of the regression of the original structural model 
including “quickresid” as the residuals from the step 1 regression.  Also included in this 
figure is a Wald test for the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient for the residuals 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1128 
                                                       F( 19,  1108) =   12.77 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1904 
                                                       Root MSE      =  40.097 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FEMOWN |   7.145788   4.080524     1.75   0.080     -.860637    15.15221 
      MINOWN |  -17.61253   5.816917    -3.03   0.003    -29.02595   -6.199119 
      OWNEXP |    .658489   .1411564     4.66   0.000     .3815251     .935453 
      OWNEDU |   1.133372   .9108961     1.24   0.214    -.6539037    2.920648 
    PCACCTNG |     11.955   5.161037     2.32   0.021     1.828491    22.08151 
    MAINSUPL |   14.69452   3.223786     4.56   0.000     8.369106    21.01993 
      OWNSHR |   .1015582   .0884806     1.15   0.251    -.0720502    .2751666 
      OWNMGR |  -3.125172   4.919469    -0.64   0.525     -12.7777    6.527354 
   wLnOWNERS |   4.699707   3.470138     1.35   0.176    -2.109076    11.50849 
    USEDCARD |   -2.54174   4.024871    -0.63   0.528    -10.43897    5.355488 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   6.861855   6.379607     1.08   0.282    -5.655618    19.37933 
wLnQUICKRA~O |    -2.9519   6.823721    -0.43   0.665    -16.34077    10.43697 
wLnPROFTOI~E |   17.10475   7.239183     2.36   0.018     2.900693     31.3088 
     DBSCORE |  -2.902804   1.517289    -1.91   0.056    -5.879889    .0742796 
    PAIDLATE |  -10.54324   3.830702    -2.75   0.006    -18.05949   -3.026993 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -20.75256    4.53254    -4.58   0.000    -29.64589   -11.85923 
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -3.790301   5.682728    -0.67   0.505    -14.94042    7.359821 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -19.77256   16.26048    -1.22   0.224    -51.67736    12.13224 
  quickresid |   8.776312   7.068501     1.24   0.215    -5.092845    22.64547 
       _cons |  -21.59876   40.21116    -0.54   0.591    -100.4974    57.29985 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: quickresid = coefficient for residuals from step 1 regression) 
Wald test for H0: quickresid = 0   
F(  1,  1108) =    1.54    Prob > F =    0.2146 
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is zero.  The test results indicate that the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero cannot 
be rejected.  From this it is concluded that LnQUICKRATIO is not endogenous in the 
model using the 2003 NSSBF data. 
Since LnQUICKRATIO is not endogenous in the model, the model will not be 
estimated using 2SLS regression, as that would not be an appropriate estimation method 
in this case. 
 
Figure 2.17. 2003 NSSBF: Regression of reduced form model for LnQUICKRATIO (step 1 of Durban-Wu-Hausman 
test, using implicate #3 only) 
  
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1458 
                                                       F( 18,  1439) =   15.51 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3320 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .7775 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FEMOWN |  -.0575275   .0726871    -0.79   0.429    -.2001114    .0850564 
      MINOWN |  -.1675001   .1430627    -1.17   0.242     -.448134    .1131338 
      OWNEXP |    .001042   .0030808     0.34   0.735    -.0050014    .0070853 
      OWNEDU |  -.0030634   .0168186    -0.18   0.855     -.036055    .0299283 
    PCACCTNG |   .1022847   .1113086     0.92   0.358    -.1160599    .3206293 
    MAINSUPL |  -.0020161   .0630403    -0.03   0.974    -.1256769    .1216447 
      OWNSHR |   .0015025   .0011724     1.28   0.200    -.0007974    .0038023 
      OWNMGR |   .0921253   .0921342     1.00   0.318    -.0886064    .2728571 
    USEDCARD |   .0859155   .0891353     0.96   0.335    -.0889336    .2607646 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   -.072471   .1096908    -0.66   0.509     -.287642       .1427 
wLnPROFTOI~E |    .005521   .2375943     0.02   0.981    -.4605472    .4715893 
     DBSCORE |  -.0737959   .0187978    -3.93   0.000    -.1106699   -.0369218 
    PAIDLATE |  -.1154993   .0711013    -1.62   0.105    -.2549725    .0239739 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -.0331077   .0993767    -0.33   0.739    -.2280463    .1618309 
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -.8982158   .0786232   -11.42   0.000    -1.052444   -.7439874 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -1.496067   .1872062    -7.99   0.000    -1.863293   -1.128841 
 wLnOTRRATIO |    .449127   .2354571     1.91   0.057    -.0127489     .911003 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |  -1.349834   .2061715    -6.55   0.000    -1.754263   -.9454047 
       _cons |   1.556327   1.349264     1.15   0.249    -1.090407    4.203061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test for H0: LnOTRRATIO = 0 and LnDEPRTOASSETS = 0 
F(  2,  1439) =   24.49     Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Figure 2.18.  2003 NSSBF: Regression of structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS (step 2 of Durban-Wu-Hausman test, 
using implicate #3 only) 
 
2.4.2.3 The test of over-identifying restrictions.  In order to investigate whether 
or not the chosen instruments are exogenous, the test of over-identifying restrictions can 
be used, since the model has one endogenous variable and two instruments, making it 
over-identified by one instrument.  This test relies on the fact that under the null 
hypothesis that all instruments are valid,  the objective function of the GMM estimator 
has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of over-identifying restrictions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  So the model must be 
estimated using GMM with robust errors instead of 2SLS, then the Hansen’s J statistic 
produced is examined to see if one can reject the null hypothesis that the chosen set of 
instruments is valid.   
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1458 
                                                       F( 18,  1439) =   10.17 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1849 
                                                       Root MSE      =  40.262 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FEMOWN |   3.251877   5.328072     0.61   0.542    -7.199742     13.7035 
      MINOWN |  -3.487909    7.96128    -0.44   0.661    -19.10487    12.12905 
      OWNEXP |   .0485413   .1431064     0.34   0.735    -.2321783    .3292609 
      OWNEDU |   1.381428   .9281648     1.49   0.137    -.4392728    3.202129 
    PCACCTNG |   -.132007   5.958247    -0.02   0.982    -11.81979    11.55577 
    MAINSUPL |   8.884232   3.300053     2.69   0.007     2.410802    15.35766 
      OWNSHR |    .011337   .0634957     0.18   0.858     -.113217    .1358911 
      OWNMGR |  -3.369845   5.038293    -0.67   0.504    -13.25303     6.51334 
    USEDCARD |  -7.391274   4.496817    -1.64   0.100    -16.21229    1.429745 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   17.73881   5.879973     3.02   0.003     6.204572    29.27305 
wLnQUICKRA~O |   12.27657   6.627639     1.85   0.064    -.7243022    25.27744 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -5.524069   10.65165    -0.52   0.604    -26.41849    15.37035 
     DBSCORE |   -3.61856   1.237551    -2.92   0.004    -6.046156   -1.190963 
    PAIDLATE |  -19.27278   3.699261    -5.21   0.000     -26.5293   -12.01625 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -9.706589    10.2632    -0.95   0.344    -29.83902    10.42584 
wLnDEBTRATIO |    3.31084   7.283537     0.45   0.649    -10.97665    17.59833 
 wLnINVRATIO |   31.83555   11.35008     2.80   0.005     9.571085    54.10002 
  quickresid |  -8.459131   6.975378    -1.21   0.225    -22.14213    5.223867 
       _cons |   74.43161   62.03761     1.20   0.230    -47.26222    196.1254 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: quickresid = coefficient for residuals from step 1 regression) 
       Wald test for null: quickresid = 0    
F( 1,  1439) =   1.47     Prob > F =  0.2254 
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Shown below are the results of the GMM estimation of the model and Hansen’s J 
statistic for the 1998 NSSBF survey.  For the 1998 NSSBF data, the null hypothesis that 
the chosen instruments for LnQUICKRATIO are valid cannot be rejected.   
 
Figure 2.19. 1998 NSSBF: GMM regression of structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS with instruments for 
LnQUICKRATIO 
Shown below are the results of the GMM estimation of the model and Hansen’s J 
statistic for the 2003 NSSBF survey.  For the 2003 NSSBF data, the null hypothesis that 
the chosen instruments for LnQUICKRATIO are valid cannot be rejected.   
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =    1128 
                                                       Wald chi2(17) =  215.00 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1696 
GMM weight matrix: Robust                              Root MSE      =  40.248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnQUICKRA~O |  -2.369528   6.880186    -0.34   0.731    -15.85444    11.11539 
      FEMOWN |   6.977314   4.079691     1.71   0.087    -1.018733    14.97336 
      MINOWN |  -17.93512   5.874447    -3.05   0.002    -29.44882   -6.421412 
      OWNEXP |   .6659862   .1401161     4.75   0.000     .3913636    .9406088 
      OWNEDU |   1.221354   .9265754     1.32   0.187    -.5947002    3.037409 
    PCACCTNG |   12.15788   5.277206     2.30   0.021     1.814743    22.50101 
    MAINSUPL |     14.425   3.210209     4.49   0.000      8.13311     20.7169 
      OWNSHR |    .006395   .0588331     0.11   0.913    -.1089156    .1217057 
      OWNMGR |  -3.414694   5.048441    -0.68   0.499    -13.30946    6.480069 
    USEDCARD |  -2.691758   4.068697    -0.66   0.508    -10.66626    5.282741 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   7.355868   6.397988     1.15   0.250    -5.183959    19.89569 
wLnPROFTOI~E |   17.71031   7.324319     2.42   0.016     3.354909    32.06571 
     DBSCORE |  -2.949567   1.522382    -1.94   0.053    -5.933381    .0342467 
    PAIDLATE |  -9.982724   3.892596    -2.56   0.010    -17.61207   -2.353375 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -20.73281   4.596912    -4.51   0.000    -29.74259   -11.72302 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   -3.89643   5.647557    -0.69   0.490    -14.96544    7.172579 
 wLnINVRATIO |  -19.18868   16.50613    -1.16   0.245    -51.54009    13.16274 
       _cons |  -15.75488   40.11458    -0.39   0.695      -94.378    62.86825 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  wLnQUICKRATIO 
Instruments:   FEMOWN MINOWN OWNEXP OWNEDU PCACCTNG MAINSUPL OWNSHR OWNMGR 
               USEDCARD wLnUNUSEDLOC wLnPROFTOINCOME DBSCORE PAIDLATE 
               FIRMDISTRESS wLnDEBTRATIO wLnINVRATIO wLnOTRRATIO 
               WLnDEPRTOASSETS 
 
Test of endogeneity (orthogonality conditions) 
      H0: variables are exogenous 
  GMM C statistic chi2(1) =  1.29808  (p = 0.2546) 
 
Test of over-identifying restriction: 
      H0: instruments are valid 
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .305599 (p = 0.5804) 
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Figure 2.20. 2003 NSSBF: GMM regression of structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS with instruments for 
LnQUICKRATIO 
2.5 Univariate Analysis 
Chapter 1 of this document provided an overview of some descriptive statistics 
for small U.S. firms, taken from the 2003 NSSBF survey data.   That overview painted a 
broad picture of the characteristics of small U.S. firms in general.  This section will focus 
on univariate analysis particular to the trade credit discounts question, in order to attempt 
to illuminate the characteristics of firms that are offered trade credit discounts, and those 
that actually take advantage of them.  This analysis is preliminary to the multivariate 
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =    1458 
                                                       Wald chi2(17) =  179.68 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1637 
GMM weight matrix: Robust                              Root MSE      =  40.516 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnQUICKRA~O |   12.17409   6.642266     1.83   0.067     -.844516    25.19269 
      FEMOWN |   3.311145   5.310601     0.62   0.533    -7.097442    13.71973 
      MINOWN |  -3.577016   8.081336    -0.44   0.658    -19.41614    12.26211 
      OWNEXP |   .0473578   .1445213     0.33   0.743    -.2358988    .3306143 
      OWNEDU |   1.388471     .93151     1.49   0.136     -.437255    3.214197 
    PCACCTNG |  -.1668532   5.763003    -0.03   0.977    -11.46213    11.12843 
    MAINSUPL |   8.880268   3.316078     2.68   0.007     2.380874    15.37966 
      OWNSHR |   .0105246   .0635932     0.17   0.869    -.1141157    .1351649 
      OWNMGR |  -3.435293    5.04713    -0.68   0.496    -13.32748      6.4569 
    USEDCARD |  -7.387655   4.578256    -1.61   0.107    -16.36087    1.585561 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   17.75247    5.90137     3.01   0.003     6.185995    29.31894 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -5.657274   10.78764    -0.52   0.600    -26.80065     15.4861 
     DBSCORE |  -3.622708   1.254711    -2.89   0.004    -6.081896   -1.163521 
    PAIDLATE |  -19.25421   3.730194    -5.16   0.000    -26.56526   -11.94316 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -9.918535   10.24053    -0.97   0.333    -29.98961    10.15254 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   3.250149   7.281779     0.45   0.655    -11.02188    17.52217 
 wLnINVRATIO |   31.72482    11.3406     2.80   0.005      9.49766    53.95198 
       _cons |   75.50177   62.30208     1.21   0.226    -46.60806    197.6116 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  wLnQUICKRATIO 
Instruments:   FEMOWN MINOWN OWNEXP OWNEDU PCACCTNG MAINSUPL OWNSHR OWNMGR 
               USEDCARD wLnUNUSEDLOC wLnPROFTOINCOME DBSCORE PAIDLATE 
               FIRMDISTRESS wLnDEBTRATIO wLnINVRATIO wLnOTRRATIO 
               WLnDEPRTOASSETS 
 
Test of endogeneity (orthogonality conditions) 
     H0: variables are exogenous 
     GMM C statistic chi2(1) =  1.42435  (p = 0.2327) 
 
Test of over identifying restriction: 
   H0: instruments are valid 
     Hansen's J chi2(1) = .033377 (p = 0.8550) 
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analysis presented in the next section in support of the hypotheses of this essay.   All 
statistics presented in this section are survey-weighted population statistics, not 
unweighted sample statistics. 
Figures 2.21 (for the 1998 NSSBF) and 2.22 (for the 2003 NSSBF) below present 
two-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical regressors used in the trade credit 
model, against the variable OFFEREDTCD.  For each two-way tabulation presented, the 
Pearson Chi-square test results are presented.  The null hypothesis for this test is that 
there is no difference between the responses of the regressor variable between firms that 
have been offered trade credit discounts, and those that have not been offered them.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there is a significant difference in the 
responses between the two subpopulations.   
Examination of figure 2.21 shows that for the population represented by the 1998 
NSSBF survey, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance for all 
regressors except OWNDISTRESS.  Examination of figure 2.22 shows that for the 
population represented by the 2003 NSSBF survey, the null hypothesis can be rejected at 
the 0.05 level of significance for all regressors except OWNDISTRESS and 
FIRMDISTRESS.  Hence, there is no significant different in the responses to the owner 
and firm distress questions between firms in the population that are offered trade credit 
discounts, and those that are not.  It is interesting that all other dummy and categorical 
variables in the model show significant differences in responses  between the two 
subpopulations.   One possible interpretation is that OFFEREDTCD is a broad proxy for 
a number of other latent variables that influence the firm characteristics along the 
dimensions measured by the dummy and categorical variables.  In fact, when 
OFFERETCD is modeled in the first stage of the Heckman estimation presented in the 
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next section, it will be shown that OFFEREDTCD can in fact be significantly modeled in 
terms of other factors, some of which have been presented in figures 2.21 and 2.22. 
 
 
 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FAMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No | 6.075  5.113  11.19 
Yes|  56.4  32.41  88.81 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441  
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =   12.7985 
Design-based F(1, 3363) =  9.0660   
P = 0.0026  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FEMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No |  44.8   31.4   76.2 
      Yes | 17.68  6.123   23.8 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441      
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  65.9859 
Design-based  F(1, 3363)= 45.6961   
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  MINOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 55.33  35.47  90.81 
      Yes | 7.207  1.985  9.192 
    Total | 62.54  37.46    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3553 
Number of PSUs     =      3434      
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  38.6452 
Design-based  F(1, 3356) = 42.5161  
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  OWNMGR  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 3.883  3.744  7.627 
      Yes | 58.59  33.78  92.37 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441      
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 16.7671 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 12.3034  
P = 0.0005 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  OWNEDU  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
 Less tha | 2.393  1.025  3.418 
 High Sch | 12.25  7.953   20.2 
 Some col | 10.61  7.565  18.18 
 Associat |  3.56  1.922  5.482 
 Trade Sc | 2.953  1.398  4.351 
  College | 17.63  12.38  30.02 
 Post-gra | 13.08  5.275  18.36 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441      
Uncorrected   chi2(6) = 38.9382 
Design-based  F(5.92,19909.34) = 
4.225    
P = 0.0003 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 PCACCTNG |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 11.12  5.223  16.35 
      Yes | 47.78  35.88  83.65 
    Total |  58.9   41.1    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      2863 
Number of PSUs     =      2781      
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 19.3490 
Design-based  F(1, 2703) = 12.0654  
P = 0.0005 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
MANUFACTUR|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 59.04  32.57  91.61 
      Yes |  3.44  4.953  8.394 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441      
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 64.2677 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 45.9396  
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD  
TRANSPORTN|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 59.75  36.59  96.34 
      Yes | 2.728  .9303  3.658 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78      
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441      
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 8.4325 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 6.1604   
P = 0.0131 
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Figure 2.21. 1998 NSSBF: Two-way tabulation of OFFEREDTCD versus firm characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
WHOLESALE |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 59.36  33.48  92.84 
      Yes | 3.117   4.04  7.157 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 41.9401 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 
26.3415     P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 RETAIL   |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 51.51  29.23  80.74 
      Yes | 10.97  8.288  19.26 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 10.9946 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 7.6143  
P = 0.0058 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 SERVICES |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 30.15  26.69  56.84 
      Yes | 32.33  10.83  43.16 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  177.9980 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) =  
121.5270     P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 USEDCARD |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 22.68  8.397  31.07 
      Yes |  39.8  29.13  68.93 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 75.5107 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 
49.2098     P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 DBSCORE  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
 Low Risk | 2.045  3.489  5.535 
 Moderate | 14.88  12.11  26.99 
  Average |  27.3  11.53  38.83 
 Signific | 14.47  7.007  21.48 
 High Ris |  3.77   3.39   7.16 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(4) =  131.4280 
Design-based  F(3.99,13432.91)= 
22.8768     
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 PAIDLATE |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 25.75  31.54  57.29 
      Yes |  15.1  27.62  42.71 
    Total | 40.85  59.15    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      2338 
Number of PSUs     =      2310     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 21.8279 
Design-based  F(1, 2232) = 
14.5044     P = 0.0001 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
OWNDISTRES|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 52.04  32.08  84.11 
      Yes | 10.44  5.446  15.89 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 3.0200 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 2.0256  
P = 0.1548 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
FIRMDISTRS|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 55.72  30.44  86.16 
      Yes |  6.76   7.08  13.84 
    Total | 62.48  37.52    100 
Number of strata   =        78     
Number of obs      =      3561 
Number of PSUs     =      3441     
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  45.3433 
Design-based  F(1, 3363) = 
31.4878     P = 0.0000 
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          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FAMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
      No  | 5.903  4.237  10.14 
      Yes | 61.37  28.49  89.86 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 Uncorrected   chi2(1) 
= 17.8244 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 12.1288      
P = 0.0005   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FEMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 50.35  27.89  78.24 
      Yes | 16.97  4.789  21.76 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055  Uncorrected   
chi2(1) =  60.1335 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 34.9288      
P = 0.0000  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  MINOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 59.59  31.17  90.76 
      Yes | 7.736  1.506  9.242 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055 
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  51.9509 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 32.1854      
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  OWNMGR  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No |  3.12  2.608  5.728 
      Yes |  64.2  30.07  94.27 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100       
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055 
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 19.0864 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 10.8367      
P = 0.0010   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  OWNEDU  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
 Less tha | 1.325  .4123  1.737 
 High Sch | 12.08  7.485  19.57 
 Some col | 10.09  6.313   16.4 
 Associat | 5.997  3.197  9.193 
 Trade Sc | 4.378  2.511   6.89 
  College | 18.33   7.83  26.16 
 Post-gra | 15.12  4.928  20.05 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100  
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055  
Uncorrected   chi2(6)  =  56.0894 
Design-based F(5.98,23812.30)=    5.3311     
P = 0.0000  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 PCACCTNG |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 10.41  3.639  14.05 
      Yes | 54.76  31.19  85.95 
    Total | 65.17  34.83    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      3814 
Number of PSUs     =      3709 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  = 21.9026 
Design-based  F(1, 3637) = 10.3734      
P = 0.0013 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
MANUFACTUR|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 64.13  28.63  92.76 
      Yes | 3.142  4.094  7.237 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100        
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  85.4721 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) =  55.7737      
P = 0.0000    
          |      OFFEREDTCD  
TRANSPORTN|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 64.53  31.68  96.21 
      Yes | 2.741  1.049   3.79 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  = 1.9418 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) =  0.8963      
P = 0.3438   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
WHOLESALE |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
                No | 64.39  29.74  94.13 
      Yes | 2.887  2.984  5.871 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113  
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  39.3819 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 25.8476      
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 RETAIL   |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 55.76  25.35  81.11 
      Yes | 11.52  7.377  18.89 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =   17.9142 
Design-based  F(1,4041) =  10.1505      
P = 0.0015 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 SERVICES |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 30.66  23.71  54.37 
      Yes | 36.61  9.018  45.63 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  271.5291 
Design-based F(1, 4041) =  157.2020      
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 USEDCARD |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No |  17.3  5.061  22.36 
      Yes | 49.98  27.66  77.64 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113  
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =   56.4532 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 32.2914       
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FAMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
      No  | 5.903  4.237  10.14 
      Yes | 61.37  28.49  89.86 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 Uncorrected   chi2(1) 
= 17.8244 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 12.1288      
P = 0.0005   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FAMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
      No  | 5.903  4.237  10.14 
      Yes | 61.37  28.49  89.86 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 Uncorrected   chi2(1) 
= 17.8244 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 12.1288      
P = 0.0005   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FEMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 50.35  27.89  78.24 
      Yes | 16.97  4.789  21.76 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055  Uncorrected   
chi2(1) =  60.1335 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 34.9288      
P = 0.0000  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  FEMOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No | 50.35  27.89  78.24 
      Yes | 16.97  4.789  21.76 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100 
Number of strata   =        72                   
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055  Uncorrected   
chi2(1) =  60.1335 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 34.9288      
P = 0.0000  
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Figure 2.22. 2003 NSSBF: Two-way tabulation of OFFEREDTCD versus firm characteristics (using implicate #3 
only) 
   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  MINOWN  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No | 59.59  31.17  90.76 
      Yes | 7.736  1.506  9.242 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055 
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  51.9509 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 32.1854      
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  OWNMGR  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No |  3.12  2.608  5.728 
      Yes |  64.2  30.07  94.27 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100       
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055 
Uncorrected   chi2(1) = 19.0864 
Design-based  F(1, 3983) = 10.8367      
P = 0.0010   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
  OWNEDU  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
 Less tha | 1.325  .4123  1.737 
 High Sch | 12.08  7.485  19.57 
 Some col | 10.09  6.313   16.4 
 Associat | 5.997  3.197  9.193 
 Trade Sc | 4.378  2.511   6.89 
  College | 18.33   7.83  26.16 
 Post-gra | 15.12  4.928  20.05 
    Total | 67.32  32.68    100  
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4181 
Number of PSUs     =      4055  
Uncorrected   chi2(6)  =  56.0894 
Design-based F(5.98,23812.30)=    
5.3311     
P = 0.0000  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 PCACCTNG |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 10.41  3.639  14.05 
      Yes | 54.76  31.19  85.95 
    Total | 65.17  34.83    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      3814 
Number of PSUs     =      3709 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  = 21.9026 
Design-based  F(1, 3637) = 10.3734      
P = 0.0013 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
MANUFACTUR|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 64.13  28.63  92.76 
      Yes | 3.142  4.094  7.237 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100        
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  85.4721 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) =  55.7737     
P = 0.0000    
          |      OFFEREDTCD  
TRANSPORTN|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No | 64.53  31.68  96.21 
      Yes | 2.741  1.049   3.79 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  = 1.9418 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) =  0.8963      
P = 0.3438   
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
WHOLESALE |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
                No | 64.39  29.74  94.13 
      Yes | 2.887  2.984  5.871 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113  
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  39.3819 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 25.8476      
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 RETAIL   |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No | 55.76  25.35  81.11 
      Yes | 11.52  7.377  18.89 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =   17.9142 
Design-based  F(1,4041) =  10.1505      
P = 0.0015 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 SERVICES |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No | 30.66  23.71  54.37 
      Yes | 36.61  9.018  45.63 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113 
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  271.5291 
Design-based F(1, 4041) =  157.2020     
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 USEDCARD |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
No |  17.3  5.061  22.36 
      Yes | 49.98  27.66  77.64 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113  
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =   56.4532 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 32.2914      
P = 0.0000 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 DBSCORE  |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
 Low Risk | 4.981  5.642  10.62 
 Moderate | 11.68  6.476  18.16 
  Average | 16.76  8.597  25.36 
 Signific | 17.05  5.344  22.39 
High Risk | 10.96  3.665  14.62 
Very High | 5.792  3.046  8.838 
    Total | 67.23  32.77    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4211 
Number of PSUs     =      4087 
Uncorrected   chi2(5) =  138.5917 
Design-based  F(4.93, 19806.54)=   
15.4369     
P = 0.0000    
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
 PAIDLATE |    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 30.31   28.9  59.21 
      Yes |  16.4  24.39  40.79 
    Total | 46.71  53.29    100       
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      2922 
Number of PSUs     =      2881 
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  34.1905 
Design-based  F(1, 2809) =  16.3177     
P = 0.0001 
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
OWNDISTRES|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
       No | 63.79  31.66  95.45 
      Yes | 3.483  1.067   4.55 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100       
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113  
Uncorrected   chi2(1)  =  7.8936 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) =  3.3476      
P = 0.0674  
          |      OFFEREDTCD 
FIRMDISTRS|    No    Yes  Total 
----------+-------------------- 
                No | 64.96  31.57  96.53 
      Yes | 2.316  1.156  3.472 
    Total | 67.27  32.73    100 
Number of strata   =        72          
Number of obs      =      4240 
Number of PSUs     =      4113  
Uncorrected   chi2(1) =  0.0231 
Design-based  F(1, 4041) = 0.0098      
P = 0.9211  
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Tables 2.8 (for the 1998 NSSBF) and 2.9 (for the 2003 NSSBF) below present the 
means of a variety of numerical variables that characterize the firm across multiple 
dimensions.  These variables are drawn from the firm’s balance sheet and income 
statement, represent owner characteristics, or represent lender relationship characteristics.  
The variables are: 
 SALES: Annual sales 
 LOANS: Total of all outstanding loans held by the firm 
 PAYABLES: Accounts Payable 
 RECEIVABLES: Accounts receivable 
 OCURRLIB: Other current liabilities 
 OPEX: Operating expenses 
 INVENTORY: Inventory 
 OTRCURRENT: Other current assets 
 TOTALASSETS: Total assets of the firm 
 CURRLIB: Current liabilities 
 INVESTMENTS: Firm’s investments in non-core activities (see 
essay #3) 
 OTRINCOME: Other income (not from Sales) 
 TOTINCOME: Total income from all sources 
 TOTLIABILITIES: Total liabilities of the firm 
 DEPRECIABLES: Depreciable assets 
 LAND: Value of firm’s investment in land 
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 FIRMAGE: Age of the firm 
 TOTEMP: Total employees 
 OWNEXP: Years of primary owner experience managing a 
business 
 OWNAGE: The age of the primary owner 
 RELLENGTH: The length of the firm’s relationship with its 
primary financial inst. 
 RELNUM: The number of relationships with financial institutions. 
 OWNSHR: The percentage of ownership share of the firm’s 
primary owner 
 OWNERS: The number of owners/shareholders of the firm 
 OWNWORTH: Net worth of the firm’s primary owner, not 
including the firm 
 OWNEQUITY: Primary owner’s equity investment in the firm 
For each variable, means are calculated for the two subpopulations represented by 
the binary variable OFFEREDTCD.  For each pair of means presented, the results of the 
Adjusted Wald Test for equality of means is provided.  The null hypothesis for this test is 
that there is no difference between the means for firms that have been offered trade credit 
discounts (OFFEREDTCD=1), and those that have not been offered them 
(OFFEREDTCD=0).  Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there is a significant 
difference in the means between the two subpopulations.   
When examining the results in tables 2.8 and 2.9, two observations are 
immediately apparent.  First, for all of the variables examined, the subpopulation means 
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are significantly different from each other at the 0.05 percent level of significance except 
for LAND and OWNAGE for the 1998 survey, and OWNERS, LAND and OWNAGE 
for the 2003 survey.  Second, for all of the income statement and balance sheet variables 
examined (excluding LAND), the subpopulation mean for the firms for which 
OFFEREDTCD=1 are significantly larger than the means for the other firms, indicating 
that firms that are offered trade credit discounts are uniformly larger in all of the 
measures examined than those for which OFFEREDTCD=0.  These firms also tend to be 
older, have wealthier and more experienced owners, have longer relationships with their 
primary financial institution, and have more relationships with financial institutions.  
Since the subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 is also the subpopulation that will be 
examined in the multivariate analysis in the next section, it is important to keep in mind 
these characteristics of that subpopulation under study. 
 
  
 
Table 2.8 
 1998 NSSBF: Survey-weighted means over OFFEREDTCD for firm characteristic variables 
             |             Linearized 
   OFFEREDTCD|       Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]    Adj Wald Test (H0: means are equal) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SALES        | 
          No |   503390.3   34757.28      435242.2    571538.4   
         Yes |    1931726   161325.6       1615417     2248035   F(1, 3291) = 73.34, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LOANS        | 
          No |   89469.91   12292.38      65368.42    113571.4 
         Yes |   263089.2   20849.07      222210.8    303967.7   F(1, 3291) = 50.59, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PAYABLES     | 
          No |    26564.5   2802.768      21069.15    32059.85 
         Yes |     128186   10435.14        107726      148646   F(1, 3291) = 86.99, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OCURRLIB     | 
          No |   15965.86   1876.695      12286.25    19645.47 
         Yes |   70804.54   8228.168      54671.69    86937.38   F(1, 3291) = 41.46, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RECEIVABLES  | 
          No |   41538.76   4187.543       33328.3    49749.21 
         Yes |   192228.4   20600.72      151836.9    232619.9   F(1, 3291) = 50.75, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPEX         | 
          No |   401671.8   31863.32      339197.9    464145.8 
         Yes |    1757892   154991.4       1454002     2061781   F(1, 3291) = 72.16, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INVENTORY    | 
          No |   26145.02   2538.699      21167.44    31122.61 
         Yes |   172573.3   14034.28      145056.5    200090.1   F(1, 3291) = 104.05,Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CASH         | 
          No |   24741.83   2411.904      20012.85    29470.82 
         Yes |   78195.04   10119.73      58353.43    98036.65   F(1, 3291) = 26.23, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OTRCURRENT   | 
          No |   18817.48    4048.93      10878.81    26756.16 
         Yes |   52998.37   8620.397      36096.49    69900.26   F(1, 3291) = 12.70, Prob > F = 0.0004 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTALASSETS  | 
          No |   229915.2   17143.77      196301.7    263528.7 
         Yes |   773008.5   48252.46      678400.7    867616.4   F(1, 3291) = 108.60,Prob > F = 0.0000 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CURRLIB      | 
          No |   42530.36   3852.248      34977.31     50083.4 
         Yes |   198990.5   14490.75      170578.7    227402.3   F(1, 3291) = 105.69,Prob > F = 0.0000 
INVESTMENTS  | 
          No |   11919.78    2819.44      6391.742    17447.81 
         Yes |   23744.97   3402.283      17074.16    30415.77   F(1, 3291) = 7.07,  Prob > F = 0.0079 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OTRINCOME    | 
          No |   7922.612   1548.831      4885.841    10959.38 
         Yes |   24475.05   3972.597      16686.04    32264.07   F(1, 3291) = 15.01, Prob > F = 0.0001 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTINCOME    | 
          No |   511312.9   35000.56      442687.9      579938 
         Yes |    1956201   162319.6       1637943     2274459   F(1, 3291) = 74.11, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTLIABILIES | 
          No |   134951.3   13996.19      107509.2    162393.4 
         Yes |   466076.6   30226.12      406812.7    525340.5   F(1, 3291) = 95.84, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DEPRECIABLES | 
          No |   77375.32   8670.814      60374.59    94376.06 
         Yes |   197283.5   16924.93        164099    230467.9   F(1, 3291) = 38.90, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LAND         | 
          No |   25434.76   4610.499      16395.02    34474.49 
         Yes |   48116.06   11292.96      25974.14    70257.99   F(1, 3291) = 3.46,  Prob > F = 0.0631 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
FIRMAGE      | 
          No |   12.83383   .2867487      12.27161    13.39606 
         Yes |   14.58927   .3650314      13.87356    15.30498   F(1, 3291) = 14.21, Prob > F = 0.0002 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTEMP       | 
          No |   6.140928   .2677732      5.615909    6.665947 
         Yes |   13.56289   .6302133      12.32724    14.79854   F(1, 3291) = 106.69,Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNEXP       | 
          No |   17.40193   .2968669      16.81987    17.98399 
         Yes |   19.75739   .3727386      19.02657    20.48821   F(1, 3291) = 24.31, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNAGE       | 
          No |   49.70782   .2965234      49.12643    50.28921 
         Yes |   50.50998    .354256       49.8154    51.20457   F(1, 3291) = 3.01,  Prob > F = 0.0827 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RELLENGTH    | 
          No |   89.54078   2.590315      84.46199    94.61957 
         Yes |   103.0949   3.584077      96.06767    110.1222   F(1, 3291) = 9.29,  Prob > F = 0.0023 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RELNUM       | 
          No |   1.961133    .031434      1.899501    2.022765 
         Yes |     2.3976   .0456943      2.308007    2.487192   F(1, 3291) = 61.72, Prob > F = 0.0000   
 
OWNSHR       | 
          No |    87.1163   .5988006      85.94224    88.29036 
         Yes |   80.56001   .8457168      78.90183     82.2182   F(1, 3291) = 39.64, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNERS       | 
          No |   1.755378   .2003692      1.362517    2.148239 
         Yes |   3.825297    .774444      2.306856    5.343738   F(1, 3291) = 6.66,  Prob > F = 0.0099 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNWORTH     | 
          No |   465884.5   25155.47      416562.6    515206.5 
         Yes |   886334.7   78477.38      732465.2     1040204   F(1, 3291) = 25.93, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNEQUITY    | 
          No |   62442.55    11154.3      40572.49    84312.61 
         Yes |   178705.2   21615.14      136324.7    221085.7   F(1, 3291) = 22.78, Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units. 
No:  OFFEREDTCD = No     Yes: OFFEREDTCD = Yes 
Number of strata =      78         Number of obs    =     3489        Design df   =   3291 
Number of PSUs   =    3369         Population size  =  4944450 
 
 
 
  
88
  
 
Table 2.9 
2003 NSSBF: Survey-weighted means over OFFEREDTCD for firm characteristic variables (using implicate #3 only) 
             |             Linearized 
   OFFEREDTCD|       Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]   Adj Wald Test (H0: means are equal) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SALES        | 
          No |   597686.4    45882.4      507730.8      687642 
         Yes |    2140688   99786.99       1945049     2336327  F(1,3920) =  191.20, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LOANS        | 
          No |   140833.1   20195.11      101239.1      180427 
         Yes |   388221.4   34551.99      320479.9      455963  F(1,3920) =  37.92,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PAYABLES     | 
          No |   26843.91   3292.804      20388.13    33299.68 
         Yes |   136181.4   12305.46      112055.7    160307.1  F(1,3920) =  72.84,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OCURRLIB     | 
          No |   14478.04   2229.416      10107.11    18848.96 
         Yes |   83354.19   8703.192      66290.98    100417.4  F(1,3920) =  58.16,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RECEIVABLES  | 
          No |   43797.64   4608.575      34762.21    52833.07 
         Yes |   210461.2   18034.02      175104.3    245818.2  F(1,3920) =  79.18,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
OPEX         | 
          No |   473656.3   40425.98      394398.4    552914.3 
         Yes |    1896059   89875.57       1719852     2072266  F(1,3920) = 201.77,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INVENTORY    | 
          No |   28267.06   3235.963      21922.73    34611.39 
         Yes |   224231.9   23555.13      178050.4    270413.4  F(1,3920) =  67.74,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CASH         | 
          No |   33553.44   2845.527      27974.59    39132.29 
         Yes |   91644.95   5875.072      80126.46    103163.4  F(1,3920) =  78.07,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OTRCURRENT   | 
          No |   35393.95    10340.1      15121.46    55666.45 
         Yes |    91688.1   13945.87      64346.25    119029.9  F(1,3920) =  10.50,  Prob > F = 0.0012 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTALASSETS  | 
          No |     330063   33890.25      263618.8    396507.2 
         Yes |    1013090   63615.78      888366.9     1137813  F(1,3920) =  88.83,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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CURRLIB      | 
          No |   41321.94   4152.259      33181.15    49462.73 
         Yes |   219535.6   16594.61      187000.7    252070.5  F(1,3920) =  106.72, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INVESTMENTS  | 
          No |       7643   1382.565      4932.386    10353.62 
         Yes |   39383.88   6656.252      26333.84    52433.93  F(1,3920) =  21.76,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OTRINCOME    | 
          No |   7959.555   1611.151      4800.781    11118.33 
         Yes |   37058.99   7760.056      21844.86    52273.12  F(1,3920) =  13.43,  Prob > F = 0.0003 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTINCOME    | 
          No |     605646   46025.93      515408.9      695883 
         Yes |    2177747   101086.6       1979560     2375935  F(1,3920) =  194.00, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTLIABILI~S | 
          No |   182690.9   21608.87      140325.3    225056.6 
         Yes |     610172   44888.48        522165    698178.9  F(1,3920) =  72.70,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DEPRECIABLE  | 
          No |   114580.3    16038.8      83135.14    146025.5 
         Yes |   294999.7   28988.37        238166    351833.4  F(1,3920) =  29.57,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LAND         | 
          No |   61560.53   18647.45      25000.91    98120.15 
         Yes |   47229.21   6003.406      35459.11     58999.3  F(1,3920) =   0.54,  Prob > F = 0.4642 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
  
 
FIRMAGE      | 
          No |     13.469    .276513      12.92688    14.01112 
         Yes |   16.22688   .3891675      15.46389    16.98987  F(1,3920) =  33.27,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTEMP       | 
          No |   6.030053   .1796891       5.67776    6.382346 
         Yes |   14.35153   .4374823      13.49382    15.20925  F(1,3920) =  283.10, Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNEXP       | 
          No |   18.36057    .291261      17.78953     18.9316 
         Yes |    21.5767   .4113715      20.77018    22.38322  F(1,3920) =  40.43,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNAGE       | 
          No |   51.12127   .2949782      50.54294    51.69959 
         Yes |    52.0894   .3996654      51.30582    52.87297  F(1,3920) =   3.79,  Prob > F = 0.0516 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RELLENGTH    | 
          No |   117.7714   2.708566      112.4611    123.0818 
         Yes |   138.6513   4.059063      130.6932    146.6094  F(1,3920) =  18.12,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RELNUM       | 
          No |   2.284904   .0347736      2.216727     2.35308 
         Yes |   2.866383   .0523889      2.763671    2.969095  F(1,3920) =  85.13,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNSHR       | 
          No |   83.21178   .6404027      81.95623    84.46733 
         Yes |   76.89289   .8944955      75.13917    78.64661  F(1,3920) =  32.69,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNERS       | 
          No |   1.697411   .0669149       1.56622    1.828603 
         Yes |   4.125812   1.719659      .7543026    7.497322  F(1,3920) =   1.99,  Prob > F = 0.1583 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNWORTH     | 
          No |     826077   78024.12      673105.3    979048.7 
         Yes |    1418565   213653.9      999681.2     1837448  F(1,3920) =   6.73,  Prob > F = 0.0095 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OWNEQUITY    | 
          No |   103781.9   12247.46      79769.92    127793.9 
         Yes |   271560.6   21344.07        229714    313407.1  F(1,3920) =  46.29,  Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
No: OFFEREDTCD = No   Yes: OFFEREDTCD = Yes 
Number of strata =      72         Number of obs    =     4119 
Number of PSUs   =    3992         Population size  =  5858208        Design df   =   3920 
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Tables 2.10 (1998 NSSBF) and 2.11 (2003 NSSBF) show the mean of 
PCTDISCOUNTS across the four quartiles of the numeric model variables.   Listed with 
the PCTDISCOUNTS mean for each quartile in the table is an Adjusted Wald Test that 
tests the null hypothesis that the PCTDISCOUNTS mean for that quartile is equal to the 
PCTDISCOUNTS mean of the previous quartile.  An observation that the mean of 
PCTDISCOUNTS increases and is significantly different from one quartile of a variable 
to the next higher quartile would indicate that there may be a positive relationship 
between PCTDISCOUNTS and that variable.  However, the results of the multivariate 
analysis that will be presented in the next section will be required to establish the 
relationship between the model variables and PCTDISCOUNTS. 
Not all of the numeric variables could be divided into four distinct quartiles.  For 
the 1998 NSSBF sample, the variables OWNSHR and wLnUNUSEDLOC did not exhibit 
sufficient variation to be divided into four distinct quartiles.  For the 2003 NSSBF, only 
OWNSHR exhibited this phenomenon.  It should be noted from the table that the order of 
the quartiles (1,2,3,4) corresponds to an increase in the value of the quartile variable. 
 The tables show that the mean of PCTDISCOUTS is highest for the highest 
quartile of OWNEXP and significantly different than the previous quartile, but this result 
only holds for the 1998 sample and not the 2003 sample.  This suggests that there may be 
some positive relationship between PCTDISCOUNTS and OWNEXP for the 1998 
sample. 
 The mean of PCTDISCOUNTS does not vary significantly across the quartiles of 
OWNSHR for either the 1998 or 2003 samples. 
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 The mean of PCTDISCOUNTS varies significantly across all quartiles of 
wLnUNUSLEDLOC for both samples.  However, the highest means of 
PCTDISCOUNTS are observed for the first and fourth quartiles of wLnUNUSEDLOC, 
and the lowest means of PCTDISCOUNTS are observed for the middle quartiles of 
wLnUNUSEDLOC, for both samples.  This suggests there may be a nonlinear 
relationship between these variables. 
 The results in the tables suggest there may be positive relationship between 
wLnQUICKRATIO and PCTDISCOUNTS in both samples.  The results also suggest 
there may be a positive relationship between wLnPROFTOINCOME and 
PCTDISCOUNTS in the 2003 sample but not the 1998 sample. 
 There does not appear to be a significant relationship between the mean of 
PCTDISCOUNTS and wLnDEBTRATIO for the 2003 sample.  For the 1998 sample, the 
means of PCTDISCOUTS are significantly different from one quartile to the next and 
trend downward with rising quartile, but not in a linear fashion.  This suggests that the 
relationship between PCTDISCOUNTS and wLnDEBTRATIO may be nonlinear. 
The mean of PCTDISCOUNTS does not vary significantly across the quartiles of 
wLnINVRATIO for either the 1998 or 2003 samples. 
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Table 2.10 
1998 NSSBF: Mean of PCTDISCOUNTS by quartiles of the model numeric variables 
Number of strata =      77         Number of obs    =     1128 
Number of PSUs   =    1128         Population size  =  1279594 
                                   Design df        =     1051 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |   Mean of    Linearized     Adjusted Wald Test* 
    Quartile | PCTDISCOUNTS  Std. Err.   (H0 = means are equal) 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNEXP |  
           1 |   45.6234    3.517784    
           2 |   53.23507   3.515406  F(1,1051)=2.36, Prob > F=0.1247 
           3 |   56.44546   3.212861  F(1,1051)=0.46, Prob > F=0.4996 
           4 |   65.79282   3.143511  F(1,1051)=4.30, Prob > F=0.0383 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR | 
           1 |   53.5279    2.988834   
           2 |   55.69914   2.10258   F(1,1051)=0.35, Prob > F=0.5532 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnUNUSEDLOC | 
           1 |   56.1235    2.427605          
           3 |   46.88208   3.404893  F(1,1051)=4.91, Prob > F=0.0269 
           4 |   59.30912   3.31286   F(1,1051)=6.80, Prob > F=0.0092 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnQUICKRATIO| 
           1 |   46.12135   3.528986       
           2 |   50.83395   3.292778  F(1,1051)=0.98, Prob > F=0.3235 
           3 |   54.49172   3.389392  F(1,1051)=0.59, Prob > F=0.4424 
           4 |   68.61726   3.170663  F(1,1051)=9.13, Prob > F=0.0026 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wlnPROFTOINC~| 
           1 |   51.1019    3.417237       
           2 |   55.12511   3.207862  F(1,1051)=0.75, Prob > F=0.3873 
           3 |   53.87126   3.620621  F(1,1051)=0.07, Prob > F=0.7968 
           4 |   59.95796   3.47159   F(1,1051)=1.46, Prob > F=0.2277 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnDEBTRATIO | 
           1 |   66.18724   3.246907      
           2 |   49.7661    3.465199  F(1,1051)=11.94,Prob > F=0.0006 
           3 |   59.56726   3.123555  F(1,1051)=4.40, Prob > F=0.0363 
           4 |   44.4085    3.59423   F(1,1051)=10.02,Prob > F=0.0016 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 wLnINVRATIO | 
           1 |   58.42607   3.345904   
           2 |   49.29048   3.660587  F(1,1051)=3.38, Prob > F=0.0663 
           3 |   55.43444   3.271403  F(1,1051)=1.56, Prob > F=0.2119 
           4 |   55.76242   3.510511  F(1,1051)=0.00, Prob > F=0.9455 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Each Wald Test is for the difference between the preceding “quartile n-1” and  
current “quartile n” mean. 
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Table 2.11 
2003 NSSBF: Mean of PCTDISCOUNTS by quartiles of the model numeric variables 
Number of strata =      72         Number of obs    =     1458 
Number of PSUs   =    1458         Population size  =  1453495 
                                   Design df        =     1386 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |   Mean of    Linearized     Adjusted Wald Test* 
    Quartile | PCTDISCOUNTS  Std. Err.   (H0 = means are equal) 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNEXP |  
           1 |   49.60542   3.872943       
           2 |   47.04653   3.436399  F(1,1386)=0.25, Prob > F=0.6192 
           3 |   52.11074   3.413026  F(1,1386)=1.06, Prob > F=0.3043 
           4 |   58.84394   3.933537  F(1,1386)=1.63, Prob > F=0.2017 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR | 
           1 |   53.34279   3.202047       
           2 |   49.18386   4.020549  F(1,1386)=0.65, Prob > F=0.4210 
           3 |   50.95087   2.71012   F(1,1386)=0.13, Prob > F=0.7152 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnUNUSEDLOC | 
           1 |   50.67792   2.789129       
           2 |   21.16953   8.099946  F(1,1386)=11.92,Prob > F=0.0006 
           3 |   44.48487   3.334438  F(1,1386)=7.06, Prob > F=0.0080 
           4 |   61.72138   3.260422  F(1,1386)=13.75,Prob > F=0.0002 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnQUICKRATIO| 
           1 |   39.22558   3.471883       
           2 |    51.9559   3.359625  F(1,1386)=6.87, Prob > F=0.0089 
           3 |    54.0251   3.82929   F(1,1386)=0.16, Prob > F=0.6849 
           4 |   60.43858   3.584102  F(1,1386)=1.48, Prob > F=0.2245 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wlnPROFTOINC~| 
           1 |   46.59505   3.610999       
           2 |    57.6694   3.880586  F(1,1386)=4.27, Prob > F=0.0390 
           3 |   52.11416   3.620205  F(1,1386)=1.09, Prob > F=0.2976 
           4 |   49.21903   3.656134  F(1,1386)=0.32, Prob > F=0.5728 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnDEBTRATIO | 
           1 |   59.96164   4.020407        
           2 |   53.01591   3.28547   F(1,1386)=1.75, Prob > F=0.1858 
           3 |   50.5953    3.664417  F(1,1386)=0.24, Prob > F=0.6269 
           4 |   41.96966   3.583399  F(1,1386)=2.83, Prob > F=0.0926 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 wLnINVRATIO | 
           1 |   52.45195   3.942713       
           2 |   48.20614   3.793182  F(1,1386)=0.60, Prob > F=0.4399 
           3 |   48.40459   3.595431  F(1,1386)=0.00, Prob > F=0.9696 
           4 |    56.1615   3.349878  F(1,1386)=2.49, Prob > F=0.1150 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Each Wald Test is for the difference between the preceding “quartile n-1” and  
current “quartile n” mean. 
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2.6 Multivariate Analysis and Results      
The results of the estimation of the structural model for PCTDISCOUNTS are 
presented in the following sections.  Survey-weighted least squares estimation is used as 
the base estimation method.  However, it was demonstrated in a previous section how 
selection bias could potentially be a problem for the model, and it was explained that the 
Heckman estimator would be a remedy for this bias.  The results of the Heckman 
estimation of the model will be presented along with evidence confirming that selection 
bias is not an issue for the model and that the use of the Heckman estimator is not 
required. 
Figures 2.23 and  2.24 show the results of the estimation of the model for the 
1998 NSSBF and 2003 NSSBF surveys.  The columns in the table represent coefficient 
estimation using:  (1) OLS with robust errors, (2) survey-weighted least squares with 
robust errors, and (3) Heckman estimation using maximum likelihood with survey 
weights and robust errors.  Column (4) holds the estimate of the probit selection 
coefficients of the Heckman model.  The Probit model used to select firms with 
OFFEREDTCD=1 in the first stage of the estimator is described in section 2.4.   
The column (1) OLS estimates using robust standard errors are included for 
comparison purposes only: it is understood that the estimates will be biased by failure to 
use survey weights.  The column (2) survey-weighted least squares estimates using robust 
standard errors would be the chosen estimates if selection bias does not affect the model.  
The column (3) Heckman estimates would be chosen if selection bias affected the model.   
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Figures 2.23 and 2.24 include a Wald test of the null hypothesis that ρ=0 in 
equation (4) of section 2.4.  Failure to reject this null hypothesis would indicate that 
selection bias is not an issue for this model and data, while rejection of the null would 
indicate that the selection step and the estimation step are not independent of one another, 
and the Heckman estimator is appropriate to correct for selection bias.  For the Heckman 
estimation using the 1998 NSSBF survey, one cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 
0.05 percent level, indicating that the Heckman estimator is not to be preferred over 
survey-weighted least squares for the subpopulation OFFEREDTCD=1.   Similarly, 
examining the Wald test for the 2003 NSSBF survey one cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that ρ=0 at the 0.05 level.   The survey-weighted estimates with robust standard errors in 
column (2) will be used for interpretation of both the 1998 and 2003 estimations. 
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(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
1998 NSSBF Survey - Subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Robust OLS Robust WLS Heckman ML Probit Est. 
     
FEMOWN 5.847 6.833* 6.356  
 (3.675) (4.082) (4.050)  
MINOWN -11.98** -18.56*** -18.59***  
 (4.824) (5.753) (5.674)  
OWNEXP 0.433*** 0.670*** 0.708***  
 (0.109) (0.139) (0.140)  
OWNEDU 0.840 0.904 0.889  
 (0.696) (0.853) (0.845)  
PCACCTNG 5.136 11.77** 13.08**  
 (4.426) (5.124) (5.178)  
MAINSUPL 10.89*** 14.26*** 14.73***  
 (2.503) (3.209) (3.191)  
OWNSHR -0.0180 -0.00436 -0.0335  
 (0.0433) (0.0578) (0.0599)  
OWNMGR -4.126 -3.305 -4.487  
 (3.511) (4.975) (4.936)  
USEDCARD -3.981 -2.710 -2.290  
 (3.358) (4.038) (3.990)  
wLnUNUSEDLOC 3.395 5.136 5.537  
 (5.387) (6.175) (6.082)  
wLnQUICKRATIO 4.708*** 5.071*** 4.822***  
 (1.623) (1.871) (1.847)  
wLnPROFTOINCOME 12.66** 18.51*** 16.62**  
 (5.720) (7.123) (6.995)  
DBSCORE -4.909*** -2.915* -3.243** -0.0439 
 (1.171) (1.513) (1.521) (0.0312) 
PAIDLATE -9.140*** -8.229** -8.220**  
 (2.838) (3.565) (3.531)  
FIRMDISTRESS -17.12*** -19.23*** -19.39***  
 (3.347) (4.349) (4.326)  
wLnDEBTRATIO 2.872 1.426 1.068  
 (3.425) (3.758) (3.721)  
wLnINVRATIO -6.982 -8.557 -5.711  
 (11.02) (13.44) (13.29)  
MANUFACTURING    0.401*** 
    (0.121) 
TRANSPORTATION    -0.618*** 
    (0.187) 
WHOLESALE    0.427*** 
    (0.129) 
RETAIL    -0.0673 
    (0.0963) 
SERVICES    -0.426*** 
    (0.0869) 
wLnTOTEMP    0.429*** 
    (0.0260) 
wLnFIRMAGE    -0.0201 
    (0.0415) 
Constant 6.502 -36.37 -35.64 -0.885*** 
 (26.89) (34.03) (33.49) (0.168) 
     
Observations 1133 1128 3114 3114 
R-squared 0.161 0.187   
Model df 17 17 17 17 
Residual df 1115 1110   
F statistic 16.12 13.91   
Wald Chi-sq   237.7 237.7 
Uncensored Obs   1128 1128 
Wald indep test   3.432 3.432 
P >   0.0640 0.0640 
Significance   0 0 
Lambda   7.723 7.723 
SE Lambda   4.143 4.143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =  3.432   Prob > chi2 = 0.0640 
 
Figure 2.23. 1998 NSSBF: Estimation of Trade Credit Discount Model
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Table 2.1.6.1.1(b) –  
 
  
(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
2003 NSSBF Survey - Subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Robust OLS Robust WLS Heckman ML Probit Est. 
     
FEMOWN -1.372 3.181 3.261  
 (3.431) (5.346) (5.350)  
MINOWN -4.490 -4.300 -4.347  
 (5.651) (7.923) (7.883)  
OWNEXP 0.171 0.0556 0.0434  
 (0.105) (0.144) (0.146)  
OWNEDU 1.580*** 1.406 1.398  
 (0.611) (0.926) (0.922)  
PCACCTNG 6.634 0.844 0.418  
 (4.965) (6.042) (6.113)  
MAINSUPL 6.305*** 8.757*** 8.805***  
 (2.147) (3.312) (3.286)  
OWNSHR -0.0584 0.0253 0.0303  
 (0.0390) (0.0634) (0.0643)  
OWNMGR 3.307 -3.077 -2.837  
 (3.076) (5.024) (5.070)  
USEDCARD -7.466** -6.893 -6.890  
 (3.028) (4.457) (4.435)  
wLnUNUSEDLOC 10.89** 17.65*** 17.67***  
 (5.462) (5.949) (5.925)  
wLnQUICKRATIO 1.432 4.538** 4.650**  
 (1.417) (1.902) (1.899)  
wLnPROFTOINCOME 3.116 -5.402 -5.024  
 (7.876) (10.60) (10.51)  
DBSCORE -6.345*** -4.263*** -4.195*** -0.0540** 
 (0.750) (1.135) (1.141) (0.0229) 
PAIDLATE -18.95*** -20.43*** -20.48***  
 (2.381) (3.589) (3.561)  
FIRMDISTRESS -7.000 -10.57 -10.76  
 (5.455) (10.17) (10.02)  
wLnDEBTRATIO -7.705** -3.928 -3.771  
 (3.593) (4.507) (4.506)  
wLnINVRATIO 16.95*** 24.25** 24.20***  
 (6.373) (9.441) (9.374)  
MANUFACTURING    0.280** 
    (0.131) 
TRANSPORTATION    -0.579*** 
    (0.196) 
WHOLESALE    0.230* 
    (0.129) 
RETAIL    -0.247** 
    (0.107) 
SERVICES    -0.712*** 
    (0.0964) 
wLnTOTEMP    0.505*** 
    (0.0304) 
wLnFIRMAGE    0.106*** 
    (0.0380) 
Constant 51.81 88.41 87.44 -1.286*** 
 (44.75) (61.04) (60.56) (0.169) 
     
Observations 1460 1458 3741 3741 
R-squared 0.178 0.183   
Model df 17 17 17 17 
Residual df 1442 1440   
F statistic 22.13 10.63   
Wald Chi-sq   180.2 180.2 
Uncensored Obs   1458 1458 
Wald indep test   0.127 0.127 
P >   0.721 0.721 
Significance   0 0 
Lambda   -1.469 -1.469 
SE Lambda   4.122 4.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =    0.127   Prob > chi2 = 0.721 
 
Figure 2.24. 2003 NSSBF: Estimation of Trade Credit Discount Model (using implicate #3 only) 
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Note the similarities between the results presented in columns (2) and (3).  For the 
purposes of testing the hypotheses of this essay, the results are almost identical, but all 
are different than the OLS results in column (1).  It would appear that the transition from 
not using survey weights in the regression estimation to using them has the largest effect 
on the results.  The survey-weighted least squares and Heckman estimation results are 
very similar. 
Table 2.12 below provides a tabular summary of the results from the two 
regression tables, comparing the hypothesized results for each regressor in the model, to 
the estimated results.  No support is observed for H1, the hypothesis that trade credit 
discount usage increases as agency conflict in the firm is reduced.  The coefficients of 
OWNSHR and OWNMGR are not significant in any regression in either survey.  H1 is 
rejected on the basis of this lack of supporting evidence. 
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Table 2.12 
Comparison of actual results with hypothesized results 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Discount Usage 
Observed 
Relationship 
1998/2003 
Agency:    
OWNSHR H1 (+) ns/ns 
OWNMGR H1 (+) ns/ns 
Liquidity and Credit 
Availability: 
   
FEMOWN H2 (-) (+)*/ns 
MINOWN H2 (-) (-)***/ns 
USEDCARD H2 (+) ns/ns 
LnUNUSEDLOC H2 (+) ns/(+)*** 
LnQUICKRATIO H2 (+) (+)***/(+)** 
LnPROFTOINCOME H2 (+) (+)***/ns 
DBSCORE H2 (-) (-)*/(-)*** 
PAIDLATE H2 (-) (-)**/(-)*** 
FIRMDISTRESS H2 (-) (-)***/ns 
LnDEBTRATIO H2 (-) ns/ns 
LnINVRATIO H2 (+) ns/(+)** 
Mgmt Competence:    
OWNEXP H3 (+) (+)***/ns 
OWNEDU H3 (+) ns/ns 
Transaction Costs:    
PCACCTNG H4 (+) (+)**/ns 
MAINSUPL H4 (+) (+)***/(+)*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ns = ”not significant” 
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Some evidence supporting the hypothesis H2 is observed, that trade credit 
discount usage increases with firm liquidity and with availability of less expensive forms 
of finance.  Using the 1998 survey data, it is observed that as expected, more profitable 
firms and firms with higher liquidity (QUICKRATIO) use more trade credit discounts.  
Also as expected, minority owned firms (MINOWN), firms with riskier DB credit scores 
(DBSCORE), firms in financial distress (FIRMDISTRESS), and firms with a history of 
paying bills late (PAIDLATE) all use less trade credit discounts.  Scant evidence is 
observed that the gender of the firm’s primary owner (FEMOWN) is a determinant of the 
firm’s use of trade credit discounts. 
An additional word about the significance of QUICKRATIO is in order.  The 
QUICKRATIO is comprised of the sum of two current asset components, CASH and 
RECEIVABLES, divided by current liabilities CURRLIB.  When QUICKRATIO is 
divided into two separate ratios called CASHRATIO (=CASH/CURRLIB) and 
ARRATIO (=RECEIVABLES/CURRLIB), and the Robust WLS estimation is repeated 
with these variables in place of QUICKRATIO, only the coefficient of CASHRATIO is 
significant and positive.  The coefficient of ARRATIO is not significantly different than 
zero.  This result holds for both the 1998 and 2003 samples.  Thus, only cash is a 
significant determinant of the usage of trade credit discounts.  Accounts receivable are 
apparently inadequately liquid to induce firms to take discounts offered. 
USEDCARD is not significant in either the 1998 or 2003 estimations.  This is an 
interesting result since if the pecking order theory of capital structure held, one would 
expect that firms would use their credit cards to make discounted purchases, because 
credit card financing is nominally less expensive than trade credit financing in the 
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presence of discounts.   Since USEDCARD only indicates whether or not the firm used 
credit cards to make purchases, and not the types of purchases made, it may contain too 
little information to discern the effect of credit card usage on trade credit discount usage.  
Some firms may use their credit cards because they have exhausted other forms of short-
term finance and are in distress.   USEDCARD will not discern these firms from those 
that use their cards opportunistically to take discounts.  This could explain the lack of 
significance of USEDCARD in the model. 
However, there is another variable in the NSSBF database that indicates whether 
or not the firm pays its credit card balance in full every month, or carries the balance over 
to the next month.   Firms that use credit cards opportunistically to take discounts will 
likely pay the balance in full each month or suffer a financing charge that will offset to 
some extent the benefit of the discount.   Firms in distress will likely carry their credit 
card balance forward from month to month because they must.  Dummy variable 
USEDGRACE is defined which is “1” if USEDCARD=1 and if the firm pays its credit 
card balance in full each month, and “0” if USEDCARD=1 and the firm carries a credit 
card balance from month to month.  This variable is a subset of USEDCARD, being 
defined in the database only for those firms that have USEDCARD=1, and missing 
otherwise.  It is highly correlated with USEDCARD.  For this reason, USEDCARD and 
USEDGRACE are not included together in the same model estimation.  Including 
USEDGRACE in the model in place of USEDCARD reduces the number of complete 
observations from 1128 to 939 in the 1998 NSSBF sample, and from 1458 to 1259 in the 
2003 NSSBF sample. 
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Figures 2.25 and 2.26 below show the results of the 1998 and 2003 estimations 
using survey-weighted least squares with robust standard errors, and with USEDGRACE 
substituted for USEDCARD.   The estimated coefficient for USEDGRACE is positive 
and significant at the 0.05 percent level for both estimations, and is relatively large.  This 
is a strong indication that some firms are using their credit cards to take trade credit 
discounts and substituting the grace period on their credit cards for the trade credit period 
offered by their suppliers.  This result lends support to hypothesis H2. 
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Table 2.1.6.1.3(a) –  
  
(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
1998 NSSBF Survey - Subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 
 (1) 
Robust WLS 
(2) 
Robust WLS 
VARIABLES With USEDCARD With USEDGRACE 
   
FEMOWN 6.833* 9.435** 
 (4.082) (4.400) 
MINOWN -18.56*** -20.92*** 
 (5.753) (6.255) 
OWNEXP 0.670*** 0.607*** 
 (0.139) (0.154) 
OWNEDU 0.904 0.312 
 (0.853) (0.957) 
PCACCTNG 11.77** 14.21** 
 (5.124) (5.555) 
MAINSUPL 14.26*** 16.14*** 
 (3.209) (3.537) 
OWNSHR -0.00436 -0.0151 
 (0.0578) (0.0645) 
OWNMGR -3.305 -4.528 
 (4.975) (5.661) 
USEDCARD -2.710  
 (4.038)  
wLnUNUSEDLOC 5.136 4.503 
 (6.175) (6.403) 
wLnQUICKRATIO 5.071*** 4.570** 
 (1.871) (2.035) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME 18.51*** 22.92*** 
 (7.123) (7.449) 
DBSCORE -2.915* -3.141* 
 (1.513) (1.668) 
PAIDLATE -8.229** -5.451 
 (3.565) (3.921) 
FIRMDISTRESS -19.23*** -19.97*** 
 (4.349) (4.780) 
wLnDEBTRATIO 1.426 0.709 
 (3.758) (4.185) 
wLnINVRATIO -8.557 -5.745 
 (13.44) (14.80) 
USEDGRACE  10.25** 
  (4.731) 
Constant -36.37 -65.09* 
 (34.03) (37.45) 
   
Observations 1128 939 
R-squared 0.187 0.208 
Model df 17 17 
Residual df 1110 921 
F statistic 13.91 14.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 2.25. 1998 NSSBF: Estimation of Trade Credit Discount Model with USEDGRACE substituted for 
USEDCARD 
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(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
2003 NSSBF Survey - Subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 
Implicate #3 only used in estimation 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES With USEDCARD With USEDGRACE 
   
FEMOWN 3.181 5.106 
 (5.346) (5.672) 
MINOWN -4.300 -6.407 
 (7.923) (8.959) 
OWNEXP 0.0556 0.0786 
 (0.144) (0.158) 
OWNEDU 1.406 0.912 
 (0.926) (0.989) 
PCACCTNG 0.844 -0.575 
 (6.042) (6.420) 
MAINSUPL 8.757*** 8.456** 
 (3.312) (3.536) 
OWNSHR 0.0253 0.0191 
 (0.0634) (0.0708) 
OWNMGR -3.077 -0.505 
 (5.024) (5.584) 
USEDCARD -6.893  
 (4.457)  
wLnUNUSEDLOC 17.65*** 14.40** 
 (5.949) (6.689) 
wLnQUICKRATIO 4.538** 4.822** 
 (1.902) (2.031) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -5.402 -6.627 
 (10.60) (11.49) 
DBSCORE -4.263*** -3.645*** 
 (1.135) (1.257) 
PAIDLATE -20.43*** -18.09*** 
 (3.589) (3.886) 
FIRMDISTRESS -10.57 -13.65 
 (10.17) (10.76) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -3.928 0.137 
 (4.507) (4.962) 
wLnINVRATIO 24.25** 22.92** 
 (9.441) (10.13) 
USEDGRACE  10.42** 
  (4.783) 
Constant 88.41 76.42 
 (61.04) (65.68) 
   
Observations 1458 1259 
R-squared 0.183 0.175 
Model df 17 17 
Residual df 1440 1241 
F statistic 10.63 8.976 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 2.26. 2003 NSSBF: Estimation of Trade Credit Discount Model with USEDGRACE substituted for 
USEDCARD 
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Regarding the hypothesis H3 that trade credit discount usage increases with 
management competence, only weak support is observed in the model estimation.  
OWNEXP is very positively significant, though small, in the 1998 survey estimation.  It 
is not significant in the 2003 survey estimation.  OWNEDU is not significant in either 
survey estimation.  Management experience may increase trade credit discount usage 
slightly, but education has no observable effect. 
Regarding hypothesis H4, that trade credit discount usage increases as the firm’s 
transaction costs of taking discounts decreases, strong support is seen in the 1998 and 
2003 survey estimations.   PCACCTNG  and MAINSUPL are significantly positive and 
strong in the 1998 estimation, and MAINSUPL is significantly positive and strong in the 
2003 estimation.   
 Figures 2.27 and 2.28 present the Robust WLS regression results again, but with 
ZDEBTRATIO in place of DEBTRATIO.  (Recall that ZDEBTRATIO has been trimmed 
above DEBTRATIO=1.0).   The regression results with DEBTRATIO and 
ZDEBTRATIO are presented side by side for comparison.  For the 1998 sample 
regression, PCACCTNG and DBSCORE become insignificant when ZDEBTRATIO is 
substituted for DEBTRATIO, and the total number of observations drops from 1128 to 
876.  For the 2003 sample regression, USEDCARD becomes negative and significant at 
the 0.05 level when ZDEBTRATIO is substituted for DEBTRATIO, and the number of 
observations drops from 1458 to 1185.  In the former case, the 252 insolvent firm 
observations dropped from the 1998 sample must have contained information that 
contributed to the significance of PCACCTNG and DBSCORE.  In the latter case, the 
273 insolvent firm observations dropped from the 2003 sample left behind lower-debt 
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firms that apparently use their credit cards and trade credit as a substitute for other forms 
of debt. 
 
 
(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
1998 NSSBF Survey - Subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 
 (1) 
Robust WLS 
(2) 
Robust WLS 
VARIABLES With DEBTRATIO With ZDEBTRATIO 
   
FEMOWN 6.833* 8.970* 
 (4.082) (4.623) 
MINOWN -18.56*** -23.19*** 
 (5.753) (6.105) 
OWNEXP 0.670*** 0.845*** 
 (0.139) (0.160) 
OWNEDU 0.904 0.888 
 (0.853) (1.002) 
PCACCTNG 11.77** 8.327 
 (5.124) (6.286) 
MAINSUPL 14.26*** 11.48*** 
 (3.209) (3.719) 
OWNSHR -0.00436 0.0171 
 (0.0578) (0.0664) 
OWNMGR -3.305 -2.225 
 (4.975) (5.777) 
USEDCARD -2.710 0.195 
 (4.038) (4.879) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 5.136 11.35 
 (6.175) (8.036) 
wLnQUICKRATIO 5.071*** 5.104** 
 (1.871) (2.263) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME 18.51*** 17.02** 
 (7.123) (7.833) 
DBSCORE -2.915* -1.595 
 (1.513) (1.767) 
PAIDLATE -8.229** -9.252** 
 (3.565) (4.074) 
FIRMDISTRESS -19.23*** -17.27*** 
 (4.349) (5.319) 
wLnDEBTRATIO 1.426  
 (3.758)  
wLnINVRATIO -8.557 4.131 
 (13.44) (16.19) 
wLnZDEBTRATIO  8.215 
  (11.01) 
Constant -36.37 -48.88 
 (34.03) (38.11) 
Observations 1128 876 
R-squared 0.187 0.169 
Model df 17 17 
Residual  df 1110 858 
F statistic 13.91 10.28 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 2.27. 1998 NSSBF:  Robust WLS with ZDEBTRATIO in place of DEBTRATIO
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Table 2.1.6.1.4(b) –  
 
In conclusion, weak support is observed for hypotheses H1 and H3, but strong 
support for H2 and H4.  In general, estimation of the 1998 survey led to more significant 
(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
2003 NSSBF Survey - Subpopulation with OFFEREDTCD=1 
Using Implicate #3 Only 
 (1) 
Robust WLS 
(2) 
Robust WLS 
VARIABLES With DEBTRATIO With ZDEBTRATIO 
   
FEMOWN 3.181 1.614 
 (5.346) (6.235) 
MINOWN -4.300 -13.89 
 (7.923) (8.711) 
OWNEXP 0.0556 0.0199 
 (0.144) (0.162) 
OWNEDU 1.406 1.950* 
 (0.926) (1.049) 
PCACCTNG 0.844 1.482 
 (6.042) (6.632) 
MAINSUPL 8.757*** 9.002** 
 (3.312) (3.639) 
OWNSHR 0.0253 -0.0171 
 (0.0634) (0.0742) 
OWNMGR -3.077 -1.072 
 (5.024) (5.592) 
USEDCARD -6.893 -10.67** 
 (4.457) (4.829) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 17.65*** 23.92*** 
 (5.949) (6.800) 
wLnQUICKRATIO 4.538** 5.999*** 
 (1.902) (2.185) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -5.402 -5.637 
 (10.60) (12.88) 
DBSCORE -4.263*** -4.480*** 
 (1.135) (1.291) 
PAIDLATE -20.43*** -17.89*** 
 (3.589) (4.069) 
FIRMDISTRESS -10.57 -9.758 
 (10.17) (11.51) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -3.928  
 (4.507)  
wLnINVRATIO 24.25** 29.05*** 
 (9.441) (10.63) 
wLnZDEBTRATIO  2.979 
  (10.33) 
Constant 88.41 86.72 
 (61.04) (74.73) 
Observations 1458 1185 
R-squared 0.183 0.190 
Model df 17 17 
Residual  df 1440 1167 
F statistic 10.63 9.579 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 2.28. 2003 NSSBF:  Robust WLS with ZDEBTRATIO in place of DEBTRATIO
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results with larger coefficients than the estimation of the 2003 survey.  It is difficult to 
provide a single unifying reason for this observation, but observing individual results in 
table 2.12 can shed some light on the reasons for the differences. 
MINOWN is significantly negative and strong in the 1998 survey estimation, but 
insignificant in the 2003 estimation.  This variable is viewed as a proxy for credit 
discrimination for minority-owned firms.  It is possible that between 1998 and 2003, the 
availability of credit to minority-owned firms improved sufficiently that this variable no 
longer represented credit discrimination.   Certainly the observed result would be 
consistent with and offer support to that view. 
FIRMDISTRESS is another regressor that is significant (0.01) for the 1998 survey 
estimation, but insignificant for the 2003 survey estimation.  Comparison of the two-way 
tabulation of FIRMDISTRESS over OFFEREDTCD in figures 2.21 and 2.22 shows that 
while in the 1998 survey, 13.8% of firm observations had FIRMDISTRESS=1, that 
number dropped to only 3.5% in 2003.  This number may simply be too small to obtain a 
significant result in the regression.  It is important to remember that this variable is 
backward-looking, defined as “firm declared bankruptcy within past 7 years or defaulted 
on an obligation within past 3 years”.  The year 2003 was a mild recession year in the 
U.S., but previous years had seen a major financial expansionary period during which 
firm profits and the U.S. economy were strong.  This may explain the drop in firms 
reporting FIRMDISTRESS=1. 
OWNEXP (0.01) and PCACCTNG (0.01) were both positively significant in the 
1998 survey estimation, but not in the 2003 estimation.  Examining the differences in 
range of OWNEXP between 1998 and 2003, and the distribution of PCACCTNG 
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between 1998 and 2003, sheds no light on a reason for this.  It is possible that in the 
difficult economic climate of the 2003 period, neither owner experience nor the use of 
computers for accounting made a difference to the decision to take trade credit discounts.  
Under those economic circumstances, financial constraints may have dominated that 
decision process.  A more detailed study would be required to discern the differences 
between the two results. 
As an additional robustness check of the results, two additional estimations were 
performed using two alternate dependent variables.  The variable DISCOUNTS was 
defined to be “1” if PCTDISCOUNTS > 50, and “0” if PCTDISCOUNTS ≤ 50.  The 
variable ALLORNONE was defined to be “1” if PCTDISCOUNTS=100, “0” if 
PCTDISCOUNTS=0, and missing otherwise.  Survey-weighted logistic regression was 
performed using the model variables as regressors and these two variables as the 
dependents.   
Tables 2.29 and 2.30 below present the survey-weighted logistic estimations of 
the model with DISCOUNTS and ALLORNONE as the dependent variable, and a third 
column containing the survey-weighted least squares estimation (with robust errors) of 
PCTDISCOUNTS against the model regressors, for reference purposes.  Comparison of 
the three estimations for the 2003 sample shows that the same regressors are significant 
and of the same sign across all three estimations, though of course the magnitude of the 
coefficients is not the same and their degree of significance is also not the same.   
For the 1998 sample, the results are consistent between the DISCOUNTS and 
PCTDISCOUNTS estimations, but the ALLORNONE estimation shows several 
coefficients that are not significant in that estimation but are significant in the other two 
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estimations.  It is not immediately obvious why this is so, though it may be due to the fact 
that the ALLORNONE variable has discarded useful observations in the middle range of 
PCTDISCOUNTS without which the significant relationships observed in the other two 
estimations cannot be seen in the 1998 sample. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Svy Logit 
DISCOUNTS 
Svy Logit 
ALLORNONE 
Robust WLS 
PCTDISCOUNTS 
    
FEMOWN 0.378* 0.292 6.833* 
 (0.228) (0.310) (4.082) 
MINOWN -1.260*** -0.865 -18.56*** 
 (0.346) (0.533) (5.753) 
OWNEXP 0.0352*** 0.0503*** 0.670*** 
 (0.00825) (0.0127) (0.139) 
OWNEDU 0.0576 0.00229 0.904 
 (0.0464) (0.0633) (0.853) 
PCACCTNG 0.749*** 0.400 11.77** 
 (0.289) (0.346) (5.124) 
MAINSUPL 0.729*** 0.877*** 14.26*** 
 (0.178) (0.247) (3.209) 
OWNSHR -0.00138 0.00316 -0.00436 
 (0.00318) (0.00472) (0.0578) 
OWNMGR -0.238 0.00761 -3.305 
 (0.268) (0.385) (4.975) 
USEDCARD -0.0834 -0.200 -2.710 
 (0.235) (0.321) (4.038) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 0.127 0.615 5.136 
 (0.367) (0.493) (6.175) 
wLnQUICKRATIO 0.335*** 0.183 5.071*** 
 (0.112) (0.138) (1.871) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME 1.153*** 1.015* 18.51*** 
 (0.414) (0.600) (7.123) 
DBSCORE -0.148* -0.0581 -2.915* 
 (0.0816) (0.115) (1.513) 
PAIDLATE -0.342* -0.661** -8.229** 
 (0.190) (0.259) (3.565) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.944*** -1.211*** -19.23*** 
 (0.236) (0.317) (4.349) 
wLnDEBTRATIO 0.138 -0.272 1.426 
 (0.234) (0.287) (3.758) 
wLnINVRATIO -0.351 -0.0378 -8.557 
 (0.732) (1.085) (13.44) 
Constant -5.763*** -4.817* -36.37 
 (1.958) (2.679) (34.03) 
Subpopulation obs 1128 685 1128 
R-squared   0.187 
Model df 17 17 17 
Residual df 3483 3011 1110 
F statistic 6.778 4.926 13.91 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 2.29. 1998 NSSBF: Logistic regression of DISCOUNTS and ALLORNONE
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Table 2.1.6.1.5(b) –  
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Svy Logit 
DISCOUNTS 
Svy Logit 
ALLORNONE 
Robust WLS 
PCTDISCOUNTS 
    
FEMOWN 0.236 0.234 3.181 
 (0.290) (0.418) (5.346) 
MINOWN -0.0463 0.721 -4.300 
 (0.422) (0.739) (7.923) 
OWNEXP -9.78e-05 -0.00423 0.0556 
 (0.00781) (0.0118) (0.144) 
OWNEDU 0.0670 0.0674 1.406 
 (0.0522) (0.0746) (0.926) 
PCACCTNG -0.0961 0.148 0.844 
 (0.319) (0.461) (6.042) 
MAINSUPL 0.539*** 0.915*** 8.757*** 
 (0.179) (0.264) (3.312) 
OWNSHR -0.000530 0.00177 0.0253 
 (0.00341) (0.00493) (0.0634) 
OWNMGR -0.260 -0.0951 -3.077 
 (0.260) (0.378) (5.024) 
USEDCARD -0.242 0.224 -6.893 
 (0.234) (0.359) (4.457) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 0.628* 1.228** 17.65*** 
 (0.375) (0.600) (5.949) 
wLnQUICKRATIO 0.197* 0.259* 4.538** 
 (0.101) (0.156) (1.902) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -0.529 -0.105 -5.402 
 (0.581) (0.792) (10.60) 
DBSCORE -0.224*** -0.259*** -4.263*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0909) (1.135) 
PAIDLATE -0.955*** -1.555*** -20.43*** 
 (0.185) (0.262) (3.589) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.853 -1.006 -10.57 
 (0.770) (0.848) (10.17) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.238 -0.308 -3.928 
 (0.268) (0.413) (4.507) 
wLnINVRATIO 1.039* 1.466* 24.25** 
 (0.530) (0.821) (9.441) 
Constant 3.534 1.181 88.41 
 (3.352) (4.723) (61.04) 
Subpopulation obs 1458 894 1458 
R-squared   0.183 
Model df 17 17 17 
Residual  df 4168 3602 1440 
F statistic 5.300 6.138 10.63 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 2.30. 2003 NSSBF: Logistic regression of DISCOUNTS and ALLORNONE
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2.7 Contributions to the Literature 
This study contributes to the literature on trade credit discount usage in a number 
of ways.  First, this is the first study identified that examines the failure to take Trade 
Credit discounts as a possible agency cost to the firm (hypothesis H1). 
Second, this is also the first study to examine the effect of credit card usage by 
small firms on the usage of trade credit discounts (hypothesis H2).  This was made 
possible by the uniquely detailed data about firm credit card usage available in the 
NSSBF survey databases. 
Third, this is the first study to consider the capability of the firm and  its manager 
as an issue in the decision to accept or reject trade credit discounts (hypothesis H3).   
Fourth, this is the first study to consider the transaction costs of taking trade credit 
as a determinant in the decision to do so (hypothesis H4). 
Fifth, this study addresses potentially serious deficiencies in the econometric 
methodology used by previous authors who used profitability and liquidity as regressors 
without considering the potential endogeneity of those regressors and testing for it.  
Furthermore, previous papers in this area used unweighted OLS estimation (Bopaiah, 
also Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti) rather than using survey weights, for the 1998 
NSSBF survey data used in those studies.  The results of this study show that unweighted 
estimation results can differ significantly from weighted ones, and theory indicates that 
using weighted estimation provides unbiased estimates of the population parameters. 
Sixth, this study separately utilized both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys for 
model estimation.  The results of these separate estimations facilitated interpretation that 
is relevant to the macroeconomic environment in which the data was collected.  The year 
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1998 was near the peak of a large economic expansion in the U.S., while the year 2003 
was at the end of a brief recession in the U.S.  One would expect that availability of credit 
to small firms would differ between these periods, perhaps in a way that would affect 
trade credit discount usage.  Such comparisons between the results of the two estimations 
provided an additional dimension to the analysis that has not previously been undertaken. 
 116 
 
CHAPTER III 
ESSAY 2: WHAT DETERMINES THE CASH HOLDINGS OF SMALL FIRMS? 
This study will examine variations in small firms’ cash holdings and relate them 
to variables that proxy for agency costs and monitoring, variables that proxy for 
substitutes for cash, variables reflecting the firm’s short and long-term financial 
obligations, variables that proxy for management/firm competency in cash management, 
and firm characteristic control variables.   
This study will examine the relationship between agency costs and the level of 
cash holdings in small firms using a database of small firm financing data compiled by 
the Federal Reserve Board.  It builds upon previous work by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) 
on agency costs in small firms, as well as work by Opler, et. al (1999) on the 
determinants of cash holdings.  This study will also draw upon the literature on bank 
monitoring, relationship lending and shareholder-creditor agency problems in small firms 
for determinants of agency costs in this sample of small firms.   
3.1 Theory and Testable Hypotheses 
The issue of agency costs in small closely held firms is an issue of great 
importance to many stakeholders.  Small firms of less than 500 employees constitute the 
majority of firms in the U.S., and are collectively the largest employer in the U.S.  These 
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firms tend to be owned by individuals, small groups of investors or families, with other 
minority equity holders represented by angel investors, extended family, friends, and 
venture capitalists.  Most of these firms are not publicly traded and issue no public debt, 
but rely on financial institutions such as banks and finance companies, and even friends 
and family members or other shareholders for debt financing.  These firms are often, but 
not always, managed by shareholders with a substantial equity stake in the company.  
These firms also tend to be informationally opaque relative to large public corporations.  
A lack of participation in public financial markets means that little information is 
publicly available regarding the firm’s history, current condition or future prospects.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) distinguished between two types of agency costs; 
those between shareholders (owners) and managers, and those between shareholders and 
debt holders.  Shareholder-manager agency costs arise when the objectives of 
management and shareholders are not perfectly aligned toward the goal of maximizing 
shareholder value.  It is characterized by misuse of company assets for personal or 
professional gain by managers, to the detriment of shareholder value.   
Jensen (1986) extends agency arguments to free cash flows in firms and suggests 
that management can alleviate this agency problem by paying out the free cash flows as 
dividends, using them to repurchase stock, or increasing the firm’s leverage to commit 
cash flows to repayment of debt under a debt contract.  Thus, in empirical examinations a 
firm’s cash flows and level of cash holdings could be indicative of the magnitude of 
manager-owner related agency costs.  
Opler et al. (1999) are among the first to put forth arguments suggesting a 
relationship between cash holdings and agency costs in firms. As described by Opler et 
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al., management that is interested in maximizing the value of the firm will adjust cash 
holdings until the marginal cost of holding cash just equals the marginal benefit.  The 
cost of holding cash and liquid assets in general is the lower rate of return on them than 
on other forms of investment.  The benefits of holding cash are the reduction in the 
transaction costs of raising new funds (transaction cost motive), and the availability of 
funds to invest in new projects if other sources of funding are not available or too costly 
(precautionary motive).  This suggests that for each firm there exists some optimal level 
of cash holdings that maximizes firm value.  As Opler et al. point out, however, managers 
and shareholders may view the costs and benefits of holding cash differently.  Managers 
may prefer to hold cash, because it reduces firm risk and increases their ability to make 
discretionary investments and disbursements.  Therefore, they suggest that agency theory 
may be required to explain the level of cash held by the firm.   
It would be reasonable to expect that if cash holdings are a sign of owner-manager 
agency conflict, then the same determinants that have been used in previous empirical 
studies to model agency costs should be significant determinants of cash holdings as well, 
while controlling for other firm variables that can influence the level of cash holdings.  
Furthermore, one would expect to find a high positive correlation between measures of 
agency costs and measures of cash holdings in firms that have been identified as having 
an owner-manager agency conflict.  This leads to the first testable hypothesis: 
H1: Cash holdings are positively related to agency conflict in the firm.  
It is common in small financially-constrained firms for the owners to provide 
working capital to the firm out of their personal resources.  It is also common for small 
business owners to pay themselves dividends or bonuses when cash is available to do so.  
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Wealthier owners will have greater personal resources out of which to provide working 
capital to the firm, and will also have less need to extract dividends and bonuses from the 
firm than less wealthy owners.  These owners will have the resources to support the 
liquidity of the firm, both at initial start-up and at critical periods of working capital 
requirement beyond the start-up period.  Numerous studies documented by Parker (2004) 
support the notion that small firms are capital constrained and that capital provided by 
entrepreneurs plays an important role in the formation and survival of small firms.  This 
suggests that a positive relationship may exist between the wealth of the firm’s owners 
and the cash holdings of the firm.  This specific relationship is a heretofore empirically 
unexplored subject, which leads to the second hypotheses: 
H2a: Cash holdings are positively related to the personal wealth of the 
firm’s owner 
H2b: Cash holdings are lower for firms having a financially distressed 
owner 
 If it can be accepted that cash holdings (liquidity) is an important contributor to 
small firm survival, then there are other entrepreneur characteristics that have been 
identified as determinants of small firm survival that may also be determinants of small 
firm cash holdings.  Entrepreneur education level has been identified as a positive 
determinant of entering self-employment by multiple studies (Parker 2004).   A college 
educated entrepreneur  has also been associated with a higher probability of small firm 
survival (Bates 1990).  The effect of prior management experience of the entrepreneur on 
small firm growth has been mixed in previous studies, but mostly positive (Storey 1994).  
Regarding entrepreneur age, Bates (1990) found that the highest probability for survival 
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was found in firms with owners in the 45-54 age range, and the lowest probability of 
survival in firms with an owner over 55 years of age.  Storey (1994) suggests that middle-
aged entrepreneurs possess a successful combination of experience, credibility and 
energy that is lacking in the youngest and oldest entrepreneurs.  These observations lead 
to the third set of hypotheses: 
 H3a: Cash holdings are positively related to owner experience 
 
H3b: Cash holdings are higher for firms with a college educated owner 
 
Firms that are financially constrained and cannot always obtain the required 
financing from external sources must use undistributed profits to fund the firm’s 
operations.  Small firms are notoriously informationally-opaque and do not have access 
to the debt and equity markets to which large public firms have access.  It is reasonable to 
expect that such firms will accumulate cash from retained earnings to be used to finance 
the firm’s operations.  This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Cash holdings are positively related to the financial constraints of the firm 
 
The use of debt can increase a firm’s return on equity, but it can also increase the 
firm’s financial risk.  Such risk includes the possibility that the firm may default on an 
interest or principal payment for their debt, which would drive them into bankruptcy.  It 
is reasonable to expect that firms that have higher levels of debt to be serviced will hold 
more cash to reduce the possibility of defaulting on an interest or principal payment.  
Firms with higher debt are also under increased scrutiny by their creditors who are certain 
to be monitoring the firm’s liquidity ratios.  Firms with higher current liabilities that 
require liquid assets to service will also likely hold more cash.  This leads to the fifth 
hypothesis:  
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H5: Cash holdings are positively related to the firm’s debt service requirements  
 
 Firms that have ready substitutes for cash, such as a line of credit or access to 
trade credit, which reduces the firm’s liquidity requirement, will need to hold less cash.  
This leads to the fifth and final hypothesis: 
 H6:  Cash holdings are negatively related to the firm’s access to cash substitutes 
3.2 Review of Empirical Studies  
Using a large sample of publicly traded manufacturing firms over the period 1971 
to 2000, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) show empirically that financially 
constrained firms tend to accumulate cash out of cash flows more readily than 
unconstrained firms.  That is, they show a positive “cash flow sensitivity of cash” 
compared to unconstrained firms which show a cash flow sensitivity of cash of zero.  
They attribute this tendency for constrained firms to accumulate cash to the precautionary 
motive, by which these firms keep cash ready to invest in positive NPV projects for 
which cash may not be readily available from capital markets when it is needed.  
Constrained firms are those that have limited ability to raise sufficient funds in capital 
markets at an acceptable cost to fund all investment needs.  Small, closely held firms 
generally have limited access to financial markets as they tend not to issue equity or debt 
publicly, but rely on banks, insider and angel finance, trade credit and venture capitalists 
for their funding (Berger and Udell, 1998).  The results of Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach suggest that small firms would tend to accumulate cash to satisfy the 
precautionary motive. 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) examine a sample of 11,000 firms 
across 45 countries and find that firms in countries with the lowest level of shareholder 
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protection hold more than twice the amount of cash on average than firms in the countries 
with the highest level of protection.  They interpret this result as being consistent with the 
agency motive for cash holdings, in which managers hold cash for their own 
discretionary uses and will only release it to shareholders if required to do so by law.  
Furthermore, controlling for the development of capital markets in each country, they 
find that cash holdings are actually larger in countries with more developed debt markets.  
They attribute this finding to their agency motive interpretation of cash holdings, as firms 
tend to hold cash even when not constrained by underdeveloped capital markets.  They 
also find that firms with higher net working capital hold less cash, indicating that cash 
and net working capital are substitutes.  (In their study, net working capital excludes cash 
and equivalents.)  Also, smaller firms, firms that are more profitable and firms with a 
higher market-to-book ratio (proxy for investment opportunities) tend to hold more cash.  
These findings indicate that when management can do so, it will hoard cash for reasons 
other than the precautionary motive or transaction costs motive. 
Starting with the hypothesis empirically confirmed by Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and 
Servaes that stronger shareholder rights will lead to smaller cash holdings, Harford, 
Mansi and Maxwell (2005) examine a sample of 1,442 U.S. firms over the period 1993 
through 2002.  They regress the cash-to-sales ratio against a governance index developed 
by Gompers et al. (2003).  This index is constructed by measuring each firm in the 
sample against twenty-four governance rules.  It increases in value as shareholder rights 
decrease (managerial power increases).  They incorporate in their model a number of 
control variables similar to those used by Opler et al. (1999).  Contrary to the results of 
Dittmar et al., they find that firms with weaker shareholder rights hold less cash than 
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those with stronger shareholder rights.  In fact, cash holdings decrease monotonically 
with increasing index (managerial power).  Granger causality tests confirm that 
governance leads cash, and that firms with strong management rights tend to shed more 
cash from one period to the next.   
Limiting the examination to firms with high-cash holdings, they find that firms 
with weak shareholder rights tend to shed cash faster than firms with strong shareholder 
rights.  Firms with weak shareholder rights also do not accumulate cash as fast as those 
with strong shareholder rights when cash flows are increasing.  Strong shareholder firms 
issue more equity, while weak shareholder firms issue more debt.  Weak shareholder 
firms are also much more active in making acquisitions than strong shareholder firms, 
which tends to support the results of Harford (1999).  Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 
conclude that strong managers in weak shareholder firms tend to dissipate cash on value-
reducing acquisitions, creating an agency conflict between shareholders and 
management. 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) wrote the definitive work in the 
area of the determinants of corporate cash holdings.  They performed both time series and 
cross-sectional empirical examinations of cash holdings and their determinants on a 
sample of publicly traded U.S. firms during the period 1971 through 1994.  They suggest 
that agency theory can explain why managers hold an amount of cash that is greater than 
that required for maximizing shareholder wealth.  They propose that managers have a 
preference for cash because it reduces firm risk, helps them avoid market discipline and 
increases their discretionary ability to pursue their own interests, including value-
reducing projects.  All of this can have an adverse effect on firm value.   
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Opler et al.  propose four conditions that will reduce management discipline and 
thus increase the likelihood that managers will accumulate excess cash for discretionary 
use:  (1) shareholders are highly dispersed, reducing their ability to monitor managerial 
behavior, (2) the firm is large, as size is a takeover deterrent so the firm can accumulate 
cash with less fear of being a takeover target, (3) the firm has low debt and is therefore 
less subject to monitoring by debt markets and banks, and (4) the firm is protected by 
anti-takeover charter amendments. 
The authors also acknowledge that the agency costs of debt can influence the 
level of liquid assets held by the firm.  They suggest that firms for which the agency costs 
of debt are high will hold more liquid assets or maintain a lower level of leverage in order 
to ensure that funding is available for projects when needed.    They attribute the agency 
costs of debt to the information asymmetry that exists between the firm’s management 
and potential creditors.  The alternative to holding cash in the presence of high agency 
costs of debt is to reduce the level of investments, which would be very costly for firms 
that have valuable investment opportunities.  The authors thus suggest that firms with 
higher market-to-book ratios (more investment opportunities) would hold more cash than 
an equivalent firm with a lower market-to-book ratio. 
Examining a sample of firms from the Compustat database from the period 1952 
through 1994, and using the cash/net assets and cash/sales ratios as their dependent 
variables, they found that firms with strong growth opportunities, firms with riskier cash 
flows and small firms tend to accumulate cash.  The percentage of managerial ownership 
of the firm had no effect on cash holdings.  Large firms and those with credit ratings 
tended to hold less cash.  They found limited support for the argument that positive 
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excess cash leads firms to spend more on acquisitions.  They conclude that the 
precautionary motive for holding cash is strong, and that management accumulates cash 
if it can do so.  They also suggest that the failure of the proxies for agency costs to 
explain excess cash holdings indicates that more work needs to be done to explain why 
firms hold excess cash. 
Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich firms are more likely to undertake value-
reducing acquisitions than firms with less cash.  The targets they choose are often 
unattractive to other bidders.  The mergers result in a negative stock price reaction, and 
subsequent poor operating performance of the merged firm.  They find some evidence 
that cash rich firms with lower managerial ownership are responsible for the acquisition 
activity, leading to an agency theory explanation for the phenomenon.  Harford concludes 
that his results are consistent with the Free Cash Flow hypothesis.   
 Faulkender (2002) examines the determinants of cash holding in small firms, 
using the 1993 NSSBF database as his sample.  He finds that cash holdings decline as the 
percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder increases, regardless of whether that 
shareholder is also the firm’s manager or not.  He applies an agency theory interpretation 
to this result, suggesting that owners remove cash from the firm so that managers cannot 
misuse it, and that the ability of the owner to remove cash is not affected by his role as a 
manager.  He also finds that firms with more shareholders have more cash, which he 
interprets to mean that firms that are less tightly held have better access to capital and 
may receive more cash infusions from more shareholders.   An alternative interpretation 
from agency theory is that more shareholders implies more diffuse ownership and less 
monitoring of management behavior, which allows managers to hoard cash rather than 
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invest it in positive NPV projects.  He also finds that small firms tend to hold more cash 
as leverage increases, which is the opposite of the behavior of publicly traded firms.  He 
interprets this to mean that small firms value holding cash over paying down debt, 
perhaps because as leverage increases, obtaining new sources of financing becomes more 
difficult.  The availability of trade credit also reduces the amount of cash held by small 
firms. 
3.3 Model, Variables and Data 
The model chosen to test the hypotheses of this essay is shown below.  It is 
proposed that the cash holdings for a small firm are a function of variables that proxy for 
agency costs and value maximizing behavior, variables that proxy for financing sources 
and constraints, variables that proxy for cash substitutes, variables that represent the 
firm’s short-term financial obligations and debt, and firm characteristic control variables. 
LnCASHTOSALESi = β0i + β1iPASSTHRUi + β2iLnSALES i + β3iFAMOWN i + 
β4iOWNSHR i + β5iOWNMGR i + β6iLnOWNERS i + β7iPURCHASED i  + 
 β8iINHERITED i + β9iOWNDISTRESS i + β10iFIRMDISTRESS i + β11iFEARDENIAL i + 
β12iLnOTRINCTOSALESi + β13iLnOWNWORTHTOSALES i + β14iLnPROFTOINCOME i 
+ β15iTRADECREDIT i + β16iLnUNUSEDLOC i + β17iLnCURLIBTOSALES i + 
β18iLnDEBTRATIO i + β19iCOLLEGEGRADi + β20iSPECIALED i  + β21iOWNEXPi  + εi 
 
 The specific variables chosen in each category are summarized in table 3.1, along 
with their hypothesized relationship (+ or -) to LnCASHTOSALES.  These variables are 
defined the same in both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys, which are used as the 
source of data for the study.  Those variables that are not directly defined in the database 
were derived from other variables that are.  Based on correlation between the variables, it 
may be necessary to run several regressions, each excluding variables highly correlated 
with others in the model. 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Independent variables and their hypothesized relationship to LnCASHTOSALES 
Independent Variable Description Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Cash Holdings  
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Comments 
Firm Characteristics 
(Controls): 
    
PASSTHRU Dummy, 1 = firm is structured as a pass-
through entity for tax purposes 
(-)  Firms will hold less cash if owners are personally taxed on 
firm profits. 
LnSALES Natural log of annual sales (-)  Larger firms hold less cash because they have access to 
alternate forms of finance 
PURCHASED Dummy, 1 = firm was purchased by current 
owner(s) 
(-)  Firm that is purchased may be viewed as an investment 
rather than a family legacy and will not hold excess cash 
INHERITED Dummy, 1 = firm was inherited by current 
owner(s) 
(+)  Firm that is a family legacy will hold accumulated cash 
Industry Dummies Dummy variables for: Wholesale, Retail, 
Manufacturing, Transportation, Services 
n/a  Control for industry-specific factors 
Agency and Value 
Maximization: 
    
FAMOWN Dummy, 1 = greater than 50% family 
ownership 
(+) H1 Family firms are concerned with survival and risk reduction 
over value maximization; will hold cash to reduce firm risk 
OWNSHR Percentage of business owned by principal 
owner 
(-) H1 Increasing firm ownership share reduces agency conflict 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
OWNMGR Dummy, 1 = firm is managed by an owner (-) H1 Having firm managed by owner reduces agency  conflict 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
LnOWNERS Natural log of the total number of firm 
owners 
(+) H1 Increasingly diffuse firm ownership promotes agency 
conflict 
Owner Characteristics     
LnOWNWORTHTOSALES Natural log of the ratio of the primary 
owner’s personal wealth (net of her share of 
firm ownership), to Sales 
(+) H2a Wealthier owners are less likely to extract cash from firm 
and more able to provide cash infusion to firm than less 
wealthy owners 
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OWNDISTRESS Dummy, 1 = primary owner declared 
bankruptcy within past 7 years or defaulted 
on an obligation within past 3 years 
(-) H2b Distressed owners more likely to extract cash from firm to 
cover personal obligations, and less able to make cash 
infusions to firm 
OWNEXP Number of years of experience of principal 
owner managing this or other business 
(+) H3a More experienced owners have experience with working 
capital management 
COLLEGEGRAD Dummy, 1 = primary owner of firm is a 
college grad (or higher) 
(+) H3b Owners with a college degree or higher may have business 
training and understand working capital management 
SPECIALED Dummy, 1 = primary owner of firm is a 
trade school grad or has associate degree 
(-) H3b Owners who started firm to leverage their specialized skill 
or training may not have business training in working 
capital management 
Financing Sources and 
Constraints: 
    
FIRMDISTRESS Dummy, 1 = firm declared bankruptcy 
within past 7 years or defaulted on an 
obligation within past 3 years 
(-) H4 Distressed firms cannot accumulate cash and will deplete 
cash to meet obligations 
FEARDENIAL Dummy, 1 = firm declined to apply for a 
loan within the past 3 years, even though 
they needed the funds 
(-) H4 Failure to apply for credit when needed is an indicator of 
firm’s poor financial condition, including liquidity 
condition 
LnOTRINCTOSALES Natural log of the ratio of  “other income” 
to sales 
(+) H4 Firms with income from non-operating sources will use 
this as “windfall” to accumulate cash. 
LnPROFTOINCOME Natural log of the ratio of profit to total 
income from all sources for current or 
previous fiscal year 
(+)  H4 Profitable firms can more easily accumulate cash; 
unprofitable ones drain cash reserves. 
Financial Obligations and 
Debt: 
    
LnCURLIBTOSALES Natural log of the ratio of the firm’s current 
liabilities to sales 
(+) H5 Firms with higher short-term liabilities will hold more cash 
to meet obligations 
LnDEBTRATIO Natural log of the ratio of Total Liabilities 
to Total Assets.   
(-) H5 Firms with higher outstanding debt will need cash to 
service debt to avoid default .   
Cash Substitutes:     
TRADECREDIT Dummy, 1 = if firm uses trade credit (-) H6 Availability of trade credit relaxes firm’s liquidity 
requirements 
LnUNUSEDLOC Natural log of the ratio of unused balance 
on all Lines of Credit to Sales 
(-) H6 Availability of a Line of credit relaxes firm’s liquidity 
requirements 
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3.3.1 Sample size and summary statistics for numeric variables. Sections 6.2 
and 6.3 of this document describe the transformation and clean-up applied to the 1998 
and 2003 NSSBF sample data prior to analysis.  In that section it was indicated that 120 
observations (out of 3561 total) in the 1998 NSSBF are excluded, and 627 observations 
(out of 21200 total) in the 2003 NSSBF are excluded, due to failure to meet the “going 
concern” criteria. 
An additional 103 observations are excluded from the 1998 NSSBF sample data 
due to missing item data for the cash regression model independent variables, leaving 
3338 complete observations for analysis from the 1998 NSSBF.  Observations are 
excluded by setting FIN_WGT to zero, but the observations are not actually dropped 
from the sample, as described in Section 6.3.   
An additional 899 observations are excluded from the 2003 NSSBF sample data 
due to missing item data for the cash regression model independent variables, leaving 
19674 complete observations for analysis.  Observations are excluded by setting 
FIN_WGT to zero, but the observations are not actually dropped from the sample, as 
described in Section 6.3.  Finally, selection of implicate #3 only as described in section 
6.4  results in 3934 complete observations for analysis from the 2003 NSSBF. 
Note that some of the variables in the model have been transformed to their 
natural log form and Winsorized.  This has been done to reduce the rather large skewness 
and kurtosis typical of the untransformed numeric variables in the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF 
samples.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 describe the rationale behind this and the transformation 
methodology used.   Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below provide sample statistics for the numeric 
variables in the model, including mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis.  The 
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untransformed and transformed variables are included in the table for comparison, and to 
show how the logarithmic transformation and Winsorization of the variables have 
reduced skewness and kurtosis. 
 
 
Table 2.2.3.2 –  
  
   variable |         N      mean        sd       max       min  skewness  kurtosis 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR |      3338  80.23158  27.29921       100         1 -.9307972  2.467675 
      OWNEXP |      3338   19.2867  11.76435        72         0  .8046414  3.570297 
 CASHTOSALES |      3338   .112028  .4056525  13.92928         0   17.7049  486.5553 
LnCASHTOSA~S |      3338  .0841031   .171444  2.703324         0  5.708642  50.82512 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      3338   .080505  .1431948   .924841         0  3.741395  19.14796 
       SALES |      3338   3508420  1.53e+07  6.24e+08        75  22.92307  836.3026 
     LnSALES |      3338  12.70107   2.28872  20.25166  4.330733   .040026  2.972415 
    wLnSALES |      3338  12.69599  2.276372  17.74784  4.330733  .0073093  2.904989 
      OWNERS |      3338  6.379868  72.00058      2500         1  24.68248  693.9601 
    LnOWNERS |      3338   .471144  .8291453  7.824046         0  3.276864  19.09508 
   wLnOWNERS |      3338  .4570813  .7469981  3.912023         0  2.315092  9.419795 
OTRINCTOSA~S |      3338   .037509  .7689369  43.54243  -.281078   54.3781  3071.917 
LnOTRINCTO~S |      3338  .2636814  .0997177  3.802733         0  17.74462  513.7332 
wLnOTRINCT~S |      3338  .2612101  .0620167  .7800731  .2477019   6.81772  53.01461 
OWNWORTHTO~S |      3338  9.864433  97.03174  2948.288 -66.66666  23.52095  632.4018 
LnOWNWORTH~S |      3338  8.658729  .0142825  9.070996  8.645469   21.9008   554.645 
wLnOWNWORT~S |      3338  8.658056  .0030956  8.682423  8.657129  6.226323  45.17571 
PROFTOINCOME |      3338  .0809244  2.017273         1       -99 -37.26497  1761.583 
LnPROFTOIN~E |      3338  4.225523  .2832803      4.81  .1948795 -3.204925  30.86424 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      3338  4.229775  .2530558  4.803224   2.86409 -1.483425   11.4712 
   UNUSEDLOC |      3338  .3495936    6.4175       335         0  45.34706  2269.892 
 LnUNUSEDLOC |      3338  .0992033   .316021  5.817111         0  7.485123   85.2514 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      3338  .0902894  .2369373  1.593252         0   4.14085  22.50825 
CURLIBTOSA~S |      3338  .1001296   .203248         2         0  3.921697  23.36026 
LnCURLIBTO~S |      3338  .0830916  .1457479  1.098612         0  2.928233  13.02207 
wLnCURLIBT~S |      3338  .0817219  .1385666  .6876656         0  2.564781  9.549197 
   DEBTRATIO |      3338  1.114961  3.932861  97.98157         0  13.39175  253.0054 
 LnDEBTRATIO |      3338  .4677874  .5558724  4.594934         0  2.504338  12.02956 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      3338  .4634161  .5325272   2.89844         0  2.126647  8.707107 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Figure 3.1. Sample statistics for numeric model variables from 1998 NSSBF
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Table 2.2.3.3 –  
 
3.3.2 Summary statistics for dummy and categorical variables. Table 3.2 
provides un-weighted one-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical variables in the 
model for the final 3435 observations of the 1998 NSSBF sample, and table 3.3 provides 
un-weighted one-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical variables in the model 
for the final 4052 observations of the 2003 NSSBF sample.   
   variable |         N      mean        sd       max       min  skewness  kurtosis 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR |      3934  76.10473  27.11274       100         8 -.4843441  1.657802 
      OWNEXP |      3934  21.41129  11.51455        65         0  .4905398  2.982965 
 CASHTOSALES |      3934  .1710573  2.032707     112.5         0    46.391   2440.01 
LnCASHTOSA~S |      3934  .0929259  .2138032  4.731803         0  8.667614   123.721 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      3934  .0869004  .1552212  1.049822         0  3.908554  21.07929 
       SALES |      3934   4487467  1.27e+07  2.11e+08        54   6.79327   70.8331 
     LnSALES |      3934  13.21141  2.233077  19.16672  7.845808   .042676  2.427398 
    wLnSALES |      3934  13.20777  2.224785  17.94269  7.845808  .0224686  2.385637 
      OWNERS |      3934  4.116929  51.93903      2800         1  44.38326  2231.763 
    LnOWNERS |      3934  .5576774  .7247152  7.937375         0  2.400917  14.47109 
   wLnOWNERS |      3934  .5517263  .6871977  3.912023         0  1.703539  7.173829 
OTRINCTOSA~S |      3934  .0565075  1.449223  87.64276 -.2831222  56.80069  3401.191 
LnOTRINCTO~S |      3934  .2670402  .1247206  4.487803         0  17.11748   440.332 
wLnOTRINCT~S |      3934  .2636256  .0716142  .8255439  .2492946  6.737445  49.86473 
OWNWORTHTO~S |      3934   13.4169  101.1204  2643.478       -50  16.52721  333.5803 
LnOWNWORTH~S |      3934  4.035012  .3247742   7.89896         0  5.727057  58.25106 
wLnOWNWORT~S |      3934  4.028175   .253703  5.735924  3.931826   4.79431  28.41714 
PROFTOINCOME |      3934  .0004738  7.535976         1 -467.9074  -60.9512  3780.293 
LnPROFTOIN~E |      3934  5.551858  .2394028      6.15 -.0025357 -5.188544  97.60703 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      3934  5.556506  .1966246  6.105282  4.661638 -.2386307  7.014546 
   UNUSEDLOC |      3934  .3286982   4.92221  284.5529         0   50.7541  2854.338 
 LnUNUSEDLOC |      3934  .1247809  .3220724  5.654427         0   5.93584  58.26441 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      3934  .1178517  .2661966  1.673976         0  3.607886  17.86258 
CURLIBTOSA~S |      3934  .0720034  .1461095         2         0  5.303388   43.2911 
LnCURLIBTO~S |      3934  .0628008  .1078748  1.098612         0  3.759318  22.50921 
wLnCURLIBT~S |      3934  .0612741   .098286  .5781896         0  2.937075  13.38436 
   DEBTRATIO |      3934  .8662447  2.602223  53.56457         0  11.15924  167.8626 
 LnDEBTRATIO |      3934  .4243869   .485192  3.999385         0  2.492532  12.69059 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      3934  .4194727  .4587623  2.508437         0  1.979796  8.287826 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Figure 3.2. Sample statistics for numeric model variables from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 only) 
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Table 3.2 
Sample statistics for dummy/categorical variables from 1998 NSSBF (n=3338) 
Dummy/Categorical Vars Response Number of 
Responses 
Percent of Sample 
PASSTHRU: Firm is structured as a pass-thru 
entity for tax purposes 
No 
Yes 
3127 
211 
93.7 
6.3 
FAMOWN: One Family owns more than 50% of 
the firm 
No 
Yes 
499 
2839 
14.9 
85.1 
OWNMGR: Firm's Manager is an owner  No 
Yes 
346 
2992 
10.4 
89.6 
PURCHASED: Firm was purchased by its current 
owners 
No 
Yes 
2682 
656 
80.3 
19.7 
INHERITED: Firm was inherited by its current 
owners  
No 
Yes 
3152 
186 
94.4 
5.6 
OWNDISTRESS: Principal owner has been 
bankrupt or delinquent on personal obligations 
No 
Yes 
2847 
491 
85.3 
14.7 
COLLEGEGRAD: Primary owner is a college grad 
or better  
No 
Yes 
1595 
1743 
47.8 
52.2 
SPECIALED: Primary owner is a trade school or 
assoc degree grad  
No 
Yes 
3022 
316 
90.5 
9.5 
FIRMDISTRESS: Firm has been 
bankrupt/delinquent on business obligations 
No 
Yes 
2858 
480 
85.6 
14.4 
FEARDENIAL: Firm has not applied for credit 
due to fear of denial 
No 
Yes 
2609 
729 
78.2 
21.8 
TRADECREDIT: Firm has used trade credit within 
most recent fiscal year 
No 
Yes 
1108 
2230 
33.2 
66.8 
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Table 3.3 
Sample statistics for dummy/categorical variables from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 
only, n=3934) 
Dummy/Categorical Vars Response Number of 
Responses 
Percent of Sample 
PASSTHRU: Firm is structured as a pass-
thru entity for tax purposes 
No 
Yes 
3631 
303 
92.3 
7.7 
FAMOWN: One Family owns more than 
50% of the firm 
No 
Yes 
613 
3321 
15.6 
84.4 
OWNMGR: Firm's Manager is an owner
  
No 
Yes 
364 
3570 
9.3 
90.7 
PURCHASED: Firm was purchased by 
its current owners 
No 
Yes 
3088 
846 
78.5 
21.5 
INHERITED: Firm was inherited by its 
current owners  
No 
Yes 
3678 
256 
93.5 
6.5 
OWNDISTRESS: Principal owner has 
been bankrupt or delinquent on personal 
obligations 
No 
Yes 
3797 
137 
96.5 
3.5 
COLLEGEGRAD: Primary owner is a 
college grad or better  
No 
Yes 
2015 
1919 
51.2 
48.8 
SPECIALED: Primary owner is a trade 
school or assoc degree grad  
 
No 
Yes 
3284 
650 
83.5 
16.5 
FIRMDISTRESS: Firm has been 
bankrupt/delinquent on business 
obligations 
No 
Yes 
 
3804 
130 
96.7 
3.3 
FEARDENIAL: Firm has not applied for 
credit due to fear of denial 
No 
Yes 
3376 
558 
85.8 
14.2 
TRADECREDIT: Firm has used trade 
credit within most recent fiscal year 
No 
Yes 
1189 
2745 
30.2 
69.8 
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3.3.3 Sample correlations.  Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the Pearson correlations 
between the variables in the model for the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples, respectively.  
Examining correlations that are close to 0.500 or higher (-0.500 or lower) it can be seen 
that the variables OWNSHR and LnOWNERS are correlated with several other variables 
in both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples.  In addition to the full model, regressions 
will be run that drop these two variables to observe the effect on the estimated 
coefficients. 
It can also be observed that COLLEGEGRAD and SPECIALED are negatively 
correlated, which is a natural result of their definition.   The model is estimated with each 
of these variables removed to observe the effect on the significance of the other. 
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             | wLnCA~ES PASSTHRU wLnSALES   FAMOWN   OWNSHR   OWNMGR   OWNEXP 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCASHTOS~S |   1.0000  
    PASSTHRU |   0.0030   1.0000  
    wLnSALES |  -0.2872* -0.0165   1.0000  
      FAMOWN |   0.0348* -0.2433* -0.2689*  1.0000  
      OWNSHR |   0.0642* -0.2976* -0.4621*  0.5942*  1.0000  
      OWNMGR |   0.0473* -0.0126  -0.2186*  0.0835*  0.1029*  1.0000  
      OWNEXP |  -0.0161  -0.0097   0.3038* -0.0394* -0.1418* -0.0947*  1.0000  
 COLLEGEGRAD |   0.0259  -0.0226   0.1854* -0.1067* -0.1628* -0.0971* -0.0105  
   SPECIALED |  -0.0310  -0.0083  -0.1014*  0.0409*  0.0762*  0.0495* -0.0443* 
   wLnOWNERS |  -0.0504*  0.1830*  0.5129* -0.5048* -0.8005* -0.1480*  0.1959* 
   PURCHASED |  -0.0702*  0.0171   0.1566* -0.0464* -0.0579* -0.0519*  0.0133  
   INHERITED |   0.0199  -0.0041   0.1417*  0.0066  -0.0941* -0.0459*  0.0610* 
 OWNDISTRESS |  -0.0660* -0.0001  -0.1372*  0.0508*  0.0768*  0.0302  -0.0840* 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -0.1136*  0.0199   0.0666* -0.0030  -0.0205  -0.0511* -0.0234  
  FEARDENIAL |  -0.0693*  0.0117  -0.1703*  0.0386*  0.0838*  0.0561* -0.1411* 
wLnOTRINCT~S |   0.1505* -0.0099  -0.0451* -0.0089  -0.0151   0.0124   0.0097  
wLnOWNWORT~S |   0.3106*  0.0117  -0.4424*  0.0760*  0.1159*  0.0600* -0.0456* 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -0.0708*  0.0214  -0.0207   0.0567*  0.0968*  0.0321   0.0124  
 TRADECREDIT |  -0.1144* -0.0287   0.3694* -0.0939* -0.1603* -0.0915*  0.1147* 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |  -0.0751* -0.0128   0.1227* -0.0132  -0.0447* -0.0183   0.0137  
wLnCURLIBT~S |   0.0430*  0.0027   0.1179* -0.0304  -0.0544* -0.0453*  0.0004  
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -0.1822* -0.0026   0.1210* -0.0437* -0.0501* -0.0355* -0.0437* 
 
             | COLLEG~D SPECIA~D wLnOW~RS PURCHA~D INHERI~D OWNDIS~S FIRMDI~S 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 COLLEGEGRAD |   1.0000  
   SPECIALED |  -0.3380*  1.0000  
   wLnOWNERS |   0.1964* -0.0870*  1.0000  
   PURCHASED |  -0.0204   0.0100   0.0554*  1.0000  
   INHERITED |   0.0363* -0.0206   0.1262* -0.1201*  1.0000  
 OWNDISTRESS |  -0.0684*  0.0737* -0.0944* -0.0436* -0.0493*  1.0000  
FIRMDISTRESS |  -0.0233   0.0570*  0.0289  -0.0308  -0.0326   0.3770*  1.0000  
  FEARDENIAL |  -0.0866*  0.0346* -0.1040* -0.0717* -0.0399*  0.3455*  0.2752* 
wLnOTRINCT~S |   0.0228   0.0017   0.0222  -0.0171   0.0477*  0.0266  -0.0250  
wLnOWNWORT~S |   0.0030   0.0080  -0.1105* -0.0854* -0.0354* -0.0227  -0.0728* 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -0.0658*  0.0338  -0.0925* -0.0236   0.0066   0.0315  -0.0428* 
 TRADECREDIT |   0.0619* -0.0133   0.1764*  0.0492*  0.0686* -0.0395*  0.1402* 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   0.0603* -0.0070   0.0514* -0.0148   0.0035  -0.0752* -0.0332  
wLnCURLIBT~S |   0.0230  -0.0148   0.0886*  0.0165   0.0167   0.0728*  0.1559* 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.0048  -0.0259   0.0298   0.0191  -0.0111   0.1253*  0.1774* 
 
             | FEARDE~L wLnOTR~S wLnOW~ES wLnPRO~E TRADEC~T wLnUNU~C wLnCUR~S 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
  FEARDENIAL |   1.0000  
wLnOTRINCT~S |   0.0129   1.0000  
wLnOWNWORT~S |  -0.0180   0.0163   1.0000  
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -0.0325   0.0442* -0.2156*  1.0000  
 TRADECREDIT |  -0.0293  -0.0186  -0.1640* -0.1038*  1.0000  
wLnUNUSEDLOC |  -0.0811*  0.0092  -0.0422* -0.0493*  0.0583*  1.0000  
wLnCURLIBT~S |   0.0620*  0.0587* -0.0687* -0.0791*  0.1459* -0.0196   1.0000  
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.1685* -0.0098  -0.1326* -0.0738*  0.0668*  0.1424*  0.3890* 
 
             | wLnDEB~O 
-------------+--------- 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   1.0000 
 
Figure 3.3. 1998 NSSBF: Pearson Correlations of Model Variables
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             | wLnCA~ES PASSTHRU wLnSALES   FAMOWN   OWNSHR   OWNMGR   OWNEXP 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCASHTOS~S |   1.0000  
    PASSTHRU |  -0.0109   1.0000  
    wLnSALES |  -0.3069* -0.0052   1.0000  
      FAMOWN |   0.0665* -0.1992* -0.2764*  1.0000  
      OWNSHR |   0.0745* -0.2603* -0.3700*  0.4467*  1.0000  
      OWNMGR |   0.0239  -0.0229  -0.2238*  0.0829*  0.1147*  1.0000  
      OWNEXP |   0.0153  -0.0383*  0.2894*  0.0223  -0.0484* -0.1744*  1.0000  
 COLLEGEGRAD |   0.0327* -0.0187   0.0848* -0.0799*  0.0848* -0.0306  -0.0181  
   SPECIALED |  -0.0244   0.0512*  0.0135  -0.0693* -0.2409*  0.0405* -0.0560* 
   wLnOWNERS |  -0.0752*  0.1755*  0.4596* -0.5041* -0.7852* -0.1980*  0.1248* 
   PURCHASED |  -0.0763*  0.0066   0.1881* -0.0685* -0.0841* -0.0720*  0.0171  
   INHERITED |  -0.0068  -0.0298   0.1847*  0.0423* -0.0920* -0.0545*  0.0876* 
 OWNDISTRESS |  -0.0200   0.0075  -0.1048*  0.0243   0.0389*  0.0319* -0.0558* 
FIRMDISTRESS |  -0.0410* -0.0107   0.0483* -0.0147  -0.0142  -0.0097   0.0137  
  FEARDENIAL |  -0.0598* -0.0218  -0.1293*  0.0260   0.0820*  0.0569* -0.1368* 
wLnOTRINCT~S |   0.1486* -0.0136  -0.0868*  0.0098   0.0112  -0.0007   0.0015  
wLnOWNWORT~S |   0.3950*  0.0331* -0.4902*  0.0828*  0.1188*  0.0617* -0.0552* 
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -0.0023  -0.0202  -0.0855*  0.1017*  0.1207*  0.0544* -0.0001  
 TRADECREDIT |  -0.1560* -0.0154   0.4159* -0.0905* -0.1601* -0.1070*  0.1652* 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |  -0.0589* -0.0039   0.0663* -0.0295  -0.0332*  0.0074   0.0166  
wLnCURLIBT~S |   0.0156  -0.0067   0.1920* -0.1157* -0.1038* -0.0926*  0.0670* 
wLnDEBTRATIO |  -0.2080*  0.0232   0.1429* -0.0690* -0.0686* -0.0131  -0.0332* 
 
             | COLLEG~D SPECIA~D wLnOW~RS PURCHA~D INHERI~D OWNDIS~S FIRMDI~S 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 COLLEGEGRAD |   1.0000  
   SPECIALED |  -0.4342*  1.0000  
   wLnOWNERS |  -0.0034   0.1477*  1.0000  
   PURCHASED |  -0.0008   0.0353*  0.0657*  1.0000  
   INHERITED |  -0.0121   0.0075   0.1292* -0.1381*  1.0000  
 OWNDISTRESS |  -0.0411*  0.0014  -0.0417* -0.0252  -0.0220   1.0000  
FIRMDISTRESS |  -0.0069  -0.0172   0.0217   0.0175   0.0089   0.2829*  1.0000  
  FEARDENIAL |  -0.0688* -0.0043  -0.0699* -0.0408* -0.0689*  0.2288*  0.1327* 
wLnOTRINCT~S |  -0.0082  -0.0066   0.0037  -0.0290  -0.0201   0.0325*  0.0246  
wLnOWNWORT~S |   0.0409* -0.0293  -0.1329* -0.1167* -0.0597* -0.0287  -0.0505* 
wLnPROFTOI~E |   0.0076  -0.0180  -0.1289* -0.0285  -0.0528*  0.0010  -0.0088  
 TRADECREDIT |  -0.0366*  0.0186   0.1807*  0.1168*  0.0973* -0.0471*  0.0164  
wLnUNUSEDLOC |   0.0603* -0.0129   0.0320* -0.0045  -0.0091  -0.0433* -0.0184  
wLnCURLIBT~S |   0.0125   0.0261   0.1653*  0.0062   0.0663* -0.0186   0.0579* 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.0107  -0.0093   0.0717*  0.0673* -0.0043   0.0154   0.0607* 
 
             | FEARDE~L wLnOTR~S wLnOW~ES wLnPRO~E TRADEC~T wLnUNU~C wLnCUR~S 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
  FEARDENIAL |   1.0000  
wLnOTRINCT~S |   0.0166   1.0000  
wLnOWNWORT~S |  -0.0655*  0.0788*  1.0000  
wLnPROFTOI~E |  -0.0380*  0.0807* -0.0916*  1.0000  
 TRADECREDIT |  -0.0148  -0.0591* -0.2537* -0.1282*  1.0000  
wLnUNUSEDLOC |  -0.0885* -0.0106  -0.0078  -0.0476*  0.0453*  1.0000  
wLnCURLIBT~S |   0.0534*  0.0393* -0.0488* -0.1124*  0.1594* -0.0350*  1.0000  
wLnDEBTRATIO |   0.1609* -0.0299  -0.1470* -0.1352*  0.1260*  0.1683*  0.2812* 
 
             | wLnDEB~O 
-------------+--------- 
wLnDEBTRATIO |   1.0000 
  
Figure 3.4. 2003 NSSBF: Pearson Correlations of Model Variables (using implicate #3 only) 
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3.3.4 Variance inflation factors. The variance inflation factors for the 1998 
model estimation are provided in figure 3.5 below.  The variance inflation factors for the 
2003 model estimation are provided in figure 3.6 below.  They were generated following 
unweighted OLS estimation of the Cash model for the two survey samples.  The observed 
variance inflation factors for OWNSHR and wLnOWNERS are consistent with the 
observation of relatively high correlation between these variables in figures 3.3 and 3.4 
above.  This confirms the earlier conclusion that estimating the model multiple times with 
one or both of these variables dropped would be advisable. 
 
 
 
  
        Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      OWNSHR |      3.46    0.288965 
   wLnOWNERS |      3.13    0.319469 
    wLnSALES |      2.29    0.435780 
      FAMOWN |      1.59    0.630623 
wLnOWNWORT~S |      1.40    0.712601 
 OWNDISTRESS |      1.30    0.770281 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      1.30    0.772068 
FIRMDISTRESS |      1.28    0.780571 
  FEARDENIAL |      1.25    0.802446 
wLnCURLIBT~S |      1.23    0.809805 
 COLLEGEGRAD |      1.21    0.828375 
 TRADECREDIT |      1.21    0.829834 
    PASSTHRU |      1.16    0.863688 
      OWNEXP |      1.15    0.868683 
   SPECIALED |      1.14    0.875993 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      1.11    0.897288 
      OWNMGR |      1.06    0.939183 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      1.06    0.941908 
   INHERITED |      1.06    0.942335 
   PURCHASED |      1.06    0.942415 
wLnOTRINCT~S |      1.02    0.980685 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.45 
Figure 3.5.  Variance Inflation Factors – 1998 NSSBF
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3.4 Estimation Methodology 
The model specified in the previous section is estimated using survey-weighted 
least squares regression or the equivalent method, WLS with robust standard errors.  The 
sign and statistical significance of the independent variable coefficients is used to test the 
hypotheses.  The methodology and rationale behind the use of a survey-weighted 
regression estimation methodology is described in detail in section 6.1 of this document 
and will not be repeated here.  An estimation of the model using OLS with robust 
standard errors is included in order to show the effect of the use of survey weights in the 
estimation of the model. 
 
  
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS |      3.19    0.313221 
      OWNSHR |      2.91    0.343326 
    wLnSALES |      2.24    0.446703 
wLnOWNWORT~S |      1.46    0.684776 
      FAMOWN |      1.44    0.696156 
   SPECIALED |      1.32    0.758980 
 COLLEGEGRAD |      1.30    0.770496 
 TRADECREDIT |      1.26    0.794676 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      1.21    0.827382 
      OWNEXP |      1.17    0.853627 
wLnCURLIBT~S |      1.17    0.855869 
  FEARDENIAL |      1.16    0.860790 
 OWNDISTRESS |      1.15    0.868501 
    PASSTHRU |      1.11    0.903015 
FIRMDISTRESS |      1.11    0.903694 
   INHERITED |      1.10    0.909138 
      OWNMGR |      1.09    0.913340 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      1.09    0.916234 
   PURCHASED |      1.09    0.920781 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      1.06    0.942120 
wLnOTRINCT~S |      1.03    0.974696 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.41 
 
Figure 3.6. Variance Inflation Factors – 2003 NSSBF
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3.5 Univariate Analysis 
Before estimating the multivariate regression model, it would be useful to 
examine how the small firms’ CASHTOSALES ratio is related in a univariate sense to 
the firm characteristics embodied in the model variables.  Tables 3.4 (for the 1998 
NSSBF) and 3.5 (for the 2003 NSSBF) show how the mean of CASHTOSALES differs 
for the two states of each binary variable in the model.  Included for each set of means is 
an Adjusted Wald test whose null hypothesis is that the two means are not significantly 
different from each other.   
For the 1998 NSSBF sample, the means of CASHTOSALES for PASSTHRU, 
FAMOWN, OWNMGR, SPECIALED, and INHERITED are not significantly different 
for the two states (Yes and No) of these binary variables.  However, the means of 
COLLEGEGRAD, PURCHASED, OWNDISTRESS, FIRMDISTRESS, FEARDENIAL 
and TRADECREDIT are significantly different for the two states of these binary 
variables.  Furthermore, for these variables, the differences are supportive of the 
hypothesized (+) or (-) relationship indicated in table 3.1.  Firms with a primary owner 
who is a college grad  have a significantly higher CASHTOSALES ratio, while 
purchased firms, firms in distress or with a primary owner in distress, firms that fear 
denial of a loan application, and firms that use trade credit all have significantly lower 
CASHTOSALES ratios. 
For the 2003 NSSBF sample, the means of CASHTOSALES for PASSTHRU, 
FAMOWN, OWNMGR, COLLEGEGRAD, SPECIALED, PURCHASED and 
INHERITED are not significantly different for the two states (Yes and No) of these 
binary variables.  However, the means of OWNDISTRESS, FIRMDISTRESS, 
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FEARDENIAL and TRADECREDIT are significantly different for the two states of 
these binary variables.  Furthermore, for these variables, the differences are supportive of 
the hypothesized (+) or (-) relationship indicated in table 3.1.  Firms in distress or with a 
primary owner in distress, firms that fear denial of a loan application, and firms that use 
trade credit all have significantly lower CASHTOSALES ratios. 
For the 1998 NSSBF, the only industry that showed a significant difference in the 
CASHTOSALES ratio was WHOLESALE, which had a significantly lower ratio for 
firms in that industry than those who were not. 
For the 2003 NSSBF, firms in the TRANSPORTATION, WHOLESALE and 
RETAIL industries all had a significantly lower CASHTOSALES ratio than other firms, 
while firms in the SERVICES industry had a very much higher ratio, by two orders of 
magnitude, than firms in other industries.  The significantly lower CASHTOSALES 
ratios for TRANSPORTATION, WHOLESALE and RETAIL industries for 2003 could 
be the result of the poor U.S. economic conditions at that period compared to 1998.  
Firms in these three industries may have been particularly hard-hit by the recession of 
2001-2002, and may have been cash depleted as a result.  The SERVICES sector on the 
other hand appears to have been booming in 2003, if their very high CASHTOSALES 
ratio is any indication. 
Table 3.6 shows the means and standard deviations for selected numeric variables 
from the cash holdings model, for both the 1998 NSSBF and 2003 NSSBF samples.  T-
tests were performed of the differences between the 1998 and 2003 variable means, 
assuming unequal variances and using a significance level of 0.05, with the following 
result: 
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 CASHTOSALES:  firms held significantly less cash on average in 1998 
than 2003. 
 OTRINCTOSALES:  no significant difference between 1998 and 2003. 
 OWNWORTHTOSALES:  no significant difference between 1998 and 
2003. 
 PROFTOINCOME: no significant difference between 1998 and 2003. 
 UNUSEDLOC:  no significant difference between 1998 and 2003. 
 CURLIBTOSALES:  firms maintained a significantly higher ratio in 1998 
than 2003. 
 DEBTTOASSETS:  firms maintained a significantly higher ratio in 1998 
than 2003. 
In summary, from 1998 to 2003, as the economy transitioned from a period of strong 
growth to a period of relative contraction, small firms shed debt and accumulated cash.  
Tables 3.7 (for the 1998 NSSBF) and 3.8 (for the 2003 NSSBF) show how the 
mean of the model independent variable wLnCASHTOSALES differs across four 
quartiles of each numeric variable from the regression model.   Included for each set of 
means are Adjusted Wald tests whose null hypothesis is that the two quartile means are 
not significantly different from each other.  There is a Wald test for each pair of adjacent 
quartile means (1st-2nd quartile, 2nd-3rd quartile, 3rd-4th quartile).  Note that for some of the 
numeric variables, less than four quartiles are listed in the table.  That is because that 
particular variable had a large number of missing or zero values, such that four unique 
quartiles could not be created. 
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Consistent with the results of other researchers, larger firms (measured by 
SALES) maintain a lower wLnCASHTOSALES ratio than smaller firms.  This result is 
supported by both the 1998 and 2003 samples.    
Firms whose primary owner holds a larger share (OWNSHR) of the firm maintain 
a higher wLnCASHTOSALES ratio, contrary to hypothesis H1 in table 3.1.  This result is 
supported by the 1998 but not the 2003 sample.  This observation would be consistent 
with the idea that increasing ownership in a small firm gives the primary owner greater 
control over the firm’s resources and allows her to accumulate cash in the firm for their 
own purposes.  The values of OWNSHR observed in the NSSBF are frequently in the 50 
to 100 percent range, giving the primary owner complete control.   It would appear that 
either (a) increasing ownership share in the small firm does not decrease agency, or (b) 
cash accumulation is not motivated by agency issues. 
For the both samples, firms with the most experienced owners (OWNEXP) 
maintain the highest level of wLnCASHTOSALES, consistent with hypothesis H3a.   
For the 1998 sample, firms with the lowest and highest quartiles of 
wLnOWNERS maintain the highest levels of wLnCASHTOSALES, which offers partial 
support for hypothesis H1 and suggests a nonlinear relationship between wLnOWNERS 
and wLnCASHTOSALES.  For the 2003 sample, the wLnCASHTOSALES means across 
wLnOWNERSquartiles are not significantly different. 
No significant difference is observed in the mean of wLnCASHTOSALES across 
quartiles of wLnOTRINCTOSALES in either sample. 
The wLnCASHTOSALES ratio rises with each quartile of owners wealth, with 
the fourth quartile of wealth having a wLnCASHTOSALES ratio of more than twice that 
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for the third quartile.  This suggests that the very wealthiest of owners have the greatest 
impact on the firm’s cash holdings and provides support for hypothesis H2a.  This result 
is observed for both the 1998 and 2003 samples. 
 The wLnCASHTOSALES ratio is highest for the lowest and highest quartiles of 
wLnPROFTOINCOME in both the 1998 and 2003 samples.  The least profitable and the 
most profitable firms maintain the highest ratio, with the intermediate quartiles 
maintaining a lower ratio.  This result offers partial support for hypothesis H4.  The most 
profitable firms maintain higher wLnCASHTOSALES because they can (H4).  It may be 
that the least profitable firms accumulate cash because they must; they cannot rely on a 
steady stream of profits to fund operations. 
 For the 2003 sample it is observed that firms with a higher unused line of credit 
balance (wLnUNUSEDLOC) maintain a lower wLnCASHTOSALES ratio, consistent 
with hypothesis H6.  This is not supported for the 1998 sample.  It may be that the poorer 
economic conditions in 2003 caused small firms to rely more on their available lines of 
credit and hold less cash than they did during the more economically robust 1998 period. 
 For both the 1998 and 2003 samples, it is observed that firms in the highest and 
lowest quartiles of wLnCURLIBTOSALES maintain the highest levels of the 
wLnCASHTOSALES ratio, with the middle quartiles maintaining lower ratios.  The 
presence of a high wLnCASHTOSALES ratio for the highest wLnCURLIBTOSALES 
quartile is consistent with hypothesis H5 that firms with a higher wLnCASHTOSALES 
ratio will maintain more cash to service that debt.  The firms in the highest quartile of 
current liabilities are at the highest risk of default and are motivated to maintain enough 
cash to avoid that event.  On the other hand, firms in the lowest wLnCURLIBTOSALES 
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quartile have the lowest demands on their cash and can more easily accumulate and 
maintain cash holdings.  
 For both the 1998 and 2003 samples, firms in the lower quartiles of 
DEBTTOASSETS hold more cash than firms in the higher quartiles.  This is contrary to 
hypothesis H5.  This is consistent however with the observation that firms in the lowest 
quartile of current liabilities hold more cash than the middle quartiles.  Cash and debt 
appear to be substitutes, at least at the low to mid quartiles of debt.    
  
  
 
Table 3.4 
1998 NSSBF: Two-way tabulation of CASHTOSALES versus firm characteristics from model 
Number of strata =      78         Number of obs    =     3485       Design df  =  3260 
Number of PSUs   =    3338         Population size  =  4928579 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     | CASHTOSALES  Linearized                            Adjusted Wald test for equality of means 
                     |     Mean     Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]            (H0: Means are equal) 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 PASSTHRU         No |   .1238899   .0073141      .1095492    .1382305 
                 Yes |   .1182436   .0353204      .0489911    .1874961      F(1,3260) = 0.02,  Prob > F = 0.8756       
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 FAMOWN           No |   .1057194   .0196122      .0672659    .1441729 
                 Yes |   .1257347   .0077606      .1105185    .1409509      F(1,3260) = 0.90,  Prob > F = 0.3426 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 OWNMGR           No |   .1033897   .0273082      .0498468    .1569326 
                 Yes |   .1251374   .0075053      .1104218    .139853       F(1,3260) = 0.59,  Prob > F = 0.4427 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 COLLEGEGRAD      No |   .1119641   .0094133      .0935075    .1304208  
                 Yes |   .1359166   .0110816       .114189    .1576443      F(1,3260) = 2.71,  Prob > F = 0.0997  
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 SPECIALED        No |   .1262602   .0077331      .1110981    .1414224 
                 Yes |   .0982608    .019639      .0597547    .1367668      F(1,3260) = 1.76,  Prob > F = 0.1847 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 PURCHASED        No |   .1348239   .0087004      .1177652    .1518826 
                 Yes |   .0709265   .0053222      .0604912    .0813618      F(1,3260) = 39.35, Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 INHERITED        No |   .1213924    .007345      .1069912    .1357937 
                 Yes |   .1719555   .0400117      .0935049    .2504061      F(1,3260) = 1.54,  Prob > F = 0.2140 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 OWNDISTRESS      No |   .1313728   .0082459      .1152051    .1475406 
                 Yes |     .08042   .0121697       .056559     .104281      F(1,3260) = 12.05, Prob > F = 0.0005 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 FIRMDISTRESS     No |   .1333888   .0081399      .1174291    .1493485 
                 Yes |   .0596149   .0114798      .0371066    .0821233      F(1,3260) = 27.52, Prob > F = 0.0000  
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 FEARDENIAL       No |   .1365887   .0089284      .1190829    .1540945 
                 Yes |   .0794269   .0094224      .0609525    .0979014      F(1,3260) = 19.39, Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 TRADECREDIT      No |    .164669   .0158017      .1336867    .1956513 
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                 Yes |   .0994337   .0067297      .0862389    .1126285      F(1,3260) = 14.43, Prob > F = 0.0001 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 MANUFACTURING    No |   .1250085    .007765      .1097836    .1402334 
                 Yes |   .1066493   .0151257      .0769924    .1363062      F(1,3260) = 1.17,  Prob > F = 0.2800 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 TRANSPORTATION   No |   .1227286    .007212      .1085881    .1368692 
                 Yes |   .1444302   .0562909       .034061    .2547994      F(1,3260) = 0.15,  Prob > F = 0.7022 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 WHOLESALE        No |   .1273447   .0077487      .1121518    .1425375 
                 Yes |   .073229    .0097438      .0541245    .0923336      F(1,3260) = 18.88, Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 RETAIL           No |   .1243231    .007853      .1089259    .1397203 
                 Yes |   .1200839   .0180496      .0846943    .1554735      F(1,3260) = 0.05,  Prob > F = 0.8295 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 SERVICES         No |   .1157728   .0092411      .0976539    .1338917 
                 Yes |   .1335871   .0115073      .1110248    .1561494      F(1,3260) = 1.46,  Prob > F = 0.2274 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    
 
 
Table 3.5 
2003 NSSBF: Two-way tabulation of CASHTOSALES versus firm characteristics from model 
Number of strata =      72         Number of obs    =     4145  Design df  =  3862 
Number of PSUs   =    3934         Population size  =  5806122  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     | CASHTOSALES  Linearized                            Adjusted Wald test for equality of means 
                     |     Mean     Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]            (H0: Means are equal) 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 PASSTHRU         No |   .203309    .0390685      .1267122    .2799059 
                 Yes |   .1938529   .0556456      .0847554    .3029505      F(1,3862) = 0.02,  Prob > F = 0.8895 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 FAMOWN           No |   .1349699   .0328682      .0705292    .1994107 
                 Yes |   .2098064     .03982      .1317363    .2878765      F(1,3862) = 2.10,  Prob > F = 0.1478 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 OWNMGR           No |    .094739   .0134023      .0684627    .1210153 
                 Yes |   .2087913   .0381627      .1339703    .2836123      F(1,3862) = 7.95,  Prob > F = 0.0048 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 COLLEGEGRAD      No |   .1976732   .0574065      .0851232    .3102231 
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                 Yes |   .2082209   .0398777      .1300376    .2864043      F(1,3862) = 0.02,  Prob > F = 0.8800 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 SPECIALED        No |   .1805653   .0238626      .1337808    .2273498 
                 Yes |   .3170111   .1864446     -.0485281    .6825503      F(1,3862) = 0.53,  Prob > F = 0.4679 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 PURCHASED        No |   .1903496   .0245422      .1422327    .2384666 
                 Yes |   .2590566   .1687582     -.0718071    .5899202      F(1,3862) = 0.16,  Prob > F = 0.6870 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 INHERITED        No |   .2024179   .0373298        .12923    .2756058 
                 Yes |   .2049188   .0822487      .0436639    .3661738      F(1,3862) = 0.00,  Prob > F = 0.9779 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 OWNDISTRESS      No |   .2065174   .0377634      .1324793    .2805554 
                 Yes |   .1191806   .0354973      .0495854    .1887757      F(1,3862) = 2.84,  Prob > F = 0.0919 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 FIRMDISTRESS     No |   .2064703    .037316      .1333092    .2796313 
                 Yes |   .0892426   .0291843      .0320245    .1464608      F(1,3862) = 6.13,  Prob > F = 0.0133 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 FEARDENIAL       No |   .2236478   .0435634      .1382383    .3090573 
                 Yes |   .1027884   .0163773      .0706794    .1348974      F(1,3862) = 6.74,  Prob > F = 0.0094 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 TRADECREDIT      No |   .3371961   .0898548      .1610288    .5133634 
                 Yes |   .1160866   .0132825      .0900453    .1421279      F(1,3862) = 5.93,  Prob > F = 0.0150 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 MANUFACTURING    No |   .2052015   .0387926      .1291456    .2812573 
                 Yes |   .1681732    .037614      .0944281    .2419184      F(1,3862) = 0.47,  Prob > F = 0.4936 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 TRANSPORTATION   No |   .2062226   .0374535       .132792    .2796532 
                 Yes |   .1079871   .0388388      .0318406    .1841336      F(1,3862) = 3.32,  Prob > F = 0.0686 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
WHOLESALE         No |   .2088943   .0382797      .1338439    .2839448 
                 Yes |   .0989043    .015455      .0686036     .129205      F(1,3862) = 7.10,  Prob > F = 0.0078 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 RETAIL           No |   .2206422    .044238      .1339102    .3073743 
                 Yes |   .1240289   .0168535      .0909862    .1570716      F(1,3862) = 4.16,  Prob > F = 0.0415 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 SERVICES         No |   .1296883   .0104645      .1091717    .1502048 
                 Yes |   .2900168   .0784036      .1363003    .4437333      F(1,3862) = 4.11,  Prob > F = 0.0428 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                    
  
  
 
Table 3.6 
Means of selected model variables from 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples 
Number of strata =   78  Number of obs   =    3485        Number of strata = 72     Number of obs   =     4145 
Number of PSUs   = 3338  Population size = 4928579        Number of PSUs   = 3934   Population size =  5806122 
Design df        = 3260                                   Design df        = 3862 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |              ***** 1998 NSSBF *****             |             ***** 2003 NSSBF ***** 
               |                                                 |             
               |       Mean   Std. Dev.     [95% Conf. Interval] |     Mean   Std. Dev.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+-------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------- 
CASHTOSALES    |   .112028     .4056525     .0982617    .1257943 |  .1710573    2.032707   .1075184    .2345962 
OTRINCTOSALES  |   .037509     .7689369     .0114142    .0636038 |  .0565075    1.449223   .0112073    .1018077 
OWNWORTHTOSALES|   9.864433    97.03174     6.57155     13.15732 |  13.4169     101.1204   10.25605    16.57775 
PROFTOINCOME   |   .0809244    2.017273     .0124659    .1493829 |  .0004738    7.535976  -.2350876    .2360352 
UNUSEDLOC      |   .3495936    6.4175       .1318084    .5673788 |  .3286982    4.92221    .1748386    .4825578 
CURLIBTOSALES  |   .1001296    .203248      .0932321    .1070271 |  .0720034    .1461095   .0674363    .0765705 
DEBTRATIO      |  1.114961     3.932861     .9814949    1.248427 |  .8662447    2.602223   .7849038    .9475856 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty  
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Table 3.7 
1998 NSSBF: Mean of wLnCASHTOSALES across quartiles of model variables 
Number of strata =      77         Number of obs    =     1128 
Number of PSUs   =    1128         Population size  =  1279594 
                                   Design df        =     1051 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |   Mean of     Linearized     Adjusted Wald Test* 
    Quartile |wLnCASHTOSALES  Std. Err.   (H0 = means are equal) 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
    wLnSALES | 
           1 |   .1588675   .0095929       
           2 |   .0850707   .0054981   F(1,3260)=44.55, Prob>F=0.0000 
           3 |   .0640306   .0041537   F(1,3260)=9.30,  Prob>F=0.0023 
           4 |   .0501867   .0033539   F(1,3260)=6.72,  Prob>F=0.0096 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR | 
           1 |   .0757363   .0051084       
           2 |   .0942224   .0038913   F(1,3260)=8.33,  Prob>F=0.0039 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNEXP | 
           1 |   .0955543   .0059894        
           2 |   .0844074   .0060759   F(1,3260)=1.71,  Prob>F=0.1917 
           3 |   .0799057   .0055747   F(1,3260)=0.30,  Prob>F=0.5845 
           4 |   .098225    .0078646   F(1,3260)=3.61,  Prob>F=0.0574 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS | 
           1 |   .0946834   .004072       
           3 |   .0681329   .0045808   F(1,3260)=18.87, Prob>F=0.0000 
           4 |   .0972173   .0108209   F(1,3260)=6.13,  Prob>F=0.0133 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnOTRINCTOS~| 
           1 |   .0883401   .0036337       
           4 |   .0937333   .0066935   F(1,3260)=0.50,  Prob>F=0.4788 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnOWNWORTHT~| 
           1 |   .0414717   .0025786        
           2 |   .0577249   .0029911   F(1,3260)=16.94, Prob>F=0.0000 
           3 |   .0873327   .0055687   F(1,3260)=21.99, Prob>F=0.0000 
           4 |   .172296    .0099677   F(1,3260)=55.53, Prob>F=0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnPROFTOINC~| 
           1 |   .0967847   .0079938       
           2 |   .0637847   .0040214   F(1,3260)=13.59, Prob>F=0.0002 
           3 |   .0893499   .0058791   F(1,3260)=12.91, Prob>F=0.0003 
           4 |   .1084445   .0068046   F(1,3260)=4.52,  Prob>F=0.0336 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnUNUSEDLOC | 
           1 |   .0988177   .0039959        
           3 |   .1217171   .0477461   F(1,3260)=0.23,  Prob>F=0.6328 
           4 |   .0606633   .0040505   F(1,3260)=1.62,  Prob>F=0.2027 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCURLIBTOS~| 
           1 |   .11265     .0060975       
           2 |   .0590927   .0055972   F(1,3260)=41.88, Prob>F=0.0000 
           3 |   .0630934   .0044646   F(1,3260)=0.31,  Prob>F=0.5775 
           4 |   .088905    .0059709   F(1,3260)=12.02, Prob>F=0.0005 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnDEBTRATIO | 
           1 |   .1352571   .0090247       
           2 |   .1125734   .0066452   F(1,3260)=4.10,  Prob>F=0.0429 
           3 |   .0634925   .0039664   F(1,3260)=40.28, Prob>F=0.0000 
           4 |   .0469627   .0034927   F(1,3260)=9.77,  Prob>F=0.0018 
 (Wald test is for equality of quartile mean on previous row to quartile mean on current row of table.) 
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Table 3.8 
2003 NSSBF: Mean of wLnCASHTOSALES across quartiles of model variables 
Number of strata =      72         Number of obs    =     3934 
Number of PSUs   =    3934         Population size  =  5806122 
                                   Design df        =     3862 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |   Mean of     Linearized     Adjusted Wald Test* 
    Quartile |wLnCASHTOSALES  Std. Err.   (H0 = means are equal) 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
    wLnSALES | 
           1 |   .188117    .0116205        
           2 |   .0925807   .005965    F(1,3862)=53.42, Prob>F=0.0000 
           3 |   .0675532   .0054448   F(1,3862)=9.61,  Prob>F=0.0019 
           4 |   .0531834   .0032688   F(1,3862)=5.11,  Prob>F=0.0238 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR | 
           1 |   .0922093   .0062976       
           2 |   .1041788   .0047354   F(1,3862)=2.31,  Prob>F=0.1289 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNEXP | 
           1 |   .107642    .0077331       
           2 |   .080271    .0063303   F(1,3862)=7.49,  Prob>F=0.0062 
           3 |   .0952326   .0064237   F(1,3862)=2.75,  Prob>F=0.0973 
           4 |   .1188295   .0095661   F(1,3862)=4.20,  Prob>F=0.0404 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS | 
           1 |   .10534     .0052571        
           3 |   .0942637   .0061028   F(1,3862)=1.89,  Prob>F=0.1695 
           4 |   .0931823   .0118272   F(1,3862)=0.01,  Prob>F=0.9352 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnOTRINCTOS~| 
           1 |   .0981763   .0041731       
           4 |   .1103931   .0092776   F(1,3862)=1.44,  Prob>F=0.2304 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnOWNWORTHT~| 
           1 |   .0469822   .0039244        
           2 |   .0666949   .0047752   F(1,3862)=10.17, Prob>F=0.0014 
           3 |   .0917232   .0058634   F(1,3862)=10.94, Prob>F=0.0009 
           4 |   .1968215   .0116104   F(1,3862)=65.37, Prob>F=0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnPROFTOINC~| 
           1 |   .1091862   .0085835       
           2 |   .0685365   .0044894   F(1,3862)=17.58, Prob>F=0.0000 
           3 |   .0936901   .0073523   F(1,3862)=8.54,  Prob>F=0.0035 
           4 |   .1307438   .0089647   F(1,3862)=10.24, Prob>F=0.0014 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnUNUSEDLOC | 
           1 |   .1138215   .0049281       
           3 |   .0533232   .0101824   F(1,3862)=28.63, Prob>F=0.0000 
           4 |   .080213    .006756    F(1,3862)=4.86,  Prob>F=0.0276 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCURLIBTOS~| 
           1 |    .134519   .0072202       
           2 |   .0578231   .0082289   F(1,3862)=48.94, Prob>F=0.0000 
           3 |   .0677758   .0046992   F(1,3862)=1.10,  Prob>F=0.2945 
           4 |   .0971076   .0079052   F(1,3862)=10.19, Prob>F=0.0014 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnDEBTRATIO | 
           1 |   .1551567   .0098617        
           2 |   .1210796   .0090545   F(1,3862)=6.48,  Prob>F=0.0109 
           3 |   .069137    .00426     F(1,3862)=26.96, Prob>F=0.0000 
           4 |   .0563535   .0049781   F(1,3862)=3.81,  Prob>F=0.0511 
(Wald test is for equality of quartile mean on previous row to quartile mean on current row of table.) 
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3.6 Multivariate Analysis and Results 
In this section the results of the multivariate analysis of the Cash Holdings model 
are summarized and discussed.  The results from the estimation of the model using both 
the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples are presented and an analysis of the results is offered.  
Table 3.9 presents a tabular summary of the results of the estimations, indicating which 
hypothesis is being tested by each variable, the sign of the coefficient estimated for that 
variable, and the level of significance of the t-test for that variable.  The expected sign of 
the variable based on the hypothesis being tested is also indicated in that figure. 
Figure 3.7 shows (for the 1998 NSSBF) the estimation of the full Cash Holdings 
model using OLS with robust standard errors in column 1, weighted least-squares with 
robust standard errors in column 2, and survey-weighted regression in column 3.  As 
expected and as shown in section 4, the results in columns 2 and 3 are virtually identical.  
This confirms that weighted least squares with robust standard errors can be used to 
estimate the Cash Holdings model, confident that the estimates will be unbiased and 
consistent.  Figure 3.10 shows the three comparative estimations for the 2003 NSSBF 
sample, and confirms that the estimations in columns 2 and 3 of that table are virtually 
identical for that sample as well. 
Figure 3.8 for the 1998 NSSBF (3.11 for the 2003 NSSBF) duplicates the full 
model estimation using robust WLS in column 1, then in columns 2 through 5 it repeats 
the estimation with selected variables being dropped from the model due to the high 
correlation between those variables, as explained in section 3.3.3.  Figure 3.9 for the 1998 
NSSBF (3.12 for the 2003 NSSBF) adds five industry dummy variables to the model.  
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They are MANUFACTURING, TRANSPORTATION, WHOLESALE, RETAIL, 
SERVICES. 
Table 3.9 
Summary of observed results compared to hypothesized results 
Independent Variable Hypothesis 
Tested 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Cash Holdings 
Observed 
Relationship 
1998/2003 
Firm Characteristics 
(Controls): 
   
PASSTHRU  (-) (-)**/ns 
LnSALES  (-) (-)***/(-)*** 
PURCHASED  (-) (-)**/ns 
INHERITED  (+) (+)*/ns 
Agency and Value 
Maximization: 
   
FAMOWN H1 (+) ns/ns 
OWNSHR H1 (-) (-)**/(-)** 
OWNMGR H1 (-) ns/ns 
LnOWNERS H1 (+) (+)***/(+)** 
Owner Characteristics    
LnOWNWORTHTOSALES H2a (+) (+)***/(+)*** 
OWNDISTRESS H2b (-) (-)*/ns 
OWNEXP H3a (+) (+)*/(+)*** 
COLLEGEGRAD H3b (+) (+)**/(+)** 
SPECIALED H3b (-) (-)**/ns 
Financing Sources and 
Constraints: 
   
FIRMDISTRESS H4 (-) ns/ns 
FEARDENIAL H4 (-) (-)***/ns 
LnOTRINCTOSALES H4 (+) (+)***/(+)** 
LnPROFTOINCOME H4 (+)  ns/ns 
Financial Obligations and 
Debt: 
   
LnCURLIBTOSALES H5 (+) (+)***/(+)*** 
LnDEBTRATIO H5 (+) (-)***/(-)*** 
Cash Substitutes:    
TRADECREDIT H6 (-) ns/ns 
LnUNUSEDLOC H6 (-) (-)**/ns 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ns = ”not significant” 
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 Examining the firm characteristic variables in table 3.9 first, it is observed that 
firms organized as PASSTHRU entities hold less cash due to the personal tax liability of 
the firm’s owners for any profits earned by the firm.  This result is supported by the 1998 
sample but not the 2003 sample. Examining table 3.6 and related discussion in the 
previous section of this paper, it is observed that firms maintained a significantly higher 
CASHTOSALES ratio in 2003 than in 1998, probably as a precaution due to the 
relatively weak economy in 2003.  In that environment, the tax liability of the owners 
may have been less of an issue than the need to maintain liquidity in uncertain times, 
leading to the insignificance of the coefficient for PASSTHRU in 2003. 
 It is also observed that larger firms (measured by LnSALES) hold significantly 
less cash than smaller firms, a result that is supported by both the 1998 and 2003 data.  
This is consistent with the findings of other researchers.  Larger firms have better access 
to alternative sources of capital than smaller firms, which allows them to maintain less 
cash. 
 Some indication is observed that PURCHASED firms hold less cash, and a 
weaker indication (significant at the 0.1 level) that INHERITED firms hold more cash, 
consistent with the predictions for the signs of the coefficients of these variables.   
INHERITED firms are family legacies and may hold cash to reduce the financial risk of 
the firm and promote its survival.  PURCHASED firms on the other hand may be viewed 
as investments by their purchaser and lack the emotional attachment of the owners of 
INHERITED firms.  The new owners may desire to extract cash from the firm to get an 
immediate return on their investment, or they may be less risk-averse than the inheritor of 
a family firm and be willing to accept more financial risk by operating with less cash on 
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hand.  It is observed that these results hold for the 1998 data but not the 2003 data.  This 
is consistent with the observation from tables 3.4 and 3.5 that the difference in means of 
CASHTOSALES between PURCHASED and other firms is significant for the 1998 
sample but not the 2003 sample.   
 In support of hypothesis H1,  cash holdings decrease with increasing owner share 
in the firm (OWNSHR).  This observed result is consistent with the Jensen and Meckling 
hypothesis that increasing ownership share in the firm reduces agency, and with the 
hypothesis of Opler et al. that excess cash holdings represent an agency cost to the firm.  
Additional support to hypothesis H1 is provided by the observation that cash holdings 
increase with the number of firm owners (LnOWNERS).  Increasingly diffuse ownership 
reduces monitoring of management and allows agency issues, including accumulation of 
cash, to flourish.   The observed results for OWNSHR and LnOWNERS are supported by 
both the 1998 and 2003 samples.  Note that Faulkender (2002) also observed a significant 
negative relationship between cash holdings and owner share, and a significant positive 
relationship with number of owners, though he used the 1993 NSSBF survey data. 
 One of the most statistically significant and economically strongest relationships 
to cash holdings is the positive relationship observed between owner wealth 
(LnOWNWORTHTOSALES) and cash holdings, in support of hypothesis H2a.  The 
observation is upheld by both the 1998 and 2003 samples.  The personal wealth of the 
principal owner of the firm is one of the main determinants in the model of cash holdings.  
This is consistent with the body of research that positively relates owner wealth to firm 
success, since the ability to provide liquidity at critical periods of need is essential to the 
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success of the firm and may help to explain the empirical observation in other studies that 
firms with wealthier owners enjoy greater longevity. 
 Only weak support is observed in the 1998 sample for hypothesis H2b, that the 
previous financial distress of the primary owner (OWNDISTRESS) is negatively related 
to cash holdings, and no support in the 2003 sample.  The variable OWNDISTRESS is 
“1” if the primary owner has declared bankruptcy within seven years prior to the survey 
date, or defaulted on a personal obligation within three years prior to the survey date.  It 
may be that the contemporary cash holdings in the cross-sectional NSSBF samples are 
not affected by owner distress from so far into the past, or it may be that a single negative 
credit event from the owner’s past is not enough to influence the current cash holdings of 
the firm.  Also, the number of primary owners reporting distress dropped from 14.7% in 
the 1998 sample to 3.5% in the 2003 sample, and the Adjusted Wald test for difference of 
CASHTOSALES means between firms with OWNDISTRESS=1 and other firms 
dropped from F=12.05 in the 1998 sample to F=2.84 in the 2003 sample.  One cannot 
rule out the possibility that the 2003 sample lacks adequate observations with 
OWNDISTRESS=1 to achieve a statistically significant coefficient in the model 
estimation. 
 A very interesting result is the strong support observed in the 2003 sample (but 
weak in the 1998 sample) for hypothesis H3a, that cash holdings are positively related to 
owner experience (OWNEXP).  The interpretation that presents itself is that owner 
experience is more important in a time of weak economy (2003) than in a time when the 
economy is expanding and firms are highly profitable (1998).  When times are bad, 
experienced owners accumulate cash as a precaution to maintain firm liquidity and to 
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finance firm operations since credit may be difficult to obtain.  A significantly higher 
mean of CASHTOSALES was observed in 2003 than 1998 when comparing means in 
table 3.6. 
 Support is found for hypothesis H3b, that firms with college educated owners 
maintain higher cash ratios than firms whose primary owners have a trade school or 
associate degree education.  A significant positive result is observed for both samples.  It 
is observed that owners with a trade school or associate degree education maintain 
significantly lower cash ratios with the 1998 sample, though the coefficient was 
insignificant in the 2003 sample.   These results suggest that firms with college educated 
owners maintain higher cash balances regardless of the economic climate, though less 
educated owners maintain lower cash balances during strong economic times.  
Combining this with the previous observation for OWNEXP, it would appear that owner 
experience and education level are both significant determinants of the firms cash 
holdings. 
Mixed support is seen for hypothesis H4 that Cash holdings are positively related 
to the financial constraints of the firm.  No support is found in either sample that the 
previous financial distress of the firm (FIRMDISTRESS) is negatively related to cash 
holdings.  The variable FIRMDISTRESS is “1” if the firm has declared bankruptcy 
within seven years  prior to the survey date, or defaulted on an obligation within three 
years prior to the survey date.  It may be that the contemporary cash holdings in the 
cross-sectional NSSBF samples are not affected by firm distress from so far into the past, 
or it may be that a single negative credit event from the firm’s past is not enough to 
influence the current cash holdings of the firm. Also, the number of firms reporting 
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distress dropped from 14.4% in the 1998 sample to 3.3% in the 2003 sample, and the 
Adjusted Wald test for difference of CASHTOSALES means between firms with 
FIRMDISTRESS=1 and other firms dropped from F=27.52 in the 1998 sample to F=6.13 
in the 2003 sample.  One cannot rule out the possibility that the 2003 sample lacks 
adequate observations with FIRMDISTRESS=1 to achieve a statistically significant 
coefficient in the model estimation. 
It is also noted that profitability (LnPROFTOINCOME) is not a significant 
determinant of cash holdings in either the 1998 or 2003 samples, contrary to hypothesis 
H4.  However, “other income” (LnOTRINCTOSALES) is a significant positive 
determinant of cash holdings in both samples.  This latter observation supports the 
hypothesis H4.  The NSSBF samples include “other income” in the calculation of firm 
profits, though the variables LnPROFTOINCOME and LnOTRINCTOSALES are not 
highly correlated.  (Removing LnOTRINCTOSALES from the model does not change 
the significance of the coefficient for LnPROFTOINCOME.)  Apparently, although 
higher total profits of the firm may make it more possible for a firm to accumulate cash, 
they are not a sufficient motivator for the small firm to accumulate cash.  Contributions 
from other sources of income however, such as those from financial investments, are 
apparently viewed as a windfall and are saved. 
 Also in support of hypothesis H4, a significant negative relationship is found 
between FEARDENIAL and cash holdings using the 1998 sample, though the 
relationship is not significant when using the 2003 sample.  Firms that have not applied 
for a loan within the past three years even though they need the funds  hold less cash than 
other firms.  FEARDENIAL is assumed to be a proxy for financial distress.  Such firms 
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are aware that they are too financially unfit to approach a lender for financing, and their 
lower cash holdings (liquidity) are one indicator of this lack of fitness.  The number of 
firms reporting FEARDENIAL=1 dropped from 21.8% in the 1998 sample to 14.2% in 
the 2003 sample, and the Adjusted Wald test for difference of CASHTOSALES means 
between firms with FEARDENIAL=1 and other firms dropped from F=19.39 in the 1998 
sample to F=6.74 in the 2003 sample.   
It has been assumed for hypothesis H4 that FEARDENIAL is a proxy for firm 
financial distress and thus would be negatively related to cash holdings (liquidity).  In the 
three year period preceding 1998, which was a period of financial expansion and 
prosperity, that may a good assumption and it is upheld by the empirical results.  
However, the three years preceding 2003 were a period of recession and financial 
contraction, during which firms may have feared denial of a loan application due to credit 
rationing by financial institutions rather than due to their own financial status.  In this 
situation, FEARDENIAL would no longer be an unambiguous proxy for distress and its 
relationship to cash holdings would be difficult to predict.  This could explain the lack of 
significant relationship between FEARDENIAL and cash holdings using the 2003 sample 
data. 
 Mixed support is found for hypothesis H5.   Current liabilities 
(LnCURLIBTOSALES) are significantly positively related to cash holdings using both 
the 1998 and 2003 samples.  This is consistent with the prediction for hypothesis H5.  
However, a significant negative relationship between total debt (LnDEBTTOASSETS) 
and cash holdings is found using both the 1998 and 2003 samples, in contradiction to the 
hypothesized result and in contradiction to the positive relationship observed by 
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Faulkender (2002) using the 1993 NSSBF survey data.  However, the result of this study 
is consistent with the Free Cash Flow theory of Jensen (1986) who suggests that a higher 
level of firm debt will reduce the free cash flows available to managers to spend on non-
value maximizing activities.  Although free cash flow and cash holding are not exactly 
the same thing, higher free cash flows can lead to higher cash holdings if they are 
accumulated rather than paid out to investors.  A higher level of total debt will force 
managers to pay more of their free cash flow to creditors, reducing their ability to 
accumulate cash holdings, which would support the empirical result. 
 No support is observed for hypothesis H6 using TRADECREDIT as a proxy for 
cash substitute.  Faulkender observed a significant negative relationship between the use 
of trade credit and the cash holdings of the firm using the 1993 NSSBF data, which 
would support H6.  No significant relationship is found between trade credit and cash 
holdings in the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples.  These results suggest that small firms do 
not view trade credit and lines of credit as substitutes for cash.   
A significant negative relationship between LnUNUSEDLOC and cash holdings 
is observed using the 1998 sample, but no significant relationship with the 2003 sample.  
The 1998 sample results supports the hypothesis H6, that lines of credit and cash are 
substitutes for each other.   Although the value of UNUSEDLOC did not decrease much 
from 1998 to 2003, indicating that firms still had access to unused lines of credit during 
the 2003 period, small firms apparently did not use their lines of credit as substitutes for 
cash during this period.  This hesitancy to draw upon their lines of credit instead of using 
cash is consistent with their reduction in current liabilities and other debt from 1998 to 
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2003.  During difficult financial times, it would appear that small firms reduce their 
dependence upon debt. 
 
 
  
(wLnCASHTOSALES is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Robust OLS Robust WLS Survey-weighted 
PASSTHRU -0.00899 -0.0224** -0.0224** 
 (0.00927) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
wLnSALES -0.0168*** -0.0185*** -0.0185*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00257) (0.00256) 
FAMOWN -0.00525 -0.00715 -0.00715 
 (0.00651) (0.00948) (0.00945) 
OWNMGR -0.000491 -0.00269 -0.00269 
 (0.00638) (0.00968) (0.00967) 
OWNSHR -1.88e-05 0.000334 0.000334 
 (0.000121) (0.000207) (0.000207) 
OWNEXP 0.000477** 0.000520* 0.000520* 
 (0.000224) (0.000303) (0.000302) 
COLLEGEGRAD 0.00983** 0.0121** 0.0121** 
 (0.00498) (0.00614) (0.00613) 
SPECIALED -0.0162** -0.0144 -0.0144 
 (0.00709) (0.00912) (0.00910) 
wLnOWNERS 0.0113*** 0.0349*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.00410) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
PURCHASED -0.00640 -0.0120** -0.0120** 
 (0.00427) (0.00505) (0.00503) 
INHERITED 0.0221* 0.0324* 0.0324* 
 (0.0118) (0.0173) (0.0173) 
OWNDISTRESS -0.0178** -0.0160* -0.0160* 
 (0.00727) (0.00927) (0.00923) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.0164*** -0.0138 -0.0138 
 (0.00628) (0.00870) (0.00867) 
FEARDENIAL -0.0195*** -0.0225*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00601) (0.00697) (0.00696) 
wLnOTRINCTOSALES 0.285*** 0.295*** 0.295*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0934) (0.0931) 
wLnOWNWORTHTOSALES 7.907*** 8.498*** 8.498*** 
 (2.024) (2.338) (2.333) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -0.0235 -0.00731 -0.00731 
 (0.0165) (0.0201) (0.0200) 
TRADECREDIT -0.00537 -0.00293 -0.00293 
 (0.00566) (0.00675) (0.00672) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC -0.0167** -0.0203** -0.0203** 
 (0.00654) (0.00859) (0.00858) 
wLnCURLIBTOSALES 0.150*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0248) (0.0248) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.0429*** -0.0398*** -0.0398*** 
 (0.00410) (0.00436) (0.00434) 
Constant -68.13*** -73.34*** -73.34*** 
 (17.54) (20.27) (20.23) 
Observations 3338 3338 3561 
R-squared 0.202 0.206 0.206 
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.201  
Model SS 13.80 16.23  
Residual SS 54.62 62.43  
Model df 21 21 21 
Residual df 3316 3316 3483 
F statistic 17.52 12.89 12.88 
Number of strata   78 
Population size   4.929e+06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) OLS with robust std errors       (2) Weighted OLS with robust std errors 
(3) Survey-weighted LS with std errors calculated using Taylor Linearization 
Figure 3.7. 1998 NSSBF – Comparison of Model Estimation Methods for Cash Holdings Model 
  
 
 
(wLnCASHTOSALES is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Full Model Minus LnOWNERS Minus OWNSHR Minus SPECIALED Minus COLLEGEGRAD
      
PASSTHRU -0.0224** -0.0242** -0.0264** -0.0220** -0.0237** 
 (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
wLnSALES -0.0185*** -0.0173*** -0.0188*** -0.0184*** -0.0181*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00247) (0.00259) (0.00256) (0.00255) 
FAMOWN -0.00715 -0.00830 -0.00242 -0.00696 -0.00789 
 (0.00948) (0.00966) (0.00918) (0.00947) (0.00948) 
OWNMGR -0.00269 -0.00433 -0.00371 -0.00265 -0.00328 
 (0.00968) (0.00985) (0.00974) (0.00969) (0.00968) 
OWNSHR 0.000334 -0.000284**  0.000324 0.000344* 
 (0.000207) (0.000125)  (0.000207) (0.000209) 
OWNEXP 0.000520* 0.000568* 0.000532* 0.000531* 0.000472 
 (0.000303) (0.000304) (0.000303) (0.000301) (0.000301) 
COLLEGEGRAD 0.0121** 0.0134** 0.0123** 0.0148**  
 (0.00614) (0.00619) (0.00616) (0.00582)  
SPECIALED -0.0144 -0.0137 -0.0140  -0.0205** 
 (0.00912) (0.00916) (0.00913)  (0.00864) 
wLnOWNERS 0.0349***  0.0244*** 0.0347*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.0106)  (0.00655) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
PURCHASED -0.0120** -0.0130*** -0.0123** -0.0122** -0.0128** 
 (0.00505) (0.00505) (0.00506) (0.00504) (0.00505) 
INHERITED 0.0324* 0.0358** 0.0331* 0.0327* 0.0319* 
 (0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0173) 
OWNDISTRESS -0.0160* -0.0168* -0.0163* -0.0163* -0.0162* 
 (0.00927) (0.00924) (0.00926) (0.00926) (0.00931) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.0138 -0.0126 -0.0134 -0.0144* -0.0137 
 (0.00870) (0.00865) (0.00867) (0.00866) (0.00869) 
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FEARDENIAL -0.0225*** -0.0221*** -0.0224*** -0.0222*** -0.0230*** 
 (0.00697) (0.00696) (0.00697) (0.00695) (0.00698) 
wLnOTRINCTOSALES 0.295*** 0.301*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.299*** 
 (0.0934) (0.0938) (0.0937) (0.0933) (0.0939) 
wLnOWNWORTHTOSALES 8.498*** 8.761*** 8.503*** 8.509*** 8.648*** 
 (2.338) (2.339) (2.340) (2.344) (2.322) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -0.00731 -0.00686 -0.00638 -0.00761 -0.00805 
 (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) 
TRADECREDIT -0.00293 -0.00296 -0.00291 -0.00305 -0.00327 
 (0.00675) (0.00676) (0.00675) (0.00675) (0.00676) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC -0.0203** -0.0193** -0.0198** -0.0208** -0.0195** 
 (0.00859) (0.00880) (0.00865) (0.00856) (0.00850) 
wLnCURLIBTOSALES 0.133*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0247) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.0398*** -0.0405*** -0.0401*** -0.0396*** -0.0401*** 
 (0.00436) (0.00437) (0.00436) (0.00437) (0.00437) 
Constant -73.34*** -75.56*** -73.35*** -73.44*** -74.62*** 
 (20.27) (20.28) (20.29) (20.33) (20.13) 
Observations 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 
R-squared 0.206 0.202 0.206 0.206 0.205 
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.198 0.201 0.201 0.200 
Model SS 16.23 15.92 16.18 16.17 16.12 
Residual SS 62.43 62.74 62.48 62.49 62.54 
Model df 21 20 20 20 20 
Residual df 3316 3317 3317 3317 3317 
F statistic 12.89 13.45 13.49 13.49 13.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All columns estimated using Robust WLS 
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Figure 3.8. 1998 NSSBF – Estimations of Cash Holdings Model with Selected Variables Dropped
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Figure 3.9. 1998 NSSBF – Estimations of Cash Holdings Model with Industry dummies added 
(wLnCASHTOSALES is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Full Model Industries 
   
PASSTHRU -0.0224** -0.0226** 
 (0.0107) (0.0108) 
wLnSALES -0.0185*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00268) 
FAMOWN -0.00715 -0.00663 
 (0.00948) (0.00952) 
OWNMGR -0.00269 -0.00247 
 (0.00968) (0.00960) 
OWNSHR 0.000334 0.000345* 
 (0.000207) (0.000208) 
OWNEXP 0.000520* 0.000502* 
 (0.000303) (0.000304) 
COLLEGEGRAD 0.0121** 0.0133** 
 (0.00614) (0.00629) 
SPECIALED -0.0144 -0.0137 
 (0.00912) (0.00919) 
wLnOWNERS 0.0349*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) 
PURCHASED -0.0120** -0.00996* 
 (0.00505) (0.00527) 
INHERITED 0.0324* 0.0315* 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) 
OWNDISTRESS -0.0160* -0.0163* 
 (0.00927) (0.00929) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.0138 -0.0135 
 (0.00870) (0.00869) 
FEARDENIAL -0.0225*** -0.0224*** 
 (0.00697) (0.00704) 
wLnOTRINCTOSALES 0.295*** 0.296*** 
 (0.0934) (0.0931) 
wLnOWNWORTHTOSALES 8.498*** 8.519*** 
 (2.338) (2.342) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -0.00731 -0.00881 
 (0.0201) (0.0202) 
TRADECREDIT -0.00293 -0.00202 
 (0.00675) (0.00686) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC -0.0203** -0.0214** 
 (0.00859) (0.00869) 
wLnCURLIBTOSALES 0.133*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0250) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.0398*** -0.0408*** 
 (0.00436) (0.00443) 
MANUFACTURING  -0.0159 
  (0.0130) 
TRANSPORTATION  0.00313 
  (0.0166) 
WHOLESALE  -0.0149 
  (0.0105) 
RETAIL  -0.0138 
  (0.00969) 
SERVICES  -0.0118 
  (0.00827) 
Constant -73.34*** -73.50*** 
 (20.27) (20.30) 
Observations 3338 3338 
R-squared 0.206 0.208 
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.201 
Model SS 16.23 16.33 
Residual SS 62.43 62.33 
Model df 21 26 
Residual df 3316 3311 
F statistic 12.89 10.63 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(wLnCASHTOSALES is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Robust OLS Robust WLS Survey-weighted 
 
PASSTHRU -0.0121 -0.000176 -0.000176 
 (0.00878) (0.0171) (0.0170) 
wLnSALES -0.0149*** -0.0200*** -0.0200*** 
 (0.00175) (0.00329) (0.00329) 
FAMOWN 0.00248 0.00346 0.00346 
 (0.00583) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
OWNMGR -0.00493 0.00378 0.00378 
 (0.00694) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
OWNSHR -8.64e-05 -4.47e-05 -4.47e-05 
 (0.000128) (0.000229) (0.000228) 
OWNEXP 0.000919*** 0.00111*** 0.00111*** 
 (0.000242) (0.000375) (0.000375) 
COLLEGEGRAD 0.0126** 0.0146* 0.0146* 
 (0.00521) (0.00793) (0.00792) 
SPECIALED -0.00131 -0.00205 -0.00205 
 (0.00616) (0.00938) (0.00937) 
wLnOWNERS 0.00746 0.0193 0.0193 
 (0.00472) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
PURCHASED 0.00271 0.00146 0.00146 
 (0.00421) (0.00740) (0.00738) 
INHERITED 0.0191** 0.0236 0.0236 
 (0.00915) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
OWNDISTRESS -0.0144 -0.0154 -0.0154 
 (0.0129) (0.0166) (0.0165) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.00823 -0.000882 -0.000882 
 (0.00988) (0.0182) (0.0181) 
FEARDENIAL -0.0139** -0.0121 -0.0121 
 (0.00660) (0.00859) (0.00857) 
wLnOTRINCTOSALES 0.222*** 0.218** 0.218** 
 (0.0619) (0.0883) (0.0883) 
wLnOWNWORTHTOSALES 0.164*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0303) (0.0302) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME -0.00875 0.00321 0.00321 
 (0.0213) (0.0264) (0.0263) 
TRADECREDIT -0.00446 -0.00274 -0.00274 
 (0.00574) (0.00792) (0.00792) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC -0.0120* 0.000183 0.000183 
 (0.00712) (0.0124) (0.0123) 
wLnCURLIBTOSALES 0.152*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0512) (0.0512) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.0520*** -0.0520*** -0.0520*** 
 (0.00434) (0.00598) (0.00598) 
Constant -0.389** -0.350 -0.350 
 (0.177) (0.232) (0.231) 
Observations 3934 3934 4240 
R-squared 0.225 0.209 0.209 
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.204  
Model SS 21.29 25.12  
Residual SS 73.47 95.31  
Model df 21 21 21 
Residual df 3912 3912 4168 
F statistic 20.30 11.98 11.93 
Number of strata   72 
Population size   5.806e+06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) OLS with robust std errors         (2) Weighted OLS with robust std 
errors 
(3) Survey-weighted LS with std errors calculated using Taylor Linearization 
Figure 3.10.  2003 NSSBF – Comparison of Model Estimation Methods for Cash Holdings Model 
  
  
(wLnCASHTOSALES is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Full Model Minus 
LnOWNERS 
Minus OWNSHR Minus SPECIALED Minus 
COLLEGEGRAD 
      
PASSTHRU -0.000176 -0.000191 0.000288 -8.07e-05 -0.000492 
 (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0170) 
wLnSALES -0.0200*** -0.0196*** -0.0200*** -0.0200*** -0.0193*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00326) (0.00329) (0.00328) (0.00325) 
FAMOWN 0.00346 -0.00103 0.00336 0.00351 0.00112 
 (0.0134) (0.0127) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) 
OWNMGR 0.00378 0.00160 0.00392 0.00369 0.00416 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
OWNSHR -4.47e-05 -0.000330**  -3.86e-05 -2.34e-05 
 (0.000229) (0.000159)  (0.000230) (0.000228) 
OWNEXP 0.00111*** 0.00115*** 0.00110*** 0.00111*** 0.00107*** 
 (0.000375) (0.000377) (0.000375) (0.000377) (0.000375) 
COLLEGEGRAD 0.0146* 0.0146* 0.0146* 0.0152**  
 (0.00793) (0.00795) (0.00789) (0.00730)  
SPECIALED -0.00205 -0.00208 -0.00181  -0.00975 
 (0.00938) (0.00939) (0.00946)  (0.00864) 
wLnOWNERS 0.0193  0.0209** 0.0193 0.0192 
 (0.0128)  (0.00883) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
PURCHASED 0.00146 0.00125 0.00153 0.00142 0.00133 
 (0.00740) (0.00741) (0.00739) (0.00740) (0.00743) 
INHERITED 0.0236 0.0244* 0.0235 0.0236 0.0214 
 (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
OWNDISTRESS -0.0154 -0.0153 -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0158 
 (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.000882 -0.000923 -0.000842 -0.000785 -0.00180 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0182) 
FEARDENIAL -0.0121 -0.0119 -0.0122 -0.0120 -0.0135 
 (0.00859) (0.00863) (0.00865) (0.00858) (0.00858) 
wLnOTRINCTOSALES 0.218** 0.218** 0.218** 0.218** 0.217** 
 (0.0883) (0.0883) (0.0883) (0.0883) (0.0884) 
wLnOWNWORTHTOSALES 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0298) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME 0.00321 0.00218 0.00317 0.00320 0.00403 
 (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
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TRADECREDIT -0.00274 -0.00267 -0.00274 -0.00273 -0.00378 
 (0.00792) (0.00794) (0.00792) (0.00792) (0.00802) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 0.000183 0.000233 0.000205 0.000162 0.00156 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) 
wLnCURLIBTOSALES 0.169*** 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0511) (0.0511) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.0520*** -0.0517*** -0.0520*** -0.0519*** -0.0520*** 
 (0.00598) (0.00596) (0.00597) (0.00595) (0.00598) 
Constant -0.350 -0.317 -0.355 -0.352 -0.366 
 (0.232) (0.233) (0.233) (0.232) (0.230) 
Observations 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 
R-squared 0.209 0.208 0.209 0.209 0.207 
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.203 
Model SS 25.12 25.01 25.12 25.12 24.96 
Residual SS 95.31 95.42 95.31 95.31 95.47 
Model df 21 20 20 20 20 
Residual df 3912 3913 3913 3913 3913 
F statistic 11.98 12.44 12.57 12.45 12.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All columns estimated using Robust WLS 
 
Figure 3.11. 2003 NSSBF – Estimations of Cash Holdings Model with Selected Variables Dropped
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(wLnCASHTOSALES is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Full Model Industries 
   
PASSTHRU -0.000176 -0.000691 
 (0.0171) (0.0169) 
wLnSALES -0.0200*** -0.0205*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00335) 
FAMOWN 0.00346 0.00311 
 (0.0134) (0.0135) 
OWNMGR 0.00378 0.00268 
 (0.0110) (0.0109) 
OWNSHR -4.47e-05 -5.25e-05 
 (0.000229) (0.000228) 
OWNEXP 0.00111*** 0.00108*** 
 (0.000375) (0.000369) 
COLLEGEGRAD 0.0146* 0.0169** 
 (0.00793) (0.00746) 
SPECIALED -0.00205 -0.000969 
 (0.00938) (0.00929) 
wLnOWNERS 0.0193 0.0192 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) 
PURCHASED 0.00146 0.00418 
 (0.00740) (0.00780) 
INHERITED 0.0236 0.0249* 
 (0.0146) (0.0146) 
OWNDISTRESS -0.0154 -0.0151 
 (0.0166) (0.0166) 
FIRMDISTRESS -0.000882 -0.000894 
 (0.0182) (0.0185) 
FEARDENIAL -0.0121 -0.0116 
 (0.00859) (0.00861) 
wLnOTRINCTOSALES 0.218** 0.218** 
 (0.0883) (0.0884) 
wLnOWNWORTHTOSALES 0.147*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0302) 
wLnPROFTOINCOME 0.00321 0.00222 
 (0.0264) (0.0265) 
TRADECREDIT -0.00274 -0.00380 
 (0.00792) (0.00793) 
wLnUNUSEDLOC 0.000183 -0.000558 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) 
wLnCURLIBTOSALES 0.169*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0513) 
wLnDEBTRATIO -0.0520*** -0.0525*** 
 (0.00598) (0.00605) 
MANUFACTURING  -0.00783 
  (0.0148) 
TRANSPORTATION  -0.00852 
  (0.0162) 
WHOLESALE  -0.0192 
  (0.0131) 
RETAIL  -0.0184* 
  (0.0112) 
SERVICES  -0.0176* 
  (0.0100) 
Constant -0.350 -0.320 
 (0.232) (0.234) 
Observations 3934 3934 
R-squared 0.209 0.210 
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.205 
Model SS 25.12 25.32 
Residual SS 95.31 95.12 
Model df 21 26 
Residual df 3912 3907 
F statistic 11.98 9.714 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 3.12.  2003 NSSBF – Estimations of Cash Holdings Model with Industry dummies added 
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3.7 Contributions to the Literature 
This study contributes to the literature on cash holdings in small firms in a number 
of ways.  First, this study builds on the work of Faulkender (2002) to examine for small 
firms the hypotheses that accumulation of cash is a form of non-value-maximizing 
behavior for the small firm owner, and may represent an agency cost to the firm in the 
presence of other shareholders. In addition, the consideration of the impact of family 
ownership and the inherited/purchased status of the firm on cash holdings is apparently 
unique to this paper. 
Second, this is also the first study to consider the wealth, past credit history and 
human capital characteristics of the entrepreneur on the cash holdings of the small firm.  
This is a relevant issue since for many small firms, the entrepreneur’s wealth and ability 
to obtain credit have been shown to have a positive relationship on both the probability of 
founding the firm, and on the longevity of the firm.  The human capital characteristics of 
the entrepreneur have been shown in other studies to be positively related to the success 
of the firm.  However, the link between these entrepreneurial characteristics and specific 
capital structure components of the small firm has not been completely and 
unambiguously determined.  This paper has presented additional evidence in this area. 
Third, this study separately utilized both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys for 
model estimation.  The results of these separate estimations have made it possible to 
interpret some of the observed results in the context of the very different macroeconomic 
environments in which the two datasets were collected.  Such comparisons between the 
results of the two estimations provided an additional dimension to the analysis that had 
not previously been undertaken.
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CHAPTER IV 
ESSAY 3: WHY DO SMALL FIRMS MAKE INVESTMENTS UNRELATED TO 
THEIR CORE BUSINESS? 
This study focuses on the “other investments” made by small firms in financial or 
real assets that do not support their core business operations, such as loans or mortgages 
issued to shareholders or partners, investments in other companies, or artwork.  There are 
two reasons why a small firm might make such investments that readily present 
themselves.  First, if the small firm cannot identify enough positive NPV projects 
supporting their core business to consume their available funds, they may choose to 
invest in other financial or real assets that they believe will bring a positive return to the 
firm.  
Second, the management, shareholders or partners in a small firm who value 
personal pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards over firm value maximization may choose 
to divert firm funds to more personal uses, such as personal loans or mortgages at 
favorable rates, or artwork, fine wines and other collectables that are expected to 
appreciate with time but also provide a non-pecuniary satisfaction to the collector while 
held.
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This study investigates the characteristics of small firms that act as determinants 
of the book value of these non-core investments.  The study takes advantage of unique 
data available in the NSSBF surveys that reports the “other investments” made by the 
respondent firms in investments which are intended to bring a positive return to the firm, 
but which are not supportive of the firm’s core operations.  The 2003 NSSBF survey 
questionnaire specifically describes the question posed to the small firm owner as 
follows: 
“As of [DATE]), what was the total dollar amount of other investments 
held by the business, such as (all loans to shareholders/partners, and) real 
estate loans (mortgages) owed to the business? Remember, these are 
amounts owed to the firm, not owed by the firm. IF R ASKS WHAT 
“OTHER INVESTMENTS” MEANS, SAY: Other investments are any 
items not yet discussed that were purchased by the firm with the intent to 
generate a return on the invested capital. Examples are investments in 
other companies, or artwork owned by the firm.” 
 
This study illuminates the motives of small firm management and owners that 
lead to the diversion of funds away from the growth of the core business, and into non-
core investments.  Note that these investments do not necessarily represent negative NPV 
investments to the firm; they are just not supportive of firm growth in its core business 
area, and may or may not contribute to the maximization of firm value. 
4.1 Theory and Testable Hypotheses 
Two Finance theories that can be examined to explain the motivations of small 
firm owners and managers in the area of firm investments are the Agency Theory of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the Free Cash Flow Theory of Jensen (1986).  Jensen 
and Meckling started with the proposition that in a firm that was 100% owned by its 
manager (a description which applies to almost half of the population of small U.S. 
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firms), the owner would extract value-reducing pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits 
from the firm consistent with maximization of her personal utility.  As the manager’s 
fractional share of the firm’s ownership falls, her fractional claim on the firm’s value 
falls, and this will encourage her to appropriate more benefits from the firm, causing a 
“residual loss” in firm value.  It may also encourage her to apply less effort to the 
management of the firm, with the consequence of an additional reduction of firm value 
due to lost opportunities.  In the limit of a professional manager that held no share of the 
firm’s ownership, the appropriation and shirking behavior by the manager would be at a 
maximum.  The reduction in firm value caused by appropriation and shirking were 
referred to as the “residual loss” by Jensen and Meckling, and were identified by them as 
an agency cost to the firm, along with the monitoring and bonding costs expended by 
shareholders and lenders to ensure that management’s behavior was in alignment with 
their interests.  
If the “other investments” of the small firm incur a residual loss to the firm and 
thus represent an agency cost, then it would be expected that such investments would 
increase with decreasing ownership share of the firm’s primary owner, be higher if the 
firm’s manager is not an owner, increase with the number of firm shareholders (reduced 
monitoring of management), and increase as monitoring by the firm’s lenders decreases.  
This leads to the first set of related hypothesis: 
H1a: Non-core investments are negatively related to the primary 
manager’s ownership share in the firm. 
 
H1b: Non-core investments are positively related to the number of owners 
of the firm. 
 
H1c: Non-core investments are greater in firms in which the manager is 
not an owner. 
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H1d: Non-core investments are negatively related the degree of 
monitoring by lenders. 
 
The Free Cash Flow Theory of Jensen asserts that firms having excess cash flows 
(above the level required to fund all positive NPV projects available) will tend to invest 
the excess cash in value-reducing investments or waste it on “organizational 
inefficiencies”.  They suggest that payment of the excess cash flows to shareholders as 
dividends is one way to reduce this problem, but suffers from the fact that future dividend 
payments are not a commitment by management and may be revoked.  However, they 
point out that debt payments are a commitment, and they suggest that firms with excess 
cash flows should borrow to repurchase stock, then use the excess cash flows to service 
the debt.  This will discipline management and reduce the shareholder-manager agency 
costs associated with the free cash flows, but will potentially create shareholder-creditor 
agency issues, which can be controlled by selecting a level of debt at which the marginal 
costs of debt just equals the marginal benefits.  Jensen points out that the agency costs 
associated with free cash flow will be the greatest for firms with little or no growth 
opportunities or those which must shrink; firms with growth opportunities will use the 
free cash flows to fund growth through investment in positive NPV projects. 
  This theory suggests that small firms with lower growth opportunities and 
closely-held “lifestyle” firms will have higher “other investments”, while small growing 
firms and those that are carrying a higher level of external debt (from financial 
institutions, as opposed to shareholder loans) will have less such investments due to the 
disciplinary nature of debt and the necessity to use the firm’s cash flows to service the 
debt.  This leads to the following set of hypotheses: 
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H2a: Non-core investments are negatively related to the firm’s growth 
opportunities. 
 
H2b: Non-core investments are negatively related to the firm’s level of 
external debt. 
 
H2c: Non-core investments are positively related to the level of cash 
available to the owners. 
 
 Another factor that could influence the degree to which the firm directs resources 
to non-core investments is the diversification of the primary owner’s investment 
portfolio.  The primary owner of a small firm generally owns a large or majority equity 
share, and can direct or at least strongly influence the disposition of the firm’s assets.  If 
the wealth of the primary owner of the firm is not well diversified outside of the firm, she 
may seek to diversify her risk by directing the firm to diversify its investments into areas 
outside of its core business.  The goal of this firm diversification would be to reduce the 
business risk of the firm, and thus protect the owner’s equity investment in the firm.  The 
higher the fraction of the owner’s total wealth invested in the firm, the greater the degree 
of firm diversification that would be expected in the form of “other investments”.  This 
leads to the last hypothesis: 
H3: Non-core investments are positively related to the fraction of total 
owner wealth invested in the firm. 
 
4.2 Review of Empirical Studies 
There is a remarkable lack of empirical papers that address the small firm 
decision to invest in non-core investments.  This is most likely due to the lack of 
availability of data for small firms that record this particular item of data together with 
other variables that might be used to create a reasonably complete model for this 
investment decision.   
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One recent paper that does address the overall small firm investment decision 
from an Agency perspective is Danielson and Scott (2007).  They use data from the 2003 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) “Reinvesting in the Business” 
survey, which supplies survey data for a sample of U.S. firms with 250 or less 
employees.  Among the questions posed to small business owners in this survey was the 
question: “Is the greatest long-term concern about re-investing in your business possible 
overinvestment, possible underinvestment, or possible investment in the wrong things?”.  
Limiting their analysis to firms reporting overinvestment or underinvestment as their 
greatest concern, they model this response using logistic regression against a set of 
regressors that include firm structure variables, variables that proxy for more or less 
concentration of firm ownership and control, firms representing the firm’s financing 
intentions and real growth.   
They find that underinvestment concerns are more common in small firms with 
concentrated ownership and control structures and in firms pursuing growth strategies.  
Overinvestment concerns are more common in small firms with less concentrated 
ownership and control structures; and those firms are also more likely to use planning 
tools such as business plans.  Following the theory of Fama and Jensen (1983) that firms 
that have separated ownership and control have done so to control agency costs, the 
authors conclude that the owners of small firms recognize that agency costs can arise as 
the result of free cash flows, and will use planning tools to reduce those agency costs.  
The authors also acknowledge that the lack of actual balance sheet data on firm 
investments and use of debt for their sample firms does not allow them to directly test the 
firm’s actual performance, but only the beliefs of the survey respondents.  This study uses 
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balance sheet and income statement data from the NSSBF surveys to provide a more 
direct examination of the overinvestment issue and how it relates to the firm’s ownership 
structure, debt usage and other control variables. 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) in a review paper cite a large body of finance literature 
supporting the generally-accepted idea that diversification is value-destroying for the 
firm, though they also cite cases where diversification built value for the firm rather than 
destroyed it.   They suggest that many of the previous empirical papers that showed value 
destruction were suffering from measurement problems in their empirical methodology 
that when corrected would show that there is in many cases a diversification premium 
rather than a diversification discount. 
4.3 Model, Variables and Data 
The model chosen to test the hypotheses is shown below.  It is proposed that the 
“other investments” for a small U.S. firm are a function of variables that proxy for 
agency costs and value maximizing behavior, a variable that proxies for growth, variables 
that represent cash and external debt, a variable that measures the fraction of owner 
wealth invested in the firm, and dummy industry variables.  Other investments are scaled 
by the firm’s annual sales to remove the firm size effect.  Sales rather than total assets is 
chosen as the scaling variable because many of the firms in the sample are services firms 
which have few assets and would produce abnormally large values for the ratio when 
divided by total assets. 
LnINVESTOSALESi = β0i + β1iOWNSHR i + β2iOWNMGR i + β3iLnOWNERS i + 
β4iRELLENGTH i  + β5iRELNUM i + β6iGROWTH i + β7iLnCASHTOSALES i + 
β8iLnEXTDEBTRATIO i + β9iLnDIVERSEi + β10iLnWHOLESALE i + β11iRETAIL i + 
β12iMANUFACTURING i + β13iTRANSPORTATION i + β14iSERVICESi + εi 
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 The specific variables chosen in each category are summarized in table 4.1, along 
with their hypothesized relationship (+ or -) to LnINVESTOSALES.  These variables are 
defined the same in both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys, which are used as the 
source of data for the study.  Those variables that are not directly defined in the database 
were derived from other variables that are.  Based on correlation between the variables, it 
may be necessary to run several regressions, each excluding variables highly correlated 
with others in the model. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Independent variables and their hypothesized relationship to LnINVESTOSALES 
Independent Variable Description Hypothesized 
Relationship 
to Other 
Investments 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Comments 
Firm Characteristics:     
GROWTH Dummy, 1 = firm’s sales have grown over 
the past 2 years 
(-) H2a Firms that are growing will not divert cash flows 
to other investments 
Industry dummies Dummy variables for: Wholesale, Retail, 
Manufacturing, Transportation, Services 
n/a n/a Control for industry-specific factors 
Agency and Monitoring:     
OWNSHR Percentage of business owned by principal 
owner 
(-) H1a Increasing  primary owner’s firm ownership share 
reduces agency (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
OWNMGR Dummy, 1 = firm is managed by an owner (-) H1c Having firm managed by an owner reduces 
agency (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
LnOWNERS Natural log of the total number of firm 
owners 
(+) H1b Increasingly diffuse firm ownership promotes 
agency costs 
RELLENGTH Length of the longest relationship (months) 
firm has had with its primary financial 
institution 
(-) H1d Relationship length is a proxy for monitoring by 
creditors.  Longer relationshipmore 
monitoringlower agency costs  
RELNUM Number of financial institutions with 
which the firm does business 
(+) H1d Relationship number  is a proxy for monitoring by 
creditors.  More relationshipsmore diffuse 
monitoringhigher agency costs  
Sources and uses of cash 
flows: 
    
LnCASHTOSALES Natural log of the ratio of the firm’s cash 
to sales 
(+) H2c Firms that can accumulate free cash flows can 
divert cash to other investment purposes 
LnEXTDEBTRATIO Natural log of the ratio of total amount of 
all loans, mortgages, notes and bonds, less 
loans from owners,  to Total Assets.  Does 
not include current liabilities such as 
Accounts Payable and accruals. 
(-) H2b Firms with higher outstanding debt will need to 
service debt rather than make other investments, 
to avoid default .  Loans from owners are 
removed since owners are unlikely to foreclose if 
debt interest or principal payment is missed.   
Owner diversification:     
LnDIVERSE Natural log of the ratio of the primary 
owner’s equity share in the firm to the 
primary owner’s total wealth. 
(+) H3 Higher concentration of owner wealth in the firm 
leads to more diversification of firm investments. 
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4.3.1 Sample size and summary statistics for numeric variables. Sections 6.2 
and 6.3 of this document describe the transformation and clean-up applied to the 1998 
and 2003 NSSBF sample data prior to analysis.  In that section it is  indicated that 120 
observations (out of 3561 total) in the 1998 NSSBF are excluded, and 627 observations 
(out of 21200 total) in the 2003 NSSBF are excluded, due to failure to meet the “going 
concern” criteria. 
An additional 316 observations are excluded from the 1998 NSSBF sample data 
due to missing item data for the regression model independent variables, leaving 3125 
complete observations for analysis from the 1998 NSSBF.  Observations are excluded by 
setting FIN_WGT to zero, but the observations are not actually dropped from the sample, 
as described in Section 6.3.   
An additional 1170 observations are excluded from the 2003 NSSBF sample data 
due to missing item data for the regression model independent variables, leaving 19403 
complete observations for analysis.  Observations are excluded by setting FIN_WGT to 
zero, but the observations are not actually dropped from the sample, as described in 
Section 6.3.  Finally, selection of implicate #3 only as described in section 6.4, results in 
3879 complete observations for analysis from the 2003 NSSBF. 
Note that some of the variables in the model have been transformed to their 
natural log form and Winsorized.  This has been done to reduce the rather large skewness 
and kurtosis typical of the untransformed numeric variables in the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF 
samples.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 describe the rationale behind this and the transformation 
methodology used.   Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below provide sample statistics for the numeric 
variables in the model, including mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis.  The 
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untransformed and transformed variables are included in the table for comparison, and to 
show how the logarithmic transformation and Winsorization of the variables have 
reduced skewness and kurtosis. 
 
Table 2.3.3.2 -  
 
 
 
Table 2.3.3.3 –  
4.3.2 Summary statistics for dummy and categorical variables.  Table 4.2 
provides un-weighted one-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical variables in the 
model for the final 3125 observations of the 1998 NSSBF sample, and table 4.3 provides 
   variable |         N      mean        sd       max       min  skewness  kurtosis 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR |      3879  75.69244  27.18865       100         8   -.46084  1.643467 
   RELLENGTH |      3879  136.0601  124.6776      1156         0  1.864232  8.218664 
      RELNUM |      3879  2.875226   1.86894        20         1  1.815375  9.012228 
INVESTOSALES |      3879  .0588938  1.888621  116.1667         0  60.00532  3684.733 
LnINVESTOS~S |      3879  .0185786  .1351291  4.763597         0   18.3402  486.8254 
wLnINVESTO~S |      3879  .0125552  .0550959  .4373658         0  6.128323  43.43106 
      OWNERS |      3879  4.219386  52.35496      2800         1  43.94635  2192.012 
    LnOWNERS |      3879  .5691709  .7335857  7.937375         0  2.403492  14.33836 
   wLnOWNERS |      3879  .5627534  .6940606  3.912023         0  1.703049  7.178518 
 CASHTOSALES |      3879   .182197  2.117181     112.5         0  42.60581  2117.007 
LnCASHTOSA~S |      3879  .0942589  .2238784  4.731803         0  8.762491  120.2103 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      3879  .0871595  .1562337  1.049822         0  3.942901  21.31316 
EXTDEBTRATIO |      3879  .8921209  8.035268  460.7895         0  50.05026   2795.19 
LnEXTDEBTR~O |      3879  .3879964  .4628377  6.135109         0  3.055842  20.52422 
wLnEXTDEBT~O |      3879  .3817796  .4243423  2.353991         0  2.014922  8.598249 
     DIVERSE |      3879  .2017751  .2422352         1 -.8095238  1.311646  4.055273 
   LnDIVERSE |      3879  .6921549  .1131565  1.033042  .0000762  1.074643  3.689375 
  wLnDIVERSE |      3879  .6923113  .1122877  1.023183  .5931059  1.146038  3.341442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
    variable |         N      mean        sd       max       min  skewness  kurtosis 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR |      3125  79.76352  27.55503       100         1 -.9071642  2.429518 
   RELLENGTH |      3125  99.15488  100.0857       780         0  2.199216  9.310322 
      RELNUM |      3125   2.46048  1.731715        20         1  2.309636  13.36609 
INVESTOSALES |      3125  .0285819  .3733183   13.7106         0  29.05554  931.9876 
LnINVESTOS~S |      3125  .0164366  .1061151  2.688568         0  15.76392  325.5557 
wLnINVESTO~S |      3125  .0115683  .0451002  .3257309         0  5.213302  32.35524 
      OWNERS |      3125   6.72672  74.40251      2500         1  23.87974  649.6574 
    LnOWNERS |      3125  .4885592  .8494088  7.824046         0  3.206902  18.27018 
   wLnOWNERS |      3125   .473538  .7640031  3.912023         0  2.263117  9.024026 
 CASHTOSALES |      3125  .1114595   .413744  13.92928         0  17.76343  480.1738 
LnCASHTOSA~S |      3125  .0833305    .17121  2.703324         0   5.91051  53.71599 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      3125  .0795693  .1413111   .924841         0  3.847125  20.20089 
EXTDEBTRATIO |      3125  1.929716  23.38897  908.7333         0  30.49599  1052.505 
LnEXTDEBTR~O |      3125  .4498331  .5913779  6.813151         0   3.64331  25.03899 
wLnEXTDEBT~O |      3125  .4400807  .5276574  2.963397         0  2.356749  10.06683 
     DIVERSE |      3125  .2104821  .4264058  17.60281 -7.888889  19.83745  928.6261 
   LnDIVERSE |      3125   2.20726  .0516503  3.276873  .0011105 -21.89088  1125.089 
  wLnDIVERSE |      3125  2.207584  .0267629  2.290436  2.184927  1.280482  3.791576 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
 
Figure 4.1. Sample statistics for numeric model variables from 1998 NSSBF
Figure 4.2. Sample statistics for numeric model variables from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 only) 
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un-weighted one-way tabulations of the dummy and categorical variables in the model 
for the final 3879 observations of the 2003 NSSBF sample.   
Table 4.2 
Sample statistics for dummy/categorical variables from 1998 NSSBF (n=3125) 
Dummy/Categorical Vars Response Number of 
Responses 
Percent of Sample 
INVESTS: Firm makes other investments No 
Yes 
2574 
551 
82.4 
17.6 
GROWTH: Firm has experienced sales growth 
from previous to current fiscal year 
No 
Yes 
1081 
2044 
34.6 
65.4 
OWNMGR: Firm's Manager is an owner  No 
Yes 
340 
2785 
10.9 
89.1 
MANUFACTURING: Firm is in the 
Manufacturing sector (SIC 20-39) 
No 
Yes 
2775 
350 
88.8 
11.2 
TRANSPORTATION: Firm is in the 
Transportation sector (SIC 40-49) 
No 
Yes 
3002 
123 
96.1 
3.9 
WHOLESALE: Firm is in the Wholesale sector 
(SIC 50-51) 
No 
Yes 
2907 
218 
93.0 
7.0 
RETAIL: Firm is in the Retail sector (SIC 52-59)  No 
Yes 
2502 
623 
80.1 
19.9 
SERVICES: Firm is in the Services sector (SIC 70-
89) 
No 
Yes 
1837 
1288 
58.8 
41.2 
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Table 4.3 
Sample statistics for dummy/categorical variables from 2003 NSSBF (using implicate #3 
only, n=3879) 
Dummy/Categorical Vars Response Number of 
Responses 
Percent of Sample 
INVESTS: Firm makes other investments No 
Yes 
3232 
647 
83.3 
16.7 
GROWTH: Firm has experienced sales growth 
from previous to current fiscal year 
No 
Yes 
2176 
1703 
56.1 
43.9 
OWNMGR: Firm's Manager is an owner  No 
Yes 
367 
3512 
9.5 
90.5 
MANUFACTURING: Firm is in the 
Manufacturing sector (SIC 20-39) 
No 
Yes 
3413 
466 
88.0 
12.0 
TRANSPORTATION: Firm is in the 
Transportation sector (SIC 40-49) 
No 
Yes 
3718 
161 
95.8 
4.2 
WHOLESALE: Firm is in the Wholesale sector 
(SIC 50-51) 
No 
Yes 
3608 
271 
93.0 
7.0 
RETAIL: Firm is in the Retail sector (SIC 52-59)  No 
Yes 
3108 
771 
80.1 
19.9 
SERVICES: Firm is in the Services sector (SIC 70-
89) 
No 
Yes 
2314 
1565 
59.7 
40.3 
 
4.3.3 Sample correlations.  Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present the Pearson correlations 
between the variables in the model for the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF samples, respectively.  
Looking for correlations between variables that are higher than 0.500 (or lower than -
0.500), it is noted  that in both the 1998 and 2003 samples, there is a high correlation 
between OWNSHR and LnOWNERS.  (This was observed  in the second essay on cash 
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holdings as well.)  Separate estimations of the model will be executed that exclude one of 
these variables at a time, to avoid problems with multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
  
             | wLnINV~S   GROWTH   OWNSHR   OWNMGR wLnOW~RS RELLEN~H   RELNUM 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnINVESTO~S |   1.0000  
      GROWTH |  -0.0538*  1.0000  
      OWNSHR |  -0.0598* -0.0374*  1.0000  
      OWNMGR |  -0.0294   0.0289   0.1014*  1.0000  
   wLnOWNERS |   0.0797*  0.0395* -0.7990* -0.1476*  1.0000  
   RELLENGTH |   0.0241  -0.0979* -0.0162  -0.0227   0.0467*  1.0000  
      RELNUM |   0.0856*  0.0357* -0.2127* -0.0869*  0.2383* -0.0304   1.0000  
wLnCASHTOS~S |   0.0769* -0.0691*  0.0627*  0.0326  -0.0453*  0.0183  -0.1038* 
wLnEXTDEBT~O |  -0.0367*  0.0376* -0.0270  -0.0340   0.0162  -0.0561*  0.1751* 
  wLnDIVERSE |   0.0845*  0.0019  -0.0070  -0.0272   0.0925*  0.0413*  0.0939* 
MANUFACTUR~G |   0.0203  -0.0212  -0.1207* -0.0160   0.1722* -0.0068   0.1066* 
TRANSPORTA~N |   0.0540*  0.0054  -0.0648* -0.0297   0.0552*  0.0162   0.0811* 
   WHOLESALE |  -0.0054  -0.0306  -0.0351* -0.0173   0.0267   0.0329   0.0302  
      RETAIL |  -0.0504* -0.0025   0.0027  -0.0391* -0.0369*  0.0440* -0.0189  
    SERVICES |  -0.0138   0.0212   0.1018*  0.0379* -0.0858* -0.0635* -0.0781* 
 
             | wLnCA~ES wLnEXT~O wLnDIV~E MANUFA~G TRANSP~N WHOLES~E   RETAIL 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCASHTOS~S |   1.0000  
wLnEXTDEBT~O |  -0.1711*  1.0000  
  wLnDIVERSE |   0.0073  -0.3108*  1.0000  
MANUFACTUR~G |  -0.0332  -0.0212   0.1082*  1.0000  
TRANSPORTA~N |  -0.0058   0.0824* -0.0012  -0.0719*  1.0000  
   WHOLESALE |  -0.0408* -0.0168   0.0843* -0.0973* -0.0554*  1.0000  
      RETAIL |  -0.0409* -0.0204   0.0446* -0.1772* -0.1010* -0.1366*  1.0000  
    SERVICES |   0.0621* -0.0420* -0.1291* -0.2974* -0.1695* -0.2293* -0.4178* 
 
             | SERVICES 
-------------+--------- 
    SERVICES |   1.0000 
 
Figure 4.3. 1998 NSSBF: Pearson Correlations of Model Variables
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4.3.4 Variance inflation factors.  The variance inflation factors for the 1998 
model estimation are provided in figure 4.5 below.  The variance inflation factors for the 
2003 model estimation are provided in figure 4.6 below.  They were generated following 
unweighted OLS estimation of the Investments model for the two survey samples.  The 
observed variance inflation factors for OWNSHR and wLnOWNERS are consistent with 
the observation of relatively high correlation between these variables in figures 4.3 and 
4.4 above.  This confirms the earlier conclusion that estimating the model multiple times 
with one or both of these variables dropped would be advisable. 
 
 
 
             | wLnINV~S   GROWTH   OWNSHR   OWNMGR wLnOW~RS RELLEN~H   RELNUM 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnINVESTO~S |   1.0000  
      GROWTH |  -0.0148   1.0000  
      OWNSHR |  -0.0470* -0.0575*  1.0000  
      OWNMGR |  -0.0775* -0.0371*  0.1169*  1.0000  
   wLnOWNERS |   0.0677*  0.0649* -0.7834* -0.2012*  1.0000  
   RELLENGTH |   0.0126  -0.1062* -0.0129  -0.0310   0.0215   1.0000  
      RELNUM |   0.0528*  0.1227* -0.1819* -0.0852*  0.2412* -0.0128   1.0000  
wLnCASHTOS~S |   0.0924* -0.1022*  0.0666*  0.0232  -0.0608*  0.0496* -0.1470* 
wLnEXTDEBT~O |  -0.0272   0.0535* -0.0653* -0.0205   0.0682* -0.0870*  0.1936* 
  wLnDIVERSE |   0.0602*  0.0305   0.0300  -0.0638*  0.0698*  0.0612*  0.1401* 
MANUFACTUR~G |  -0.0221  -0.0009  -0.1004* -0.0729*  0.1686*  0.0004   0.0671* 
TRANSPORTA~N |   0.0301   0.0217  -0.0028  -0.0122   0.0125   0.0056   0.0976* 
   WHOLESALE |   0.0069   0.0184  -0.0281  -0.0254   0.0379*  0.0251   0.0432* 
      RETAIL |  -0.0259  -0.0032  -0.0524* -0.0001   0.0167   0.0164   0.0613* 
    SERVICES |  -0.0019  -0.0255   0.1013*  0.0360* -0.1110* -0.0775* -0.1338* 
 
             | wLnCA~ES wLnEXT~O wLnDIV~E MANUFA~G TRANSP~N WHOLES~E   RETAIL 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCASHTOS~S |   1.0000  
wLnEXTDEBT~O |  -0.2167*  1.0000  
  wLnDIVERSE |   0.0261  -0.2801*  1.0000  
MANUFACTUR~G |  -0.0258   0.0183   0.1205*  1.0000  
TRANSPORTA~N |  -0.0292   0.0480*  0.0217  -0.0769*  1.0000  
   WHOLESALE |  -0.0214  -0.0078   0.0541* -0.1013* -0.0570*  1.0000  
      RETAIL |  -0.0601*  0.0087   0.0295  -0.1840* -0.1036* -0.1365*  1.0000  
    SERVICES |   0.0823* -0.0444* -0.1394* -0.3039* -0.1711* -0.2254* -0.4096* 
 
             | SERVICES 
-------------+--------- 
    SERVICES |   1.0000 
 
Figure 4.4. 2003 NSSBF: Pearson Correlations of Model Variables 
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4.3.5 LnDIVERSE and insolvent firms.  The value of DIVERSE in this study is 
calculated as: 
DIVERSE  =  OWNEQUITY / (OWNWORTH + OWNEQUITY) 
where OWNEQUITY is the value of the primary owner’s equity share in the firm, and 
OWNWORTH is the net worth of the primary owner, not including her share in the firm.  
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS |      2.83    0.353796 
      OWNSHR |      2.67    0.374921 
    SERVICES |      2.07    0.481956 
      RETAIL |      1.78    0.563283 
MANUFACTUR~G |      1.57    0.636169 
   WHOLESALE |      1.33    0.751196 
TRANSPORTA~N |      1.21    0.825439 
wLnEXTDEBT~O |      1.21    0.826519 
  wLnDIVERSE |      1.19    0.839865 
      RELNUM |      1.18    0.850200 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      1.08    0.928735 
      OWNMGR |      1.05    0.949171 
      GROWTH |      1.04    0.963606 
   RELLENGTH |      1.03    0.969573 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.52 
        Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS |      2.94    0.339709 
      OWNSHR |      2.84    0.352067 
    SERVICES |      2.06    0.485768 
      RETAIL |      1.77    0.564818 
MANUFACTUR~G |      1.54    0.649433 
   WHOLESALE |      1.34    0.748294 
wLnEXTDEBT~O |      1.21    0.826102 
TRANSPORTA~N |      1.20    0.832621 
  wLnDIVERSE |      1.19    0.840907 
      RELNUM |      1.14    0.880407 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      1.05    0.952085 
      OWNMGR |      1.03    0.968788 
   RELLENGTH |      1.02    0.976908 
      GROWTH |      1.02    0.979701 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.53 
 
Figure 4.5. Variance Inflation Factors – 1998 NSSBF
Figure 4.6. Variance Inflation Factors – 2003 NSSBF
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As the primary owner’s equity investment in the firm increases relative to her external 
wealth, this ratio will increase.  For an owner with great outside wealth relative to her 
investment in the firm, this value may be much less than one.  For an owner whose 
wealth consists primarily of her investment in the firm, this ratio will be close to one.   
 It is possible that the value of OWNEQUITY can be negative.   There are in fact 
767 firms in the 1998 sample with negative OWNEQUITY, and 775 such firms in 
implicate #3 of the 2003 sample.   Negative OWNEQUITY occurs when total liabilities 
exceed total assets on the firm’s balance sheet, and is indicative of a firm in distress.  In 
this condition, it is very possible that the firm will eventually cease operations and 
liquidate if it does not have adequate cash flow to meet its obligations to creditors.  Even 
if the firm can continue operations in this state, the firm’s cash flows will be prioritized to 
serving the firm’s debt and there will be little or no excess cash flow to increase the 
wealth of shareholders.  As residual claimants,  shareholders of an insolvent firm can 
expect to receive little or no value for their shares in the firm.  For this reason the 
negative values of OWNEQUITY are set to zero when calculating the value of 
DIVERSE. 
4.4 Estimation Methodology 
The model specified in the previous section is estimated using survey-weighted 
least squares regression.  The sign and statistical significance of the independent variable 
coefficients is used to test the hypotheses.  The methodology and rationale behind the use 
of a survey-weighted regression estimation methodology is described in detail in section 
6.1 of this document and will not be repeated here.  An estimation of the model using 
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OLS with robust standard errors will be included in order to highlight the effect of the use 
of survey weights in the estimation of the model. 
It is important to note that most small firms do not make “other investments”.  In 
the 1998 NSSBF survey, 2914 firm observations have INVESTOSALES=0, and only 647 
have INVESTOSALES>0.  In implicate #3 of the 2003 NSSBF survey, 3462 firm 
observations have INVESTOSALES=0, and only 778 have INVESTOSALES>0.  
According to Wooldridge (2003), a dependent variable distributed in this manner is 
called a “corner solution response”, and using the Tobit model with Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimation is appropriate.  Estimation with OLS using only the 
observations having non-zero values of the dependent variable is not appropriate as it will 
produce estimated coefficients that are biased and inconsistent (Gujarati, 2003).  
Estimation with OLS using the entire sample will produce biased coefficients that will 
predict negative values for the dependent variable.   The model is estimated using a 
survey-weighted Tobit method with ML estimation in addition to the survey-weighted 
least squares method.  The winsorized variable wLnINVESTOSALES is the independent 
variable for these estimations.  As a result of the logarithmic transformation method used 
(see section 4),  wLnINVESTOSALES is zero whenever INVESTOSALES=0. 
As a robustness check, a binary response variable called INVESTS has been 
created that takes the value “0” if INVESTOSALES=0, and “1” if INVESTOSALES>0.  
The model is then estimated using survey-weighed Logit and Probit regression, where the 
dependent variable is INVESTS.  Logit and Probit both model the probability that the 
response variable will be “1”, though Logit uses the logistic function to model the 
response variable while Probit uses the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
 187 
 
normal distribution.  STATA supports the estimation of both model types using the 
method of Maximum Likelihood, which is employed.  The justification for using Logit 
and Probit estimation as robustness checks for the estimation results of the main model is 
as follows. 
The model and hypotheses are written in such a way as to posit a positive or 
negative relationship between constructs such as growth, agency and diversification, and 
the magnitude of “other investments”.  The model relates these constructs to the amount 
of other investments made by the firm, not to the decision whether or not to make such 
investments.  In survey-weighted least squares and Tobit estimation, significant 
coefficients of positive sign will suggest that the corresponding variable contributes to an 
increase in the magnitude of other investments, while significant coefficients of negative 
sign will suggest that the corresponding variable contributes to a decrease in that 
magnitude.  In Logit and Probit estimation on the other hand, significant coefficients of 
positive sign have a positive effect on the probability that the firm has made other 
investments, while significant coefficients of negative sign will have a negative effect on 
that probability.  The Logit and Probit coefficients have a different interpretation and will 
have a different magnitude than the least squares and Tobit coefficients.  However, it can 
be anticipated that the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients of each of the 
model variables will be preserved across all four estimation methods.   
The rationale for this assumption is to consider a contradiction.  If a particular 
variable has a significant positive coefficient in the least-squares or Tobit estimation, 
indicating that it contributes to an increase in the amount of other investments made 
(above the level of zero), how can that same variable have a significant negative 
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coefficient or an insignificant coefficient in the Logit or Probit models?  In other words, 
how can a variable be a significant and positive determinant of the growth of other 
investments, and not positively contribute to the probability that such investments are 
made at all?  A similar argument can be made in the case where the coefficient in the 
least squares and Tobit estimations are significantly negative, and the same coefficients 
in the Logit and Probit estimations are significantly positive.   
The results of the four methods of estimation are compared; survey-weighted least 
squares, Logit, Probit, and Tobit.  Due to differences in the estimation methods, it is not 
reasonable to expect the values of the estimated coefficients to be the same in magnitude 
across the four estimation methods.  However, as explained above, it can be expected that 
the signs of the coefficients and their significance will be preserved across the four 
models.  Since the hypotheses all depend upon the signs of the regression coefficients in 
the model and not the magnitude, it should be possible to use all four estimation methods 
to test the hypotheses without complication. 
4.5 Univariate Analysis 
Before estimating the multivariate regression model, it would be useful to 
examine how the small firms’ INVESTOSALES ratio is related in a univariate sense to 
the firm characteristics embodied in the model variables.  Figure 4.7 (for the 1998 
NSSBF) and figure 4.8 (for the 2003 NSSBF) show how the mean of INVESTOSALES 
differs for the two states of each binary variable in the model.  Included for each set of 
means is an Adjusted Wald test whose null hypothesis is that the two means are not 
significantly different from each other.  For variables GROWTH and OWNMGR, no 
significant difference in the means of INVESTOSALES is observed between the “1” and 
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“0” state of these variables, for either the 1998 or 2003 NSSBF data.   For the 1998 data 
only,  it is observed that firms in MANUFACTURING, WHOLESALE and RETAIL 
have significantly lower levels of INVESTOSALES than other firms. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |INVESTOSALES  Linearized                          Adjusted Wald Test for Equality of Means 
        Over      |    Mean      Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]          (H0: Means are equal) 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 GROWTH        No |   .0468399   .0168339      .0138336    .0798461 
              Yes |   .0208442   .0080901      .0049819    .0367065    F(1,3201) = 1.94, Prob > F = 0.1639 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 OWNMGR        No |   .1015321   .0675729     -.030956     .2340202 
              Yes |   .0226251   .0058552      .011145     .0341051    F(1,3362) = 1.35, Prob > F = 0.2447 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 MANUFACTURING No |   .0303044   .0081702      .0142853    .0463234 
              Yes |   .010538    .0025585      .0055217    .0155543    F(1,3362) = 5.33, Prob > F = 0.0210 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
TRANSPORTATION  No|   .0287633   .0077466      .0135747    .0439519 
              Yes |   .0255243   .0162742     -.0063841    .0574327    F(1,3362) = 0.03, Prob > F = 0.8573 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 WHOLESALE     No |   .0301745   .0080623      .0143669    .0459821 
              Yes |   .008806    .0022549      .0043848    .0132272    F(1,3362) = 6.51, Prob > F = 0.0107 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 RETAIL        No |   .0335098   .0092623      .0153494    .0516702 
              Yes |   .008257    .0017347      .0048558    .0116582    F(1,3362) = 7.18, Prob > F = 0.0074 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 SERVICES      No |   .0306161   .0119603      .0071658    .0540663 
              Yes |   .026047    .0072675      .0117977    .0402962    F(1,3362) = 0.11, Prob > F = 0.7441 
Figure 4.7. 1998 NSSBF: Two-way tabulation of INVESTOSALES versus firm characteristics from model 
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                  |INVESTOSALES  Linearized                          Adjusted Wald Test for Equality of Means 
        Over      |    Mean      Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]          (H0: Means are equal) 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 GROWTH        No |   .0346107    .010182      .0146483    .0545731 
              Yes |   .1139773   .0932606      -.068865    .2968196    F(1,4038) = 0.72, Prob > F = 0.3976 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 OWNMGR        No |    .1485354   .0704835     .0103482    .2867226 
              Yes |    .0628976   .0416221    -.018705     .1445003    F(1,3980) = 1.10, Prob > F = 0.2953 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 MANUFACTURING No |    .0722937  .0423922     -.0108184    .1554058 
              Yes |    .0086116  .0024329      .0038417    .0133815    F(1,4038) = 2.25, Prob > F = 0.1338 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 TRANSPORTATION No|    .0696845  .0408775     -.010458     .149827 
              Yes |    .0171194  .0068294      .00373      .0305087    F(1,4038) = 1.61, Prob > F = 0.2047 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 WHOLESALE     No |    .0704617  .0417779     -.0114461    .1523696 
              Yes |    .0232953  .0096495      .004377     .0422136    F(1,4038) = 1.21, Prob > F = 0.2713 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 RETAIL        No |    .0808965  .0484818     -.0141545    .1759475 
              Yes |    .0110237  .0039522      .0032753    .0187721    F(1,4038) = 2.06, Prob > F = 0.1509 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 SERVICES      No |    .0231467  .0077579      .0079369    .0383565 
              Yes |    .1207833  .0856839     -.0472044    .288771     F(1,4038) = 1.29, Prob > F = 0.2565 
Figure 4.8. 2003 NSSBF: Two-way tabulation of INVESTOSALES versus firm characteristics from model 191
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Figures 4.9 (for the 1998 NSSBF) and 4.10 (for the 2003 NSSBF) show how the 
mean of wLnINVESTTOSALES differs across four quartiles of each numeric variable 
from the regression model.   Included for each set of means are Adjusted Wald tests 
whose null hypothesis is that the two quartile means are not significantly different from 
each other.  There is a Wald test for each pair of adjacent quartile means (1st-2nd quartile, 
2nd-3rd quartile, 3rd-4th quartile).  Note that for some of the numeric variables, less than 
four quartiles are listed in the table.  That is because that particular variable had a large 
number of missing or zero values, such that four unique quartiles could not be created. 
Evidence is observed in both surveys that wLnINVESTOSALES decreases with 
increasing OWNSHR, in support of hypothesis H1a.   It is also observed in both surveys 
that as wLnOWNERS increases, so does wLnINVESTOSALES in support of hypothesis 
H1b.  No evidence is observed of a relationship between RELLENGTH or RELNUM and 
wLnINVESTOSALES, which shows lack of support for hypothesis H1d in these 
univariate results. 
Some evidence is seen in both surveys that as wLnCASHTOSALES increases, so 
does wLnINVESTOSALES, which supports hypothesis H2c.  In both surveys, 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO is positively related to wLnINVESTOSALES at low levels of 
debt (lower quartiles) which disagrees with hypothesis H2b.  However, in the 1998 
survey is it observed that wLnINVESTOSALES decreases with increasing 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO at high debt levels (higher quartiles) which does support H2b..  
The multivariate analysis in the next section will be needed to resolve the true nature of 
this relationship. 
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Using the 2003 survey data it is observed that wLnINVESTOSALES increases 
with wLnDIVERSE, in support of hypothesis H3.  No such support is observed with the 
1998 survey data. 
In addition to the results above, the means of INVESTOSALES, 
CASHTOSALES, EXTDEBTRATIO, and DIVERSE were compared between 1998 and 
2003, performing t-tests of the differences between the 1998 and 2003 variable means, 
assuming unequal variances and using a significance level of 0.05.  The following results 
were obtained: 
 CASHTOSALES:  firms held significantly less cash on average in 1998 
than 2003. 
 INVESTOSALES:  no significant difference between 1998 and 2003. 
 DIVERSE:  no significant difference between 1998 and 2003. 
 EXTDEBTRATIO:  firms maintained a higher debt ratio in 1998 than 
2003. 
These results support the observation that firms shed debt and accumulated cash between 
1998 and 2003, when the economy went from a state of expansion to one of relative 
weakness. 
 
 
  
 194 
 
 
(Wald test is for equality of quartile mean on previous row to quartile mean on current row of 
table.) 
Number of strata =      78         Number of obs    =     3125 
Number of PSUs   =    3125         Population size  =  4569651 
                                   Design df        =     3047 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |   Mean of     Linearized     Adjusted Wald Test* 
    Quartile |wLnINVESTOSALES Std. Err.   (H0 = means are equal) 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR | 
           1 |   .0149181   .0023408       
           2 |   .0089814   .0010297    F(1,3047)=5.39, Prob>F=0.0204 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS | 
           1 |   .0083313   .0010519       
           3 |   .0132628   .0022917    F(1,3047)=3.82, Prob>F=0.0508 
           4 |   .0188881   .0041062    F(1,3047)=1.43, Prob>F=0.2322 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   RELLENGTH | 
           1 |   .0116641   .0018417        
           2 |    .008362   .0019279    F(1,3047)=1.54, Prob>F=0.2152 
           3 |   .0093226   .0018233    F(1,3047)=0.13, Prob>F=0.7173 
           4 |   .0116874   .0020712    F(1,3047)=0.74, Prob>F=0.3910 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RELNUM | 
           1 |    .007699   .0014791       
           2 |   .0115075   .0018808    F(1,3047)=2.54, Prob>F=0.1111 
           3 |   .0131959   .0025707    F(1,3047)=0.28, Prob>F=0.5963 
           4 |   .0136673   .0023688    F(1,3047)=0.02, Prob>F=0.8927 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCASHTOSAL~| 
           1 |   .0092312   .0017657     
           2 |   .0082664   .0016621    F(1,3047)=0.16, Prob>F=0.6909 
           3 |   .0084689   .0014884    F(1,3047)=0.01, Prob>F=0.9276 
           4 |   .0159592   .0026318    F(1,3047)=6.13, Prob>F=0.0133 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnEXTDEBTRA~| 
           1 |   .0063539   .0019197       
           2 |   .0148109   .0022684    F(1,3047)=8.11, Prob>F=0.0044 
           3 |   .0133858   .0021164    F(1,3047)=0.21, Prob>F=0.6463 
           4 |   .0073915   .0013034    F(1,3047)=5.82, Prob>F=0.0159 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  wLnDIVERSE | 
           1 |   .0058831   .0012667       
           2 |    .008553   .0017633    F(1,3047)=1.51, Prob>F=0.2185 
           3 |   .0115508   .0022167    F(1,3047)=1.12, Prob>F=0.2900 
           4 |   .0159438   .0023285    F(1,3047)=1.87, Prob>F=0.1718 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 4. 9. 1998 NSSBF: Mean of wLnINVESTOSALES across quartiles of model variables 
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4.6 Multivariate Analysis and Results 
In this section the results of the multivariate analysis for the investments model 
are summarized and discussed.  The results from the estimations of the model are 
presented using both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys and an analysis of the results is 
(Wald test is for equality of quartile mean on previous row to quartile mean on current row 
of table.) 
Number of strata =      72         Number of obs    =     3879 
Number of PSUs   =    3879         Population size  =  5669336 
                                   Design df        =     3807 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |   Mean of     Linearized     Adjusted Wald Test* 
    Quartile |wLnINVESTOSALES Std. Err.   (H0 = means are equal) 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
      OWNSHR | 
           1 |   .0147088   .0027455        
           2 |   .0087881   .0011577    F(1,3807)=3.95, Prob>F=0.0469 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   wLnOWNERS | 
           1 |   .0074193   .0012638       
           3 |   .0102807   .0017199    F(1,3807)=1.80, Prob>F=0.1794 
           4 |   .0246562   .0055681    F(1,3807)=6.09, Prob>F=0.0137 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   RELLENGTH | 
           1 |   .0078775    .002093       
           2 |   .0115609   .0023422    F(1,3807)=1.38, Prob>F=0.2408 
           3 |   .0106129   .0019044    F(1,3807)=0.10, Prob>F=0.7534 
           4 |   .0112536   .0026706    F(1,3807)=0.04, Prob>F=0.8449 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RELNUM | 
           1 |   .0072048   .0017969       
           2 |   .0085253   .0015121    F(1,3807)=0.32, Prob>F=0.5741 
           3 |   .0112844   .0027931    F(1,3807)=0.76, Prob>F=0.3847 
           4 |    .016773   .0033169    F(1,3807)=1.60, Prob>F=0.2058 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnCASHTOSAL~| 
           1 |    .007885   .0016414       
           2 |   .0069097   .0015854    F(1,3807)=0.18, Prob>F=0.6688 
           3 |   .0130238   .0028575    F(1,3807)=3.51, Prob>F=0.0612 
           4 |     .01337   .0025243    F(1,3807)=0.01, Prob>F=0.9276 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
wLnEXTDEBTRA~| 
           1 |   .0066342   .0017191       
           2 |   .012783    .0021885    F(1,3807)=4.88, Prob>F=0.0272 
           3 |   .0120548   .0026725    F(1,3807)=0.04, Prob>F=0.8330 
           4 |   .0101316   .0022637    F(1,3807)=0.30, Prob>F=0.5834 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  wLnDIVERSE | 
           1 |   .0080016   .0017971       
           2 |   .0090906   .0021744    F(1,3807)=0.15, Prob>F=0.6995 
           3 |   .0092089   .0018607    F(1,3807)=0.00, Prob>F=0.9670 
           4 |   .0148902   .0028987    F(1,3807)=2.72, Prob>F=0.0990 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4. 10. 2003 NSSBF: Mean of wLnINVESTOSALES across quartiles of model variables 
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offered.  Table 4.4 presents a tabular summary of the results of the estimations, indicating 
which hypothesis is being tested by each model variable, the sign of the coefficient that is 
expected for that variable based on the hypothesis, the observed sign of the estimated 
coefficient, and the level of significance of the t-test for that coefficient.  The observed 
relationships shown in the last column of table 4.4 are based on the survey-weighted 
estimations in figures 4.13 and 4.14, especially on the survey-weighed Tobit estimates.  
Table 4.4 
Summary of observed results compared to hypothesized results 
Independent Variable Hypothesis 
Tested 
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
to Other 
Investments 
Observed 
Relationship 
1998/2003 
Firm Characteristics:    
GROWTH H2a (-) ns/ns 
Agency and Monitoring:    
OWNSHR H1a (-) (-)***/(-)*** 
OWNMGR H1c (-) (-)**/(-)* 
LnOWNERS H1b (+) (+)***/(+)*** 
RELLENGTH H1d (-) ns/(+)*** 
RELNUM H1d (+) (+)***/(+)*** 
Sources and uses of cash 
flows: 
   
LnCASHTOSALES H2c (+) ns/ns 
LnEXTDEBTRATIO H2b (-) (-)***/na 
Owner diversification:    
LnDIVERSE H3 (+) (+)***/(+)** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  ns=not significant 
 
 
Figures 4.11 (for the 1998 NSSBF) and 4.12 (for the 2003 NSSBF) present five 
estimations of the model in columns 1 through 5.  Column 1 contains the OLS estimation 
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with robust standard errors, which is provided for comparison and will not be used in the 
analysis for reasons described in section 4 of this document.  Column 2 contains the 
survey-weighted least squares estimation using wLnINVESTOSALES as the dependent 
variable.  Column 3 contains the survey-weighted Logit estimation using the binary 
variable INVESTS as the dependent variable.  Column 4 contains the survey-weighted 
Probit estimation, which also uses INVESTS as the dependent variable.  Column 5 
contains the survey-weighted Tobit estimation using wLnINVESTOSALES as the 
dependent variable. 
In section 4.4 above, it was suggested that the signs and significance of the 
coefficient estimates in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 in figures 4.11 and 4.12 would be the same, 
through the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates would not be the same.  Examining 
figure 4.11 for the 1998 NSSBF data, a great degree of similarity is observed  across the 
four sets of estimates.  The signs of the significant coefficients are the same across the 
four estimations,  and the degree of coefficient significance though not identical, is very 
close.  Examining figure 4.12 for the 2003 NSSBF data, one can see a comparable pattern 
of similarity across the four estimations of the table.  This would lead one to draw similar 
conclusions about the support for the hypotheses from all four estimations, though the 
strength of that support would differ in a few instances.  For example, in figure 4.11 the 
coefficient of OWNMGR is significant at the 0.1% level in the Tobit estimation, but 
significant at the 0.05% level in the Logit and Probit estimations.  Examining the Tobit 
estimation alone would lead one to conclude that hypothesis H1a enjoyed only weak 
support in the results.  When combined with results from the Logit and Probit 
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estimations, one would be comfortable making a stronger claim about the degree of 
support for H1a in the results. 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 below reprise the Probit and Tobit estimations, but with 
OWNSHR and LnOWNERS dropped from the model due to their high correlation as 
described in section 4.3 above.  Column 1 of these tables contains the survey-weighted 
Probit estimation with OWNSHR dropped, while column 2 contains the Probit estimation 
with LnOWNERS dropped.  Column 3 of these tables contains the survey-weighted Tobit 
estimation with OWNSHR dropped, while column 4 contains the Tobit estimation with 
LnOWNERS dropped.  These are the estimates that are used to complete the summary of 
observed results in table 4.4, particularly the Tobit results, since the Tobit method 
estimates the original model from section 4.3 which was derived from the hypotheses.   
No support is evident in either the 1998 or 2003 surveys for hypothesis H2a, that 
growth firms would have significantly lower other investments than non-growth firm.  It 
is possible that the failure to observe a significant result here could be due to a weak 
proxy for growth.  The variable GROWTH is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” 
if the firm has experienced a growth in sales over the past two fiscal years, and “0” 
otherwise.  A one-year growth pattern may not be adequate to separate the true growth 
firms from other firms, which would reduce the ability to find a significant relationship 
between growth and other investments. 
Strong support is observed for hypotheses H1a and H1b in both surveys.  Other 
investments decrease with increasing ownership share of the primary owner and increase 
with the number of owners, in support of the assertion that non-core investments 
represent an agency cost to the firm.  Support for hypothesis H1c is observed in the 1998 
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survey but only weak support (0.1% level) is observed in the 2003 survey.  Firms whose 
manager is also an owner hold less other investments than firms whose manager is not an 
owner, consistent with the agency cost interpretation of other investments.  Strong 
support for hypothesis H1d is observed through the positive sign and significance at the 
0.01% level of the estimated coefficient of RELNUM, the number of relationships 
between the firm and financial institutions, which is a proxy for increasingly diffuse 
monitoring by creditors.  Taken together, the results described above lend support to the 
interpretation that other investments represent a residual loss agency cost to the firm, as 
originally described by Jensen and Meckling. 
It is observed that the estimated coefficient of RELLENGTH is positive and 
highly significant in the 2003 survey, though not significant in the 1998 survey.  This 
result is the opposite of the negative relationship between RELLENGTH and other 
investments that was predicted in hypothesis H1d based on agency arguments.  This 
result can be explained if RELLENGTH is interpreted as a proxy for the age of the firm.  
(Only long-lived firms can have long relationships with their financial institution.)  Older 
firms that have not grown beyond the small firm stage and thus are included in the 
NSSBF survey are likely to be “lifestyle” firms or firms in which growth and value 
maximization are not necessarily the primary goals of the owners.  Such firms would be 
more likely to accumulate other investments, leading to a strong positive relationship 
between RELLENGTH and other investments.   If RELLENGTH is replaced with 
LnFIRMAGE in the model and the model is re-estimated using the Tobit method and the 
2003 survey data, it is observed that the coefficient of LnFIRMAGE is positive and 
significant at the 0.01% level.  (Doing the same with the 1998 survey data does not 
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produce a significant coefficient for LnFIRMAGE.)  This would indicate that 
RELLENGTH is functioning as a proxy for firm age in the model. 
No support is seen for hypothesis H2c that firms whose managers have more cash 
available to them will have more other investments.  However strong support is observed 
for hypothesis H2b in the 1998 survey, but no support for it in the 2003 survey.  The level 
of external debt (not shareholder provided) held by the firm is negatively related to other 
investments, lending support to Jensen’s assertion that the need to service debt would be 
a disciplining mechanism for management that would reduce their ability to expend the 
firm’s cash flows on non-value maximizing uses.   
Last of all, strong support is seen in both surveys for hypothesis H3 that the 
higher the commitment of the primary owner’s wealth to the firm, the more other 
investments the firm will have.  The interpretation of this result is that owners whose 
wealth is relatively undiversified and concentrated in the firm will achieve diversification 
by directing the firm to diversify its investments instead.  The owner’s motivation for 
doing this is to reduce the risk associated with having all of her wealth committed to one 
investment.   Diversification of firm activities and investments is a recognized strategy 
for reducing the business risk of the firm, and is frequently undertaken by large firms.  
The argument generally advanced against such firm diversification is that diversification 
is best left to the shareholders, who are in a better position to diversify their portfolios 
and reduce their risk than is the firm. 
For an entrepreneur whose wealth is heavily invested in one small firm,  portfolio 
diversification outside of the firm may not be feasible.   Therefore, such diversification of 
the firm’s resources into other investments as has been observed in this study would have 
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to serve the same risk-reduction purpose.  The unique advantage of this study is that it 
can actually determine the degree of commitment of the primary owner’s wealth to the 
firm from the data available in the NSSBF surveys.  The observation that firms with 
primary owners whose wealth is more committed to the firm have more other 
investments supports the diversification argument that has been proposed. 
Looking for similarities and differences in the results between the 1998 survey 
data and the 2003 survey data, one of the most notable differences was the significant 
positive contribution of RELLENGTH to other investments in 2003 that was not 
observed in the 1998 data.   Considering RELLENGTH as a proxy for firm age, and 
recognizing that 1998 was a period of strong economic expansion in the U.S. while 2003 
was a period of relative economic weakness, one can interpret this result to indicate that 
older firms were more likely than younger firms to hold other investments on their 
balance sheets in 2003 that were accumulated in previous more prosperous years.  The 
economic climate in 2003 would make it difficult for firms to acquire other investments 
and might compel younger and less established firm to divest themselves of those assets.  
The model would detect this as a significant contribution of firm age to the level of other 
investments, which was indeed observed.   The economic climate in 1998 was one of 
prosperity and expansion for all firms, and firm age would be less likely to determine the 
level of other investments in that climate, leading to the observation that it was 
insignificant.  
The other notable difference was the lack of significance of the coefficient of 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO in the model estimation using the 2003 survey data, though the 
coefficient was highly significant and negative using the 1998 data.  As noted in the 
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univariate analysis section of this essay, firms on average significantly reduced their 
EXTDEBTRATIO between 1998 and 2003 as the economy weakened, though their 
average value of INVESTOSALES did not significantly change between 1998 and 2003.  
It is possible that in this reduced debt state, the discipline of debt was longer effective in 
reducing the firm’s other investments, making the relationship between debt and other 
investments insignificant.   
 
  
 
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Robust OLS Svy Regress Svy Logit Svy Probit Svy Tobit 
      
GROWTH -0.00494*** -0.00887 -0.0853 -0.0500 -0.0190 
 (0.00186) (0.0142) (0.136) (0.0727) (0.0133) 
OWNSHR -1.03e-05 0.000426 -0.00193 -0.000581 -0.000309 
 (6.08e-05) (0.000570) (0.00386) (0.00217) (0.000349) 
OWNMGR -0.00227 -0.0513* -0.411** -0.221** -0.0301* 
 (0.00264) (0.0281) (0.198) (0.111) (0.0174) 
wLnOWNERS 0.00305 0.108*** 0.577*** 0.346*** 0.0443*** 
 (0.00244) (0.0270) (0.148) (0.0855) (0.0126) 
RELLENGTH 6.37e-06 7.59e-05 0.000619 0.000319 5.09e-05 
 (8.99e-06) (7.27e-05) (0.000597) (0.000330) (5.98e-05) 
RELNUM 0.00197*** 0.0274*** 0.207*** 0.117*** 0.0176*** 
 (0.000503) (0.00515) (0.0360) (0.0205) (0.00337) 
wLnCASHTOSALES 0.0247** -0.00453 -0.0543 -0.0724 0.0555 
 (0.0102) (0.0432) (0.433) (0.234) (0.0497) 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO -0.00177* -0.0193** -0.211** -0.116** -0.0211** 
 (0.000993) (0.00841) (0.106) (0.0572) (0.0105) 
wLnDIVERSE 0.116*** 1.099*** 9.058*** 4.953*** 0.860*** 
 (0.0339) (0.301) (2.326) (1.313) (0.236) 
MANUFACTURING -0.00427 -0.00520 -0.0470 -0.0231 -0.0181 
 (0.00341) (0.0300) (0.259) (0.140) (0.0244) 
TRANSPORTATION 0.00658 -0.0322 -0.282 -0.131 -0.0185 
 (0.00669) (0.0384) (0.365) (0.196) (0.0388) 
WHOLESALE -0.00617* 0.0503 0.363 0.194 0.00411 
 (0.00320) (0.0345) (0.247) (0.139) (0.0226) 
RETAIL -0.00816*** -0.0343 -0.320 -0.167 -0.0413** 
 (0.00268) (0.0220) (0.217) (0.115) (0.0208) 
SERVICES -0.00360 -0.0163 -0.169 -0.0747 -0.0196 
 (0.00265) (0.0194) (0.185) (0.0989) (0.0184) 
Constant -0.243*** -2.359*** -21.91*** -12.12*** -2.082*** 
 (0.0746) (0.661) (5.120) (2.889) (0.524) 
Observations 3125 3561 3561 3561 3561 
R-squared 0.032 0.060    
Adjusted R2 0.0281     
F statistic 4.414 9.088 10.25 10.43 8.235 
Prob > F 6.89e-08 0 0 0 0 
Model df 14 14 14 14 14 
Uncensored obs     551 
Left censored obs     2574 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) OLS with robust std errors, wLnINVESTOSALES is dependent variable 
(2) Survey-weighted least squares regression, wLnINVESTOSALES is dependent variable 
(3) Survey-weighted logit regression, INVESTS is dependent variable 
(4) Survey-weighted Probit regression, INVESTS is dependent variable 
(5) Survey-weighted Tobit regression, wLnINVESTOSALES is dependent variable 
Figure 4.11. 1998 NSSBF: Comparative Regressions across OLS, SWLS, Logit, Probit and Tobit estimation 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Robust OLS Svy Regress Svy Logit Svy Probit Svy Tobit 
      
GROWTH -0.00210 -0.0121 -0.143 -0.0846 -0.0211 
 (0.00175) (0.0120) (0.145) (0.0750) (0.0179) 
OWNSHR -1.43e-05 -0.000246 -0.00745* -0.00361* -0.000846* 
 (6.30e-05) (0.000445) (0.00383) (0.00207) (0.000489) 
OWNMGR -0.0125*** -0.0274 -0.260 -0.144 -0.0520 
 (0.00443) (0.0294) (0.240) (0.129) (0.0350) 
wLnOWNERS 0.00398 0.0766*** 0.519*** 0.299*** 0.0630*** 
 (0.00281) (0.0220) (0.151) (0.0865) (0.0206) 
RELLENGTH -6.79e-07 0.000125** 0.00132*** 0.000743*** 0.000133** 
 (6.93e-06) (4.95e-05) (0.000496) (0.000274) (6.49e-05) 
RELNUM 0.00142** 0.0324*** 0.296*** 0.163*** 0.0324*** 
 (0.000611) (0.00455) (0.0364) (0.0202) (0.00491) 
wLnCASHTOSALES 0.0344*** -0.00782 -0.216 -0.135 0.0570 
 (0.0109) (0.0302) (0.444) (0.219) (0.0587) 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO -0.000891 0.00178 0.0604 0.0444 0.00981 
 (0.00186) (0.0107) (0.140) (0.0755) (0.0193) 
wLnDIVERSE 0.0233*** 0.151** 1.761*** 0.974*** 0.240*** 
 (0.00851) (0.0646) (0.659) (0.347) (0.0830) 
MANUFACTURING -0.0107*** -0.0206 -0.241 -0.125 -0.0460 
 (0.00308) (0.0285) (0.310) (0.164) (0.0358) 
TRANSPORTATION 0.00268 -0.00334 -0.0324 -0.0206 0.00256 
 (0.00595) (0.0358) (0.358) (0.189) (0.0452) 
WHOLESALE -0.00416 0.0300 0.234 0.144 0.0200 
 (0.00435) (0.0310) (0.271) (0.147) (0.0325) 
RETAIL -0.00717** -0.0403** -0.456** -0.247** -0.0605** 
 (0.00301) (0.0197) (0.228) (0.118) (0.0273) 
SERVICES -0.00361 -0.0211 -0.260 -0.139 -0.0263 
 (0.00276) (0.0174) (0.198) (0.102) (0.0239) 
Constant 0.00518 -0.0599 -3.591*** -2.086*** -0.477*** 
 (0.00939) (0.0661) (0.627) (0.336) (0.0890) 
Observations 3879 4240 4240 4240 4240 
R-squared 0.027 0.065    
Adjusted R2 0.0232     
F statistic 3.537 11.86 15.52 15.24 8.833 
Prob > F 8.04e-06 0 0 0 0 
Model df 14 14 14 14 14 
Uncensored obs     647 
Left censored obs     3232 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) OLS with robust std errors, wLnINVESTOSALES is dependent variable 
(2) Survey-weighted least squares regression, wLnINVESTOSALES is dependent variable 
(3) Survey-weighted logit regression, INVESTS is dependent variable 
(4) Survey-weighted Probit regression, INVESTS is dependent variable 
(5) Survey-weighted Tobit regression, wLnINVESTOSALES is dependent variable
Figure 4.12. 2003 NSSBF: Comparative Regressions across OLS, SWLS, Logit, Probit and Tobit estimation 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Svy Probit Svy Probit Svy Tobit Svy Tobit 
     
GROWTH -0.0498 -0.0435 -0.0189 -0.0182 
 (0.0727) (0.0726) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
OWNMGR -0.220** -0.255** -0.0293* -0.0350** 
 (0.110) (0.108) (0.0174) (0.0173) 
wLnOWNERS 0.366***  0.0545***  
 (0.0512)  (0.00887)  
RELLENGTH 0.000315 0.000405 4.78e-05 6.61e-05 
 (0.000330) (0.000332) (5.99e-05) (6.00e-05) 
RELNUM 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.0177*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.00337) (0.00336) 
wLnCASHTOSALES -0.0777 0.00819 0.0525 0.0663 
 (0.234) (0.237) (0.0497) (0.0509) 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO -0.117** -0.107* -0.0214** -0.0197* 
 (0.0574) (0.0568) (0.0105) (0.0104) 
wLnDIVERSE 4.913*** 5.302*** 0.836*** 0.914*** 
 (1.304) (1.299) (0.235) (0.234) 
MANUFACTURING -0.0242 0.0103 -0.0186 -0.0135 
 (0.140) (0.139) (0.0245) (0.0242) 
TRANSPORTATION -0.130 -0.129 -0.0180 -0.0182 
 (0.196) (0.193) (0.0387) (0.0386) 
WHOLESALE 0.194 0.194 0.00404 0.00527 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.0226) (0.0225) 
RETAIL -0.167 -0.167 -0.0413** -0.0415** 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
SERVICES -0.0758 -0.0707 -0.0202 -0.0190 
 (0.0990) (0.0985) (0.0185) (0.0184) 
OWNSHR  -0.00734***  -0.00119*** 
  (0.00128)  (0.000237) 
Constant -12.08*** -12.21*** -2.060*** -2.115*** 
 (2.886) (2.869) (0.525) (0.521) 
Observations 3561 3561 3561 3561 
F statistic 11.14 9.136 8.748 7.312 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Model df 13 13 13 13 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) Survey-weighted Probit regression, minus OWNSHR 
(2) Survey-weighted Probit regression, minus LnOWNERS 
(3) Survey-weighted TOBIT regression, minus OWNSHR 
(4) Survey-weighted Tobit regression, minus LnOWNERS 
Figure 4.13. 1998 NSSBF: Probit and Tobit estimations with selected variables dropped
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Svy Probit Svy Probit Svy Tobit Svy Tobit 
     
GROWTH -0.0818 -0.0840 -0.0205 -0.0209 
 (0.0750) (0.0744) (0.0179) (0.0178) 
OWNMGR -0.132 -0.206 -0.0486 -0.0660* 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.0350) (0.0348) 
wLnOWNERS 0.427***  0.0925***  
 (0.0601)  (0.0150)  
RELLENGTH 0.000728*** 0.000775*** 0.000128** 0.000143** 
 (0.000274) (0.000272) (6.46e-05) (6.52e-05) 
RELNUM 0.163*** 0.166*** 0.0324*** 0.0333*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.00493) (0.00492) 
wLnCASHTOSALES -0.140 -0.111 0.0556 0.0617 
 (0.220) (0.218) (0.0589) (0.0589) 
wLnEXTDEBTRATIO 0.0313 0.0690 0.00663 0.0153 
 (0.0766) (0.0733) (0.0195) (0.0191) 
wLnDIVERSE 0.899*** 1.042*** 0.222*** 0.256*** 
 (0.342) (0.342) (0.0816) (0.0823) 
MANUFACTURING -0.129 -0.0927 -0.0472 -0.0386 
 (0.164) (0.160) (0.0360) (0.0349) 
TRANSPORTATION -0.0253 -0.0108 0.00201 0.00364 
 (0.190) (0.186) (0.0454) (0.0448) 
WHOLESALE 0.144 0.153 0.0201 0.0218 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.0324) (0.0327) 
RETAIL -0.240** -0.246** -0.0588** -0.0611** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.0272) (0.0272) 
SERVICES -0.141 -0.137 -0.0267 -0.0262 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.0240) (0.0239) 
OWNSHR  -0.00873***  -0.00195*** 
  (0.00140)  (0.000355) 
Constant -2.377*** -1.567*** -0.545*** -0.368*** 
 (0.295) (0.309) (0.0795) (0.0804) 
Observations 4240 4240 4240 4240 
F statistic 16.51 14.74 9.595 8.794 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
Model df 13 13 13 13 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) Survey-weighted Probit regression, minus OWNSHR 
(2) Survey-weighted Probit regression, minus LnOWNERS 
(3) Survey-weighted TOBIT regression, minus OWNSHR 
(4) Survey-weighted Tobit regression, minus LnOWNERS 
Figure 4. 14. 2003 NSSBF: Probit and Tobit estimations with selected variables dropped 
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4.7 Contributions to the Literature 
This study has contributed to the literature on small firm capital structure and 
investment in a number of ways.  First, this study has taken advantage of unique data 
available in the NSSBF survey databases that reports the specific non-core investments 
made by a small firm, along with balance sheet and income statement data, and data on 
firm organization, structure and management.  This provided a unique opportunity to 
model the small firm investment decision as a function of variables that typically proxy 
for agency costs and their moderation, and to test empirical hypothesis implied by the 
Jensen and Meckling agency theory, and by the Free Cash Flow theory of Jensen.  
Second, this study extends the results of Danielson and Scott (2007) on the small 
firm overinvestment decision through the use of quantitative investment data from 
balance sheets of small U.S. firms.  The lack of data on the small firm’s use of debt and 
the author’s requirement to model the overinvestment decision of the firm using 
management’s belief as the dependent variable rather than financial data on actual firm 
investments were limitations acknowledged by those authors.  In this study, balance sheet 
data on other investments is used to study the determinants of overinvestment and 
address the limitations of the Danielson and Scott paper.   
Third, the NSSBF surveys used for this study provide a unique opportunity to 
relate the degree of the primary owner’s commitment of wealth to the firm, to the firm’s 
other investments.  This presented an opportunity to investigate a personal diversification 
motive as the reason for the small firm’s investment in non-core investments.  It appears 
that this approach is unique to this study.   
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Fourth, this study separately utilized both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys for 
model estimation.  The results of these separate estimations lent themselves to 
interpretation of some of the results in the context of the macroeconomic environment in 
which the data was collected.  The year 1998 was near the peak of a large economic 
expansion in the U.S., while the year 2003 was at the end of a brief recession in the U.S.  
Comparisons between the results of the two survey estimations provided an additional 
dimension to the analysis that has not previously been undertaken. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA:  THE NATIONAL SURVEYS OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 
The 1998 and 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) 
databases are the two samples used for each of the three essays in this dissertation.  These 
databases represent surveys of U.S. small businesses, obtained during 1998 and 2003, and 
which include financial statement data for those years, as well as answers to questions 
about sources of firm finance, firm structure and organization, management 
characteristics, and firm demographic data.  The potential advantage of using these two 
databases is that they sample the state of small U.S. businesses during two very different 
economic climates; during an economic expansion (1998) and at the end of a recession 
(2003).  This may facilitate comparisons between firm capital structure during different 
macroeconomic climates. 
5.1 1998 NSSBF Database 
The 1998 NSSBF database is a two-stage stratified, non-proportional random 
sample of the approximately 5.3 million small firms in operation as of year-end 1998.  To 
quote the 1998 NSSBF codebook4, 
                                                 
4 Available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/codebook98.pdf . 
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“The target population is the population of all for-profit, nonfinancial, nonfarm, 
non-subsidiary business enterprises that had fewer than 500 employees and were 
in operation as of year-end 1998” 
 
The initial sample frame is divided into 91 strata along the dimensions of owner 
race, geographic region, urban/rural MSA and total employees.5   The sample contains 
3,561 firm observations, each of which is assigned a weight that reflects that firm’s 
representation in the population of small firms, taking into account sample design, firm 
eligibility and survey non-response.  The variable FIN_WGT is used for observation 
weights and the variable NEWSTRAT is used for the stratum identifier. 
Characteristic of survey data, there were some missing data items in some of the 
survey responses (observations) in 1998 NSSBF database.  Quoting the 1998 NSSBF 
codebook: 
“About 0.78% of all values collected were missing. Fifty-four percent of the 
observations had no missing values; 90 percent of all observations had less than 
one percent of the values missing, and 95 percent of the observations had less 
than 3 percent missing.” 
 
Single imputation methods were used to create values for missing variables in the survey 
database.  Missing numeric variables and variables that could be characterized by Yes/No 
responses were imputed using a linear regression procedure.  Missing categorical 
variables were imputed using a randomized hot-deck procedure.  Note that the imputation 
procedure did not address those questions for which the response was coded “.S”, which 
means the question was legitimately skipped or not applicable.  
  
                                                 
5 For a complete description of the sampling methodologies for the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF surveys, refer to 
their Methodology Reports which are available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/nssbftoc.htm . 
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5.2 2003 NSSBF Database 
The 2003 NSSBF database is a two-stage stratified, non-proportional random 
sample of the approximately 6.3 million small firms in operation in December 2003.  To 
quote the NSSBF 2003 codebook: 
“The target population is the population of all for-profit, nonfinancial, nonfarm, 
non-subsidiary business enterprises that had fewer than 500 employees and were 
in operation as of year-end 2003 and on the date of the interview.” 
 
Stratification of the 2003 database is done along the dimensions of census region, 
urban/rural MSA and total employment size.  The sampling frame is divided into 72 
strata by these dimensions.  The sample contains 4,240 firm observations, each of which 
is assigned a weight that reflects that firm’s representation in the population of small 
firms, taking into account sample design, firm eligibility and survey non-response.  The 
variable FIN_WGT is used for the observation weights, and the variable A0_STRATUM 
is used for the stratum identifier.    
Characteristic of survey data, there were some missing data items in some of the 
survey responses (observations) in the 2003 NSSBF database.  Quoting the 2003 NSSBF 
codebook: 
“About 1.8% of all values collected were missing. Thirty percent of the 
observations had no missing values; 65 percent of all observations had less than 
one percent of the values missing, and 79 percent of the observations had less 
than 3 percent missing.” 
 
Unlike the 1998 NSSBF database where single imputation methods were used to create 
values for missing variables, the 2003 NSSBF database uses multiple imputation methods 
to create five “implicates” for each of the 4,240 respondent firms in the sample, for a total 
of 21,200 observations in the database.  Across each of the five implicates for any firm, 
the values of all non-missing variables for that firm are identical, though the imputed 
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values for the missing variables will differ slightly.  The differences reflect the 
uncertainty introduced by the imputation methodology that uses statistical modeling to 
“predict” the missing values using non-missing data as input to the models.  
 Both the 2003 NSSBF Codebook and Little and Rubin (2002, pg 85) recommend 
estimating each of the five sets of implicates separately, then combining the resulting 
parameter estimates and their standard errors into one estimate for each parameter, using 
the procedure described in Little and Rubin, and available in SAS and STATA.  
5.3 Mapping Study Variables to Database Variables 
Table 5.1 below provides the mapping between the variables in the 1998 and 2003 
NSSBF databases, and the variables used in the analyses performed in the three essays.  
Where a study variable is actually calculated as combination of database variables, the 
expression by which it is calculated is given. 
Table 5.1  
Variable Mapping 
Study Variable 1998 NSSBF Variable(s) 2003 NSSBF Variable(s) 
CASHTOASSETS R1 / R12 R1 / R12 
CASHTOSALES R1 / P2 R1 / P2 
CURLIBTOSALES (S2 + S3) / P2 (S2 + S3) / P2 
DBSCORE DB_SCORE A0_DB_CREDRK (scale reversed to 
match 1998 order) 
DEBTRATIO S8 / R12 S8 / R12 
EXTDEBTRATIO (S8 - F41) / R12 (S8 - F41) / R12 
DEBTTOASSETS (S1 + S2 + S3) / R12 (S1 + S2 + S3) / R12 
DENIEDCREDIT L13=1 L13=1 
DIVERSE OWNEQUITY/(OWNWORTH+OWNEQUITY) OWNEQUITY/(OWNWORTH+OWNEQUITY)
EXTDEBTTOASSETS (S1 – F41 + S2 + S3) / R12 (S1 – F41 + S2 + S3) / R12 
FAMOWN C_FAM=1 CF_FAMILY=1 
FEARDENIAL MRL31=1 MRL31=1 
FEMOWN C_SEX=1 CF_FEMALE > 50 
FIRMAGE C_FAGE CF_FAGE 
FIRMDISTRESS U1_1 = 1 or U1_1 = 3 or U3 > 1 U1 = 1 or U3 = 1 
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GROWPROB D6=14 A0_FIRMPROB=13 
GROWTH P2 > P3 P3=1 
INHERITED C_ESTR=3 CF_ESTAB=3 
INVRATIO R3/R12 R3/R12 
MAININST HLR_1 H1 
MAINSUPL L8=1 L8=1 
MINOWN C_MINOR=1 CF_MINOR > 50 
OFFEREDTCD L4 > 0 L6 > 0 
OPEXTOSALES P5 / P2 P5 / P2 
OTRINCTOSALES P4 / P2 P4 / P2 
OWNDISTRESS U1_1 = 2 or U1_1 = 3 or U2 > 1 or U4 = 1 U4 = 1 or U6 = 1 
OWNEDU C_EDUC CF_EDUC 
OWNEQUITY EQUITY x (OWNSHR/100) EQUITY x (OWNSHR/100) 
OWNERS C_NOW CF_OWNERS 
OWNEXP C_EXP CF_EXPER 
OWNMGR C_MGR=1 CF_MANAGE=1 
OWNSHR C_OWNSH C_SHARE_1 
OWNWORTH U_NETW + U_HEQ U_NETW + U_HEQ 
OWNWORTHTOSALES (U_NETW + U_HEQ) / P2 (U_NETW + U_HEQ) / P2 
PAIDLATE L6=1 L4=1 
PASSTHRU B3=2 or B3=3 or B3=7 B3=2 or B3=3 or B3=7 
PCACCTNG D5_7=1 D5T8=1 
PCTDISCOUNTS L5 L7 
PROFITABLE PROFIT > 0 PROFIT > 0 
PROFTOINCOME PROFIT / (P2 + P4) PROFIT / (P2 + P4) 
PROFTOSALES PROFIT / P2 PROFIT / P2 
PURCHASED C_ESTR=2 CF_ESTAB=2 
QUICKRATIO (R1 + R2) / (S2 + S3) (R1 + R2) / (S2 + S3) 
CASHRATIO R1 / (S2 + S3) R1 / (S2 + S3) 
ARRATIO R2 / (S2 + S3) R2 / (S2 + S3) 
RELDIST Value of IDIST1-20 for MAININST Value of IH7_1=20 for MAININST 
RELLENGTH Max of IMONS1-20 for MAININST Max of IH4_1-20 for MAININST 
RELNUM Sum of “1” for each non-missing IMONS1-
20 
Sum of “1” for each non-missing IH4_1-20 
SALES P2 P2 
TOTEMP TOTEMP TOTEMP 
TRADECREDIT L1=1 L1=1 
USEDCARD F1=1 or F4=1 F1=1 or F4=1 
USEDGRACE F3=1 or F6=1 F3=1 or F6=1 
UNUSEDLOC ((f10_1 - f11_1) + (f10_2 - f11_2) + 
(f10_3 - f11_3)) / R12 
((f10_1 - f11_1) + (f10_2 - f11_2) + 
(f10_3 - f11_3)) / R12 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the common empirical methodology that is used for all 
three essays.  Additions to or deviations from this methodology are described in the 
individual essays. 
6.1 Implications of Survey Design 
The fact that both the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF databases are stratified samples 
rather than simple random samples requires that special consideration be made of the 
impact of the sample design on statistical estimation, in order to ensure that inferences 
made regarding the population from which the sample was drawn are correct.  In a simple 
random sample (SRS), every observation of every sample is drawn with equal probability 
from an infinite population (or one that is very large relative to the sample) and shares the 
same selection probability.   However, complex survey designs utilize clustering and 
stratification schemes to guide the creation of samples, motivated by a desire to reduce 
the cost of gathering survey data and to facilitate the calculation of descriptive statistics 
for specific subgroups of the population (Kish 1965).   Observations in survey samples do 
not share the same selection probability, but have probabilities that are functions of the 
sample design, adjusted for eligibility and non-response.  Each observation in a survey 
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sample is assigned a survey weight, which represents the number of units in the 
population that the sample observation represents, and is proportional to the inverse of 
the observation’s selection probability (Korn and Graubard, 1995).   
That the use of survey weights and consideration of sample design are essential to 
obtain unbiased estimates of descriptive statistics such as totals, means, and frequencies 
for a population from a survey sample is well-understood and universally accepted.  
Excellent treatments of the statistical analysis methods required for estimating these 
values for complex survey designs can be found in Cochran (1977) and Kish (1965).   
The same unanimity of opinion does not exist with regard to the use of survey 
weights in the estimation of a linear regression model, however.  The fundamental 
question that has been debated by statisticians can be summarized as: under what 
circumstances does the sample design strategy impact the assumptions of the classical 
linear model underlying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression such that unweighted 
OLS estimators are no longer BLUE, requiring that other estimation methods be used that 
incorporate survey weights to estimate unbiased and consistent regression coefficients?  
A brief exposition of the core issues will serve to illuminate this debate. 
Assume that the population-generating model to be estimated from the stratified 
sample data is of the form 
  XY        (1) 
where Y is a vector of responses, X is an array of predictors, β is a vector of regression 
coefficients and ε is an array of random errors.  Also assume that there exists an array of 
stratification variables J that define the strata and may or may not be included in the 
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model.  The ongoing debate is over which estimator will provide unbiased and efficient 
estimates of the regression coefficients, the unweighted OLS estimator given by 
   βOLS = (X’X)-1X’Y      (2) 
or the weighed OLS estimator given by 
   βWGT = (X’WX)-1X’WY     (3) 
where W is an array containing the survey weights for each observation along the 
diagonal.  In general, when the sample under consideration has non-constant survey 
weights then βOLS for model (1) above can be shown to be biased and inconsistent while 
βWGT is unbiased and consistent, under certain circumstances. 
According to DuMouchel and Duncan (1983), the conditions that must be met in 
order for the unweighted OLS estimators to be BLUE are that the mean and variance of ε, 
conditional upon X and J, must be independent of X and J.  (The other assumptions of 
the classical linear model must also hold.)  Note that the conditions above imply that both 
the independent model variables and the stratification variables must be exogenous to the 
model being estimated, a condition which Wooldridge (2003) has also indicated is, along 
with the other classical assumptions, sufficient to ensure that the unweighted OLS 
estimators are BLUE. 
 Carrington, Eltinge and McCue (2000) show that if the survey weights are a 
simple linear combination of the stratification variables, and if all stratification variables 
are included in the model and if all other classical assumptions hold, then the unweighted 
OLS estimators are preferred.  Including the stratification variables in the model provides 
insurance against omitted variable bias that would be caused if the stratification variables 
were correlated with any of the other independent variables of the model.  However, if 
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the stratification variables are unknown, are unavailable or if the relationship between the 
survey weights and stratification variables is complex, then weighted OLS estimators are 
preferred.  Furthermore, one of the properties of βWGT that may make it preferable over 
βOLS is that it is consistent in the face of misspecification of the model, while βOLS may 
not be.  Since omitted variables and model misspecification are problems that are difficult 
to avoid in practice, using the weighted OLS estimator can be viewed as the “safe” 
alternative, although at a cost of higher standard errors of the estimated coefficients than 
would be obtained with the unweighted OLS estimator. 
After several decades of debate among knowledgeable statisticians and 
practitioners over which approach is best, the world had divided into two camps on this 
subject: the model-based strategy camp and the design-based strategy camp.   
The adherents of the model-based strategy insist that as long as the regression 
model is not seriously misspecified, then OLS will produce BLUE estimators of 
regression coefficients and their standard errors and should not be forsaken for other 
estimation methods.  They point out that the cost of using survey weights in the 
estimation of regression coefficients and their standard errors is higher standard errors 
than one would obtain with OLS, which will impact hypothesis testing using those 
standard errors and may cause Type II errors when using t-tests to test the significance of 
regression coefficients.  Followers of this strategy focus upon the model, ensuring that 
stratification variables are included if necessary to avoid omitted variable bias. 
On the other hand, the adherents of the design-based strategy advocate specifying 
a model based only on the economic theory underlying the process that generates the 
population under study then apply statistical methods that incorporate the survey weights 
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into the calculation of the coefficient estimates and their standard errors.  They point out 
the difficulty of perfectly specifying any model and insist that only regression estimation 
techniques that take into account the sample design will produce unbiased and consistent 
estimators of regression coefficients for the population.  Statistical software packages 
readily available on personal computers today contain routines for calculating statistics 
for complex survey samples. 
Reiter, Zanutto and Hunter (2005) provide an informative overview of these two 
strategies and apply both strategies to the estimation of two econometric models, 
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches to the practitioner.  In 
a frequently-cited paper on the subject, DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) provide guidance 
to practitioners regarding the conditions under which one strategy would be favored over 
another.   
This dissertation utilizes the design-based approach to model specification and 
estimation.  Survey-weighted linear regression routines are available in the current 
versions of SAS and STATA, among other software packages, making this type of 
analysis straightforward.   Furthermore, as suggested by Winship and Radbill (1994), 
using weighted OLS with robust standard errors can be used in place of survey-weighted 
regression routines if necessary.   
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 contain comparison regressions between OLS, OLS with 
robust errors, weighted OLS with robust errors and survey-weighted least-squares with 
standard errors calculated using the Taylor linearization algorithm, for the Trade Credit 
Discounts model of the first essay using the 1998 and 2003 surveys respectively.  For the 
2003 survey, only implicate #3 is used in the regressions in table 4.1.2, rather than the 
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full multiple imputation method using all five implicates for each firm, as it is not 
necessary to have the full imputation to obtain the comparison between regression 
methods. 
In both tables, it is very clear that both OLS (column 1) and OLS with robust 
errors (column 2) provide almost identical results, which are much different than the 
results for weighted OLS with robust errors (column 3) and survey-weighted least 
squares (column 4), which are almost identical.  Clearly, use of survey weights has a 
profound effect on the magnitude of the point estimates for the regression coefficients, 
which suggests that they survey design is not ignorable.  Furthermore, in most cases, the 
signs and degree of significance of the estimated coefficients are the same across all 
regressions, though the coefficient magnitudes change from non-weighted to weighted 
regression.  What is clear from these tables is that (a) using survey weights in the 
regression estimation matters, and (b) weighted OLS (WLS) with robust errors (column 
3) is a satisfactory substitute for survey-weighted LS (column 4). 
Table 6.1 
Comparative regressions for Trade Credit Discounts model: 1998 NSSBF sample 
 (PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Robust OLS Robust WLS Survey-weighted 
     
FEMOWN 7.194** 7.194* 8.648** 8.648** 
 (3.651) (3.778) (4.109) (4.070) 
MINOWN -12.53** -12.53** -16.34*** -16.34*** 
 (4.942) (4.938) (5.881) (5.819) 
OWNEXP 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.626*** 0.626*** 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.142) (0.140) 
OWNEDU 1.090 1.090 0.811 0.811 
 (0.704) (0.711) (0.873) (0.860) 
PCACCTNG 5.306 5.306 12.14** 12.14** 
 (4.426) (4.496) (5.115) (5.070) 
MAINSUPL 9.723*** 9.723*** 13.47*** 13.47*** 
 (2.535) (2.564) (3.320) (3.279) 
MANUFACTURING -17.47*** -17.47*** -7.877 -7.877 
 (4.094) (4.075) (5.256) (5.192) 
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TRANSPORTATION 2.915 2.915 -0.0958 -0.0958 
 (7.361) (7.514) (10.43) (10.31) 
WHOLESALE -1.622 -1.622 -2.421 -2.421 
 (4.618) (4.564) (5.525) (5.469) 
RETAIL -0.702 -0.702 1.299 1.299 
 (4.050) (3.929) (4.880) (4.816) 
SERVICES -6.193 -6.193 -1.512 -1.512 
 (3.924) (3.999) (4.736) (4.691) 
OWNSHR 0.0333 0.0333 0.0837 0.0837 
 (0.0590) (0.0568) (0.0784) (0.0776) 
OWNMGR -1.238 -1.238 -1.745 -1.745 
 (3.416) (3.489) (4.793) (4.747) 
LnOWNERS 2.304 2.304 4.533* 4.533* 
 (1.652) (1.529) (2.480) (2.457) 
USEDCARD -13.07*** -13.07*** -12.98** -12.98** 
 (4.965) (4.883) (5.493) (5.418) 
USEDGRACE 11.95*** 11.95*** 13.34*** 13.34*** 
 (4.215) (4.045) (4.668) (4.607) 
LnUNUSEDLOC 3.523 3.523 4.739 4.739 
 (5.155) (4.624) (4.728) (4.666) 
LnQUICKRATIO 8.994* 8.994 17.11*** 17.11*** 
 (5.407) (6.759) (6.547) (6.472) 
LnPROFTOINCOME 9.607* 9.607** 16.92*** 16.92*** 
 (5.276) (4.805) (5.623) (5.562) 
RELLENGTH 0.0134 0.0134 0.00830 0.00830 
 (0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0150) (0.0148) 
RELNUM -0.922 -0.922 -2.313** -2.313** 
 (0.649) (0.644) (1.013) (1.001) 
LnRELDIST -1.151 -1.151 -1.424 -1.424 
 (0.926) (0.974) (1.239) (1.224) 
DBSCORE -6.326*** -6.326*** -4.102*** -4.102*** 
 (1.143) (1.133) (1.472) (1.457) 
PAIDLATE -12.76*** -12.76*** -12.90*** -12.90*** 
 (2.669) (2.780) (3.453) (3.411) 
LnDEBTRATIO -1.066 -1.066 2.759 2.759 
 (3.583) (3.722) (4.005) (3.963) 
Constant -7.027 -7.027 -88.73** -88.73*** 
 (30.92) (32.66) (34.74) (34.34) 
     
Observations 1138 1138 1138 3243 
R-squared 0.169 0.169 0.183 0.183 
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.150 0.165  
Model SS 381804 381804 406595  
Residual SS 1.877e+06 1.877e+06 1.811e+06  
Model df 25 25 25 25 
Residual df 1112 1112 1112 3166 
F statistic 9.048 13.50 10.27 10.43 
Number of  strata    77 
Population size    4.462e+06 
Subpopulation size    1138 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) OLS regression 
(2) OLS with robust std errors 
(3) Weighted OLS(WLS)with robust std errors 
(4) survey-weighted least squares with std errors calculated using Taylor 
Linearization algorithm 
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Table 6.2 
Comparative regressions for Trade Credit Discounts model: 2003 NSSBF sample 
(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
(using Implicate # 3 only) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Robust OLS Robust WLS Survey-weighted 
     
FEMOWN -1.738 -1.738 0.361 0.361 
 (3.348) (3.473) (5.315) (5.257) 
MINOWN -7.477 -7.477 -7.698 -7.698 
 (5.081) (5.502) (7.535) (7.468) 
OWNEXP 0.108 0.108 -0.0612 -0.0612 
 (0.105) (0.108) (0.149) (0.148) 
OWNEDU 1.462** 1.462** 1.183 1.183 
 (0.610) (0.613) (0.914) (0.905) 
PCACCTNG 6.414 6.414 1.472 1.472 
 (4.642) (5.031) (6.144) (6.103) 
MAINSUPL 6.046*** 6.046*** 7.032** 7.032** 
 (2.177) (2.174) (3.287) (3.267) 
MANUFACTURING -5.917* -5.917* -8.021 -8.021* 
 (3.438) (3.352) (4.879) (4.838) 
TRANSPORTATION -5.762 -5.762 -9.860 -9.860 
 (5.626) (5.651) (9.253) (9.188) 
WHOLESALE 3.146 3.146 1.516 1.516 
 (4.108) (4.015) (5.902) (5.857) 
RETAIL 8.272** 8.272** 10.14** 10.14** 
 (3.407) (3.360) (4.973) (4.955) 
SERVICES 0.772 0.772 3.009 3.009 
 (3.358) (3.382) (4.926) (4.897) 
OWNSHR -0.0346 -0.0346 0.0265 0.0265 
 (0.0560) (0.0569) (0.0898) (0.0891) 
OWNMGR 2.673 2.673 -4.885 -4.885 
 (3.084) (3.111) (5.148) (5.090) 
LnOWNERS 0.547 0.547 -1.218 -1.218 
 (1.884) (1.860) (2.847) (2.817) 
USEDCARD -15.28*** -15.28*** -13.76** -13.76** 
 (4.519) (4.407) (5.643) (5.594) 
USEDGRACE 8.947** 8.947** 9.840** 9.840** 
 (3.662) (3.622) (4.590) (4.548) 
LnUNUSEDLOC 4.755 4.755 6.258 6.258 
 (4.600) (5.360) (6.309) (6.253) 
LnQUICKRATIO -2.394 -2.394 7.621 7.621 
 (4.500) (4.495) (5.682) (5.622) 
LnPROFTOINCOME 1.911 1.911 -9.144 -9.144 
 (6.180) (4.852) (8.677) (8.611) 
RELLENGTH 0.0198** 0.0198*** 0.0368*** 0.0368*** 
 (0.00820) (0.00762) (0.0127) (0.0126) 
RELNUM -0.0435 -0.0435 -0.603 -0.603 
 (0.522) (0.534) (0.850) (0.844) 
LnRELDIST -0.0609 -0.0609 -0.617 -0.617 
 (0.772) (0.768) (1.106) (1.098) 
DBSCORE -6.391*** -6.391*** -4.514*** -4.514*** 
 (0.759) (0.745) (1.101) (1.092) 
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PAIDLATE -17.54*** -17.54*** -19.71*** -19.71*** 
 (2.299) (2.389) (3.634) (3.603) 
LnDEBTRATIO -4.827* -4.827 0.611 0.611 
 (2.835) (3.177) (4.105) (4.073) 
Constant 70.15* 70.15** 86.73 86.73 
 (40.22) (34.22) (54.70) (54.28) 
     
Observations 1478 1478 1478 3905 
R-squared 0.188 0.188 0.195 0.195 
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.174 0.181  
Model SS 552690 552690 566084  
Residual SS 2.384e+06 2.384e+06 2.340e+06  
Model df 25 25 25 25 
Residual df 1452 1452 1452 3833 
F statistic 13.47 16.45 8.922 8.957 
Number of  strata    72 
Population size    5.524e+06 
Subpopulation size    1478 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) OLS regression 
(2) OLS with robust std errors 
(3) Weighted OLS (WLS) with robust std errors 
(4) SWLS with std errors calculated using Taylor Linearization 
algorithm 
 
6.2 Data Transformation 
The distributions for most of the numeric variables in the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF 
databases show a high degree of skewness and kurtosis.  This asymmetry can be caused 
by outliers, can be a symptom of heteroskedasticity or can be a natural characteristic of 
the data.  For stratified survey data, the non-random design of the sample can induce 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals of an OLS regression.  In any case, such an extreme 
departure from normality among the independent variables used in an OLS regression can 
have a detrimental effect on the normality of the OLS residuals and the tests of 
significance for the regression coefficients.  In order to remedy this and bring the 
distribution for each independent variable closer to normal, a natural logarithmic 
transformation will be applied to each independent variable that exhibits excessive 
skewness and kurtosis.  This transform is of the form 
xT = ln(xU –min(xU) + 1) 
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where xT is the transformed variable and xU is the untransformed variable, first shifted to 
be zero-based before being transformed.  A “1” is added to each shifted but 
untransformed variable to ensure that the base value of the transformed variable is zero, 
since natural log is not defined for real numbers of zero or less, and is identically zero 
when x=1.   
This logarithmic transform is effective on distributions with positive skewness.  
Since most of the independent variables in this study exhibit positive skewness, the 
transformation can be applied directly without first reflecting the variable through the 
origin.  Variables that exhibit negative skewness will first be reflected through the origin, 
transformed as described above, the re-reflected to restore their original order.  The 
logarithmic transform has a powerful effect on converting asymmetric data distributions 
with positive skewness to near normality (Osborne 2002).   
 Application of this data transformation will have little effect on the interpretation 
of the regression analysis results.  Transforming the independent variables from levels to 
logs will mean that one will have to interpret the regression coefficients as the effect of 
unit changes in the log of the independent variable rather than unit changes in the level of 
the independent variable; in other words, as elasticities.  However, since all hypotheses 
are related to the sign of the relationship between the predictors and the response 
variable, only the sign of the regression coefficients, their statistical significance and their 
relative economic significance (magnitude) will be examined.  No attempt will be made 
to interpret the absolute values of the coefficients themselves. 
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6.3 Data Cleanup and Winsorization 
The authors of the codebooks for the 1998 and 2003 NSSBF databases caution 
that despite their best attempts to screen the data and ensure its accuracy, it is likely that 
there are influential data points that escaped their scrutiny.  They suggest that users of 
these databases carefully examine the variables selected for analysis to ensure that no 
such points contaminate their analysis.   
Before performing any other analysis of the data, the variables will be screened to 
detect data that is obviously not consistent with the values expected for a going concern.  
In particular, firms with zero or negative total income for the most recent fiscal year, zero 
or negative total assets, and zero or negative sales for the most recent fiscal year will be 
excluded from analysis.  This will be done by setting the survey weight (FIN_WGT) to 
zero for those firm observations, but the observations themselves will not actually be 
dropped from the sample.   This is consistent with Lee and Forthofer (2006, pg. 41) who 
explain that the entire survey sample is required to calculate the variance of the point 
estimates correctly, though the point estimates themselves will not include the zeroed 
observations.  Note that 120 observations (out of 3561 total) in the 1998 NSSBF are 
excluded, and 627 observations (out of 21200 total) in the 2003 NSSBF are excluded, due 
to failure to meet the going concern criteria specified above. 
Table 6.3 shows descriptive statistics for the numeric variables from the 1998 
NSSBF that are used in the three essays of this paper.  Comparing the untransformed 
variables with their logarithmically transformed versions shows that the logarithmic 
transform does reduce skewness and kurtosis of the variables and brings them closer to 
normality.  Unfortunately, the transform alone is not enough.  When examining the 
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transformed data, it is clear that outliers in the distribution tails are contributing to the 
non-normality.  In order to correct this, each transformed variable that has skewness or 
kurtosis in double-digits or higher has its high and low tails Winsorized at 1 percent.  
(That is to say, values that fall within the 1st through 99th percentiles of the variable’s 
range are NOT Winsorized.)  The results of this are shown in table 6.4.  Note that 
Winsorizing at 1 percent is successful in reducing the skewness and kurtosis of each 
variable to substantially less than 100. 
Table 6.3 
1998 NSSBF - Descriptive statistics for numeric variables 
    variable |         N      mean        sd       min       max  skewness  kurtosis 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      1455   57.0646  44.43622         0       100 -.2864114  1.251038 
      OWNEXP |      3441   19.3034   11.7323         0        72  .7947106  3.563414 
      OWNSHR |      3441  80.14356   27.3181         1       100 -.9245613  2.458574 
      OWNERS |      3441  6.293229  70.96166         1      2500  25.01649  713.5992 
   UNUSEDLOC |      3435  .4351921  7.701558         0       335  35.53861  1384.729 
  QUICKRATIO |      2303  8.447221  67.82369       -16  2844.954  33.45103  1346.478 
   RELLENGTH |      3369  96.49688  99.89383         0       780  2.237469   9.51499 
      RELNUM |      3441  2.405987   1.73606         0        20  2.184701  12.61181 
 PROFTOSALES |      3441    .03585  2.736796 -101.5784  3.166757 -30.00113  1063.251 
PROFTOINCOME |      3441  .0614868  2.090686       -99         1 -33.61023  1494.567 
   DEBTRATIO |      3441  1.183149  10.65533         0       300  21.04348  495.4953 
LnOWNWORTH~S |      3441  8.658844  .0159623  8.645469  9.099521  21.32176  513.3404 
 LnUNUSEDLOC |      3435  .1019281  .3348003         0  5.817111  7.906081  92.15885 
    LnTOTEMP |      3441  1.938578  1.554581         0  6.177944  .6387706  2.426204 
LnEXTDEBTT~S |      3441  2.573864  .2219167         0  6.825388  9.116327  140.4944 
   LnFIRMAGE |      3441  2.463372  .7817523         0   4.65396  -.191188  2.423435 
    LnOWNERS |      3441  .4722863  .8270663         0  7.824046  3.262901  18.99913 
   LnRELDIST |      3369  1.480081  1.355391         0  8.087641  1.803016  7.523452 
     LnSALES |      3441  12.70946  2.297985  4.330733  20.25166  .0187466  2.999641 
LnDEBTTOAS~S |      3441  .4877584  .6184787         0  6.813151  3.311555  21.14484 
 LnDEBTRATIO |      3441  .3210239  .5405812         0   5.70711    4.0402  27.30575 
LnCASHTOSA~S |      3441  2.901952  .0201152  2.572988  3.466804  10.56124  267.2516 
LnCASHTOAS~S |      3441  2.255416  .0486456         0  2.335375 -28.74287  1344.681 
LnINVESTOS~S |      3441   .025532  .1040132         0  2.689221   15.5671  320.8143 
LnCURLIBTO~S |      3441  .0900608    .17666         0  2.397895  4.676205  38.39858 
LnOPEXTOSA~S |      3441    .59829  .3086261         0  4.670663  3.997602  38.93404 
LnQUICKRATIO |      2303   3.48847   .316317  2.518233  7.963237  5.570422  46.38817 
   LnARRATIO |      2303  1.153385  .6988189         0  7.951091  3.314146  18.92151 
LnOTRINCTO~S |      3441  .2644093   .102872         0  3.802733   16.4784  447.9679 
LnPROFTOSA~S |      3441  3.605113  .1313835  .8238181  4.203495 -9.603667  153.8676 
LnPROFTOIN~E |      3441  4.221302  .2910459  .1948795      4.81 -3.406163  31.71786 
 LnCASHRATIO |      2303  3.434758  .2076993  2.449088   5.93695  5.744133   46.6338 
  LnOTRRATIO |      2303  .2975787  .6000102         0  5.194795  4.075874  22.31822 
LnTAXTOSALES |       868  1.627487  .0706025         0  2.713252 -9.324826  395.0312 
LnDEPRTOAS~S |      3441  .2671958   .216661         0  .9358733  .5389856  1.978895 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.4 
1998 NSSBF - Descriptive statistics for Winsorized numeric variables 
    variable |         N      mean        sd       min       max  skewness  kurtosis 
wLnOWNWORT~S |      3441  8.658068  .0031335  8.657129  8.682423  6.142843  43.99415 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      3435  .0912827  .2392581         0  1.593252  4.137629  22.40677 
   wLnTOTEMP |      3441  1.936577  1.549513         0  5.710427  .6239943  2.376852 
wLnEXTDEBT~S |      3441  2.567428  .1324595  2.501447  3.419816  4.451676  25.51915 
  wLnFIRMAGE |      3441  2.460981  .7753841  .6931472  4.025352  -.232061  2.323419 
   wLnOWNERS |      3441  .4583253  .7456003         0  3.912023  2.305593  9.392093 
  wLnRELDIST |      3369  1.475613  1.336221         0  6.887553  1.704202  6.902379 
    wLnSALES |      3441  12.70437  2.285698  4.330733  17.74784 -.0136965  2.935072 
wLnDEBTTOA~S |      3441  .4775423  .5558988         0  2.991288  2.174199  8.849728 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      3441  .3115793  .4777023         0  2.735449   2.78372  12.32654 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      3441  2.901404  .0114051  2.895275  2.975781  4.604558  26.90122 
wLnCASHTOA~S |      3441  2.256423  .0286967  2.227999  2.335375  1.530851  4.368904 
wLnINVESTO~S |      3441  .0207043  .0443221  .0095695  .3326493  5.322893  33.57129 
wLnCURLIBT~S |      3441  .0852877   .145184         0  .7048291  2.552149  9.394778 
wLnOPEXTOS~S |      3441  .5917811  .2614346  .0088079   1.94591  1.598297  11.34206 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      2303  3.482648  .2657355   3.34639  5.065166  3.964441  20.62408 
  wLnARRATIO |      2303  1.143966  .6409164  .6904141  4.322351  2.540878  10.82637 
wLnOTRINCT~S |      3441  .2616718  .0641877  .2477019  .7800731   6.66265  50.24466 
wLnPROFTOS~S |      3441  3.608726  .0859346  3.036829  3.743695 -3.719563  24.87899 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      3441  4.226249  .2562412   2.86409  4.803224 -1.565253  11.61904 
wLnCASHRATIO |      2303  3.430628  .1686729  3.344837   4.45467  4.193367  22.32254 
 wLnOTRRATIO |      2303  .2914463  .5614324   .062538  3.322558  3.606508  16.75012 
wLnTAXTOSA~S |       868  1.627357  .0090998  1.608733  1.695674  5.342303  37.91701 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |      3441  .2671046  .2163937  .0351113  .7108569  .5339541   1.96084 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 are the equivalents of 6.3 and 6.4, but for the 2003 NSSBF database.  
Note that the Winsorization of the transformed variables at 1 percent is successful in 
reducing skewness and kurtosis to substantially below 100.  Note also that the 
Winsorized variables are all prefixed with a lower-case “w” to distinguish them from 
their non-Winsorized counterparts.  Only implicate #3 of the five implicates in the 2003 
NSSBF were Winsorized, for reasons described in section 6.4 below. 
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Table 6.5 
2003 NSSBF - Descriptive statistics for numeric variables (implicate #3 only) 
    variable |         N      mean        sd       min       max  skewness  kurtosis 
PCTDISCOUNTS |      1813  57.07612  44.24405         0       100 -.2598099  1.236721 
      OWNEXP |      4055    21.418  11.46508         0        65  .4877799  2.985365 
      OWNSHR |      4064  75.82259  27.25953         8       100 -.4787184  1.665685 
      OWNERS |      4113  6.296377  75.43168         1      3000  31.45647   1124.18 
   UNUSEDLOC |      4110  .3314932  4.828495         0  284.5529  51.47675  2950.333 
  QUICKRATIO |      2920  40.16197  1446.122 -60.37349     77527  52.79333  2825.396 
   RELLENGTH |      4050  136.3719  125.5911         0      1156  1.882428  8.258336 
      RELNUM |      4113  2.852905  1.892542         0        20  1.711853  8.514778 
 PROFTOSALES |      4113 -.0540128  8.113041 -467.9074  79.61104 -49.65651   2765.75 
PROFTOINCOME |      4113  -.056179  7.705224 -467.9074         1 -55.79717  3327.759 
   DEBTRATIO |      4113  .9717951  9.904458         0  455.0789  32.67862  1285.669 
LnOWNWORTH~S |      4064  4.038784  .3513856         0  10.75278  6.709923  79.46949 
 LnUNUSEDLOC |      4110  .1271379  .3252341         0  5.654427   5.85456   56.0604 
    LnTOTEMP |      4113  2.427571  1.429925         0  6.188264  .5625388  2.148041 
LnEXTDEBTT~S |      4113  4.439389  .0825246         0  6.300493 -34.45253  2112.083 
   LnFIRMAGE |      4113  2.482136  .8973857         0  4.634729  -.701151  3.067271 
    LnOWNERS |      4113  .6083013  .8348358         0  8.006368  2.719066  15.27118 
   LnRELDIST |      4050  1.502711  1.358869         0   8.02388  1.673633  7.190012 
     LnSALES |      4113  13.26238  2.248684  7.845808  19.16672  .0249303   2.41746 
LnDEBTTOAS~S |      4113   .436103  .5236238         0  6.135109  3.246911  21.43607 
 LnDEBTRATIO |      4113   .309201  .4946478         0  6.122666  3.968073  28.46316 
LnCASHTOSA~S |      4113  1.626419  .1029663         0  4.766133  14.53024  369.4341 
LnCASHTOAS~S |      4113  2.388514   .190256  .0024007      2.95  1.085783  11.20998 
LnINVESTOS~S |      4113  .0224749  .1325627         0  4.763629  18.33222  494.0478 
LnCURLIBTO~S |      4113  .1993719  .1502584         0   3.55246  9.879758  155.6819 
LnOPEXTOSA~S |      4113  .6153885  .2844496         0  6.152535   6.35001  90.49075 
LnQUICKRATIO |      2920  4.542464  .2518728  3.293698  11.25951  12.80813  252.5891 
   LnARRATIO |      2920  2.843612  .3550259         0  11.22544   8.56013  142.4297 
LnOTRINCTO~S |      4113   .269143  .1438436         0  4.715734  18.13917   462.067 
LnPROFTOSA~S |      4113    1.9219  .0786964   .002781  6.311035  37.62682  2454.155 
LnPROFTOIN~E |      4113  5.546012  .2620957 -.0025357      6.15 -5.935544  94.16668 
 LnCASHRATIO |      2920  6.076206  .1460437         0  9.134718 -19.09024  1120.567 
  LnOTRRATIO |      2920  2.170354   .332077         0  7.564558  7.301879  77.57334 
LnTAXTOSALES |       987  .0077109  .0216044         0  .2674794   5.84322  48.75999 
LnDEPRTOAS~S |      4113   .438048  .1827241         0  1.280474   .591268  2.213468 
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Table 6.6 
2003 NSSBF - Descriptive statistics for Winsorized numeric variables (implicate #3 
only) 
    variable |         N      mean        sd       min       max  skewness  kurtosis 
wLnOWNWORT~S |      4064  4.029828  .2607592  3.931826  5.735924  4.754253  27.73706 
wLnUNUSEDLOC |      4110  .1198957  .2680319         0  1.673976  3.594836  17.77041 
   wLnTOTEMP |      4113  2.425732  1.424221  .6931472  5.673323  .5483114  2.097713 
wLnEXTDEBT~S |      4113  4.439125  .0146717  4.427287  4.538799   4.69352  28.88445 
  wLnFIRMAGE |      4113  2.479929   .893218         0  3.988984 -.7303285  3.049192 
   wLnOWNERS |      4113  .5960671  .7674966         0  3.912023  1.899047  7.634695 
  wLnRELDIST |      4050  1.497759  1.337892         0  6.862758  1.562103  6.517399 
    wLnSALES |      4113  13.25816   2.23922  7.845808  17.94269  .0022758  2.372292 
wLnDEBTTOA~S |      4113  .4277022  .4717202         0  2.621039  2.084373  8.881183 
wLnDEBTRATIO |      4113  .3002441  .4346188         0  2.508437  2.537433  11.20486 
wLnCASHTOS~S |      4113  1.622469  .0430507  1.599098    1.9063   4.59232  27.07929 
wLnCASHTOA~S |      4113  2.390367  .1840355  2.219317      2.95  1.805196  5.409188 
wLnINVESTO~S |      4113  .0166691   .055908  .0036699  .4397372  6.005202   41.7637 
wLnCURLIBT~S |      4113  .1941493  .0976863  .1368559   .740347  3.327257  16.29101 
wLnOPEXTOS~S |      4113  .6069046  .2096193  .0559298  1.603168  .8174081  8.772673 
wLnQUICKRA~O |      2920  4.533491  .1395273   4.46875  5.438605  4.470691   25.6513 
  wLnARRATIO |      2920  2.833581  .2498849  2.707808  4.248443  3.692331  18.14218 
wLnOTRINCT~S |      4113  .2646724  .0742596  .2492946  .8255439  6.460516  46.01996 
wLnPROFTOS~S |      4113  1.922202  .0054989  1.887055   1.93286 -2.890482  20.23552 
wLnPROFTOI~E |      4113  5.553151  .2002153  4.661638  6.105282 -.3686744  7.203466 
wLnCASHRATIO |      2920  6.073819  .0230732   6.06399  6.237202  5.326069  34.18732 
 wLnOTRRATIO |      2920  2.161295  .2431877  2.080483  3.735702  4.665117  26.68125 
wLnTAXTOSA~S |       987  .0071982  .0175825         0  .1145185  3.884959   19.7271 
wLnDEPRTOA~S |      4113  .4377332  .1814546  .2405618  .8171616  .5541507  2.016935 
 
 
6.4 Multiple Imputation 
In addition to requiring the same consideration to sample design and observation 
weights that the 1998 NSSBF databases requires, the 2003 database adds the 
complication of combining multiple implicates for each observation when estimating 
means and standard errors. The 2003 database contains survey data for 4,240 firms.  
However, it uses a multiple-imputation methodology to produce estimates of missing 
variables that produces five implicates for each selected missing variable, resulting in 
five sample observations for each firm in the data set.  Therefore, the total size of the 
sample is 21,240 observations.  Each of the five implicates for each firm observation has 
identical values for each of the non-imputed variables, but different values for each of the 
imputed variables.  The presence of five copies of each firm observation that differ only 
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in their imputed variable values complicates statistical analysis.  If the regression model 
did not include any of the imputed variables, then one could simply choose any one of the 
five implicates for each firm and discard the rest.   
Available statistical software packages contain routines to combine estimated 
regression coefficients and their standard errors obtained from estimating multiple 
imputations, into single estimates and standard errors for each firm, so that valid 
statistical inferences may be made.  A description of the application of these procedures 
to a multiply-imputed database is presented in section 5 of the NSSBF 2003 Codebook.6    
Table 6.7 shows the results of the survey-weighted least squares regression for the 
Trade Credit Discounts model, using the 2003 NSSBF database.  Columns 1 through 5 
shows the estimates and standard errors using only implicates 1 through 5 of the sample.  
Column 6 shows the estimates and standard errors that have been combined using the 
method described in Little and Rubin (2002).  It can be seen that there is a high degree of 
consistency across the regressions regarding the approximate magnitude, sign and 
statistical significance of the regression coefficients.  Since all of the hypotheses tested in 
the three essays require interpretation of only the sign and statistical significance of the 
regression coefficients, this suggests that the regression analysis for the 2003 NSSBF 
database can be carried out by choosing only one implicate, and avoiding the added 
complexity induced by the multiple imputation of missing values.  Implicate #3 was 
chosen for the analysis throughout this dissertation, simply because it has the highest F-
value and R-squared of all of the five regressions listed in table 6.7.   
 
 
                                                 
6 The 2003 NSSBF Codebook can be obtained at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss3/nssbftoc.htm 
  
 
Table 6.7 
Individual implicate and combined regressions, for Trade Credit Discounts model using 2003 NSSBF data  
Implicates drawn from the 2003 NSSBF database 
(PCTDISCOUNTS is the dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Implicate 1 Implicate 2 Implicate 3 Implicate 4 Implicate 5 Combined 
       
FEMOWN 0.990 -0.468 0.463 -0.236 0.434 0.237 
 (5.240) (5.272) (5.264) (5.254) (5.273) (5.300) 
MINOWN -7.596 -6.612 -7.725 -7.639 -7.685 -7.452 
 (7.455) (7.352) (7.511) (7.452) (7.524) (7.477) 
OWNEXP -0.0896 -0.0844 -0.0596 -0.0761 -0.0314 -0.0682 
 (0.149) (0.151) (0.148) (0.150) (0.149) (0.151) 
OWNEDU 0.988 1.164 1.149 1.105 1.208 1.123 
 (0.901) (0.903) (0.904) (0.908) (0.898) (0.907) 
PCACCTNG 1.603 1.350 1.478 1.215 1.583 1.446 
 (6.156) (6.199) (6.117) (6.187) (6.090) (6.153) 
MAINSUPL 6.730** 7.116** 7.053** 6.929** 7.222** 7.010** 
 (3.281) (3.285) (3.267) (3.275) (3.275) (3.283) 
MANUFACTURING -8.424* -7.906 -8.038* -7.905 -8.413* -8.137* 
 (4.860) (4.858) (4.848) (4.850) (4.846) (4.861) 
TRANSPORTATION -9.924 -7.082 -9.868 -8.006 -11.65 -9.306 
 (9.155) (10.11) (9.165) (9.730) (8.930) (9.630) 
WHOLESALE 1.302 1.630 1.506 1.602 1.396 1.487 
 (5.900) (5.872) (5.857) (5.870) (5.870) (5.876) 
RETAIL 9.557* 9.954** 10.23** 10.20** 10.17** 10.02** 
 (4.989) (4.988) (4.971) (4.980) (4.975) (4.990) 
SERVICES 3.156 3.245 3.064 3.204 3.021 3.138 
 (4.909) (4.914) (4.895) (4.916) (4.897) (4.907) 
OWNSHR 0.0115 0.0208 0.0244 0.0167 0.0101 0.0167 
 (0.0898) (0.0899) (0.0892) (0.0899) (0.0898) (0.0900) 
OWNMGR -5.598 -4.980 -4.957 -5.377 -4.553 -5.093 
 (5.074) (5.087) (5.087) (5.092) (5.054) (5.098) 
LnOWNERS -1.831 -1.707 -1.375 -1.776 -1.804 -1.699 
 (2.856) (2.835) (2.818) (2.832) (2.838) (2.843) 
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USEDCARD -13.89** -13.16** -13.73** -13.48** -13.82** -13.62** 
 (5.604) (5.634) (5.607) (5.621) (5.615) (5.626) 
USEDGRACE 9.827** 9.050** 9.751** 9.447** 9.831** 9.581** 
 (4.538) (4.610) (4.543) (4.588) (4.536) (4.578) 
 (5.880) (5.629) (5.659) (5.551) (5.555) (5.665) 
LnPROFTOINCOME -7.875 -7.462 -9.323 -8.260 -6.257 -7.836 
 (8.497) (8.527) (8.596) (8.527) (8.458) (8.609) 
RELLENGTH 0.0397*** 0.0392*** 0.0377*** 0.0394*** 0.0365*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0124) 
RELNUM -0.629 -0.607 -0.653 -0.630 -0.713 -0.646 
 (0.835) (0.844) (0.835) (0.840) (0.834) (0.839) 
DBSCORE -4.708*** -4.749*** -4.563*** -4.614*** -4.568*** -4.640*** 
 (1.094) (1.106) (1.095) (1.103) (1.098) (1.103) 
PAIDLATE -19.46*** -18.82*** -19.72*** -19.17*** -19.39*** -19.31*** 
 (3.615) (3.624) (3.606) (3.611) (3.615) (3.633) 
LnDEBTRATIO 0.988 0.393 0.741 0.553 0.825 0.700 
 (4.075) (4.098) (4.078) (4.112) (4.125) (4.105) 
Constant 80.45 77.93 87.21 83.87 71.76 80.24 
 (54.55) (54.45) (54.47) (54.37) (53.94) (54.74) 
       
Observations 3906 3905 3905 3905 3904 3904 
R-squared 0.194 0.189 0.194 0.191 0.194  
Model df 24 24 24 24 24  
Residual df 3834 3833 3833 3833 3832  
F statistic 9.256 8.944 9.277 9.002 9.186  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions use survey-weighted least squares with std errors calculated using Taylor Linearization 
algorithm 
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